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Introduction: Setting a Precedent for
Regional Revolution: The West Florida Revolt
Considered
by Samuel C. Hyde, Jr.
n the course of its historical development, Florida has
endured shifting and contested lines of demarcation. Few
casual observers and likely a large percentage of the recent
transplants to the Sunshine State, realize that Florida's borders
once extended far beyond the current confines of the state.
Many students of history are surprised to learn that Florida once
included a significant portion of Louisiana. On the eve of the
bicentennial of the Louisiana Purchase in 2003, scholars were
hard pressed to explain to a skeptical public that all of the Bayou
State was not a part of the Purchase. Despite President Thomas
Jefferson's instructions, his negotiating agents failed to secure the
territory situated between the Mississippi and Pearl rivers - the
"toe" of Louisiana. It would take a little known armed insurrection,
ironically referred to as the West Florida Revolt, to complete the
current configuration of Louisiana.
Arguably the most strategically important territory in the entire
region, "West Florida" as Louisiana's Florida Parishes were then
known, enjoyed an extremely colorful, and convoluted, pattern of
development. One of the only known territories within the modern

I

Samuel C. Hyde, Jr. is a Professor of History at Southeastern Louisiana University,
Director of the Center for Southeast Louisiana Studies and the Leon Ford Endowed
Chair in Regional Studies. He is the author of five books, including Pistols and
Politics: The Dilemma of Democracy in Louisiana's Florida Parishes, 1810-1899 (1997).
He also has produced 5 films, including "Reluctant Americans: The West Florida
Revolt, Completing the Louisiana Purchase," (2003).

[121]
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United States that witnessed governance by each of the major
European powers that intruded into the North American wilderness,
the inhabitants found stability extremely elusive. Successive periods
of governance by France, Britain, and Spain contributed to a chaotic
cauldron of divided loyalties, overlapping land claims, and differing
perspectives on the nature and purpose of government. 1
The various colonial administrations differed significantly
in their commitment to and vision for West Florida. Other than
establishing some rudimentary trade networks with the local Native
American population, the original French claimants of the territory
invested few resources in regional development. Mter being lost to
Britain in 1763 as a result of the treaty concluding the French and
Indian War, the first substantive efforts at development of the region
were formulated. British initiatives were just gaining momentum
when the American Revolution offered an unprecedented challenge
to their colonial authority. In support of the American rebels, the
Spanish governor at New Orleans, Bernardo de Galvez, launched
a 1779 military campaign that "liberated" the territory from British
authority adding it to the dominions of Spain. It is the Spanish period
that contributed the most to defining an identity in West Florida. 2
While Spain savored the ejection of rival Britain from the Gulf
Coast, the limited resources and absence of precious metals in
the territory rendered the region little more than a buffer zone
against the encroaching Americans. Spain, accordingly, devoted
only limited resources to maintaining the territory which in
itself did much to define regional identity. The only significant
Spanish garrison remained at Pensacola with a smaller posting
at Mobile, both of which remained painfully distant from the
woefully inadequate garrison on the Mississippi River at Baton
Rouge. Typically manned by no more than 28 to 30 soldiers, the
fortification at Baton Rouge revealed Spain's imperial weakness
in the region. Other than a half dozen soldiers stationed at the
town of St. Francisville just below the 31 sl parallel border with the
1.

For descriptions of the chaotic pattern of development see, Samuel C. Hyde,
Pistols and Politics: The Dilemma of Democracy in Louisiana's Florida Parishes,
1810-1899 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996) ; Alvin L.
Bertrand, The Many Louisianas: Rural Social Areas and Cultural Islands (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1955).
Robin Fabel, The Economy of British West Florida, 1763-1783 (Tuscaloosa:
University of Alabama Press, 1988); KingS. Robinson, "Sustaining the Glory:
Spain's Melting Pot Army in the Lower Mississippi Valley 1779-1781," Southeast
Louisiana Review, I (Fall 2008), 5-23.

Jr.,

2.
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East and West Florida. Map provided by the Edwin Davis Collection, the Center for
Southeast Louisiana Studies, Southeastern Louisiana University.

neighboring Mississippi Territory, and an equally small contingent
occasionally stationed at the key port village of Springfield near
Lake Maurepas, Spain projected little power and offered even less
protection to regional residents. 3
Spain's hold on the territory and the unwillingness, or inability,
to offer assertive legal authority rendered the area ripe for turmoil.
The discontent of long abused Native Americans occasionally
flared into violence as did the transgressions of vagrants who
entered and exited the territory virtually unmolested. The absence
of territorial stability and effective governance made the region a
veritable magnet for deserters and desperadoes eager to reside in a
region practically devoid of the rule of law. 4
As Spain succumbed to the power of Napoleonic expansion,
the Louisiana Territory was retroceded to the French who in 1803
3.

4.

For discussion of Spanish colonial authority in the area see, Isaac J Cox, The
West Florida Controversy, 1798-1813: A Study in American Diplomacy (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1918) ; Stanley C. Arthur, The Story of the West Florida
Rebellion (St. Francisville, LA: The St. Francisville Democrat, 1935). For
a broader discussion of Spanish colonial rule in Louisiana see, Gilbert C.
Din, The Spanish Presence in Louisiana, 1763-1803 (Lafayette, LA., Center for
Louisiana Studies, 1996).
H yde, Pistols and Politics, 19-20.
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promptly offered it for sale to the United States. Though the North
Americans secured the vast territory included in the Louisiana
Purchase, they failed to obtain West Florida which remained under
the authority of Spain.
The omission of West Florida, or more specifically that region
between the Pearl and Mississippi rivers, from the Louisiana
Purchase stimulated intense maneuvering in the territory. Amid
the intrigues of French, British, and American agents, three distinct
factions emerged among the regional residents. The first group, best
known as the American faction, clearly resented the exclusion of the
territory from the Louisiana Purchase. This group, concentrated in
the more affluent Feliciana district and in the environs neighboring
Baton Rouge, openly advocated annexation by the United States. 5
Spanish loyalists constituted the second group. Residents allied
with this faction typically enjoyed lucrative Spanish land grants
that would be jeopardized by American annexation. These people
likewise enjoyed the relative tax free existence proffered by the
Spanish as well as the absence of burdens normal to citizenship,
such as jury duty and political participation, which the Americans
were certain to expect. Perhaps most significant, the limits of
Spanish authority allowed residents to live largely unmolested by
interference from government, a quality fondly embraced by many
fiercely independent residents of West Florida. Spanish loyalists
were concentrated primarily in the western piney woods region of
the territory and included substantive majorities of the population
along the Natalbany, Tangipahoa, and Tchefuncte river regions.
This area of West Florida served as home to many former British
loyalists who, facing persecution along the eastern seaboard in the
aftermath of the American Revolution, had migrated to the territory
specifically because it was not controlled by the Americans. 6

5.

New England Palladium, September 18, 1804; Cox, The West Florida Controversy,

6.

William Cooper to Vincente Folch, September 12, 1810, and unsigned, undated
official Spanish report noting Spanish loyalists in the Natalbany River region ,
in Papales de Cuba, Legajo 1568 B, Letters No. 982 and 735, in the West Florida
Collection, Library of Congress (hereafter cited as LOC); Sheperd Brown to
Vincente Folch, September 28, 1810, copy in West Florida Collection, Center
for Southeast Louisiana Studies, Southeastern Louisiana University (hereafter
cited as SLU); Sam Baldwin to Philemon Thomas, October 12, 1810, Elizabeth
K Dart Collection, Mss. 5023, Louisiana and Lower Mississippi Collection,
Louisiana State University (hereafter cited as LLMVC); Cox, The West Florida
Controversy, 412; Hyde, Pistols and Politics, 12-13, 18-22.

152-67.
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The final group may be best known as the Independents. This
faction cautiously flirted with the possibilities that could arise from
the creation of an independent nation. Many among this group,
such as the notorious Kemper brothers, had issues with the Spanish
but likewise remained suspicious of the Americans. If viable, an
independent nation could offer abundant land and political
possibilities while also serving as a bargaining chip in negotiations
with foreign powers in the eyes of would be deal makers. This
group included many of the best known political chameleons of
the Revolt and their adherents could be found across the territory. 7
It is amid such high stakes posturing that the West Florida
Revolt erupted in the fall of 1810. This volume of the Florida
Historical Quarterly is designed to offer fresh interpretations from
a variety of perspectives on the emergence of the short lived,
original Lone Star Republic and its legacy. It is structured to offer
consideration of the Revolt as it affected the immediate region,
surrounding territories, and American foreign policy. In short, its
purpose is to offer a comprehensive assessment of the implications
the West Florida Revolt carried for affected players and regions of
North America that serves both as a useful tool for scholars while
also providing an enlightening read for the general public. 8
Definitions prove critical to understanding the course of
events connected to the Revolt and, accordingly, they serve as a
primary focus of Jim Cusick's lead article. While the region on
the eve of the Revolt has long been considered a frontier, Cusick
argues instead that West Florida is more appropriately viewed as a
borderland subject due to the peculiar circumstances that make
such regions distinctive. In so arguing, Cusick finds a logical
connection between events in West Florida and the instability
7.

8.

Frederick Kimball to Dear Nephew, August 15, 1806, and Kimball to Dear
Friends, March 5, 1811, in Frederick Kimball Letters, LLMVC. For an animated
discussion of the Kempers from the perspective of a journalist see, Arthur, The
Story of the West Florida Rebellion.
Existing literature detailing events connected to the West Florida Revolt
include, Arthur, The Story of the West Florida Rebellion; Cox, The West Florida
Controversy; William C. Davis, The Rogue Republic: How Would-be Patriots Waged the
Shortest Revolution in American History (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt,
2011); F. Andrew McMichael, Atlantic Layalties: Americans in Spanish West Florida
1785-1810 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2008); David A. Bice, The Original
Lone Star Republic: Scoundrels, Statesmen, and Schemers of the 1810 West Florida
Rebellion (Clanton, AL.: Heritage Publishing Consultants, 2004); Samuel C.
H yde, Jr., "Consolidating the Revolution: Factionalism and Finesse in the West
Florida Revolt, 1810," Louisiana History, LI, no. 3 (Summer, 2010).
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that characterized development in East Florida. The similarities
in development between East and West Florida help explain why
certain aspects of society, such as political inclinations and patterns
of violence, render the modern Florida Parishes of Louisiana
seemingly more akin to current north Florida rather than the
remainder of Louisiana.
A very different perspective on developments in West Florida
emanated from Washington D. C. where the Madison administration
flirted with a U.S. claim on the territory resulting from the
Louisiana Purchase. Possession it is said remains 9 I 10 of the law and
however tenuous its hold, Spain clearly retained possession of the
territory. The West Florida Revolt changed all that and President
James Madison worried that the infant nation could fall under
the control of a hostile foreign power, most notably Britain. In his
contribution to understanding the implications of the West Florida
Revolt, Steve Belko looks past the posturing and instead focuses
on a critical legacy of the Revolt - the "No Transfer" policy and its
implications for American foreign affairs. According to Belko, the
No Transfer policy "provided the ideological foundations and the
diplomatic justification for future annexation of foreign territory"
by the Americans. Incorporated as an integral ingredient of the
Monroe Doctrine of 1823, the issuance of the No Transfer policy
in 1811 arguably revealed that Manifest Destiny began not in the
1840s but instead barely seven years after the Louisiana Purchase
with Madison's response to the West Florida Revolt. Madison's
decision to dispatch armed forces by both land and sea to seize West
Florida demonstrated America's willingness to adopt expansionist
policies that undoubtedly encouraged later risings against Spanish
authority in Texas, California, and elsewhere.9
9.

American land and sea operations culminated in West Florida with CaptainJohn
Shaw's expedition to suppress lingering discontent along the Tchefuncte River
in March 1811. For descriptions of operations see, John Shaw to Honorable
T. Hamilton, January 3, 1811 , Shaw to Lt. George Merrill, December 30, 1810,
and Shaw to Thomas Cunningham, March 19, 1811 , all in John Shaw Letter
Book, Donald Sharp Collection , SLU; William C. C. Claiborne to Robert Smith ,
December 12, 1810, in Dunbar Rowland (ed.) , Official L etter Books of William
C. C. Claiborne, 1801-1816, 6 vols.Qackson: Mississippi State Department of
Archives and History, 1917) 5:53-6; David Holmes to Robert Smith, January 1,
1811, Clarence E. Carter ( ed.), The Territorial Papers of the United States, 28 vols.
(Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1934-62) 9:913.
For an example of discontent with the American occupation of the territory in
the Feliciana District see, Josiah Lawton to My Dear and Honored Sir, March
10, 1811 ,Josiah Lawton Letters, LLMVC.
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The West Florida Revolt then arguably stimulated a domino effect
of revolution that contributed to freedom from Spanish colonial
authority in much of the western hemisphere. Popular risings led
to a string of independent nations that were each, by one means or
another, incorporated into the United States. Yet whether the West
Florida Republic should actually be considered an independent
nation serves as the focus of Cody Scallions' contribution. As scholars
have begun focusing more intensely on the relevance of the West
Florida Revolt, some skeptics, including many Texans, have cringed
at the thought that there was a Lone Star Republic prior to that
in Texas. Some have questioned the legitimacy of an independent
nation in West Florida. Much of the controversy centers on whether
the West Florida rebels created a viable governmental structure that
enjoyed some popular support in its own right, or whether it existed
merely to facilitate American annexation. 10
Relying on little used sources of primary evidence along with
many long identified sources, Scallions argues that the rebels created
a brief yet sovereign nation sustained by a viable government. As
initial fears of a Spanish counter-strike against the province subsided,
some West Florida officials including the governor, Fulwar Skipwith,
moved away from calls for American annexation, preferring instead
to explore the benefits of independence. William C. C. Claiborne's
arrival at the head of American infantry and naval forces constituted
nothing less than an invasion, in Scallions' analysis, and one of the
first acts of American imperialism.
Policies and actions initiated by the West Florida Convention
suggest that the rebels at least were acting to keep all possibilities
open. As the Convention transitioned into a revolutionary
government, its leaders made clear which colonial land grants
would be honored and which would be nullified. The critical need
for security led the rebels to engage in some expansionist activities
of their own. The actual parameters of the infant republic have
10.

A variety of correspondence reveals the confusion and consternation of some,
including scholars and amateur history buffs alike, concerning the West Florida
Republic. See the email correspondence maintained in the West Florida Revolt
Collection (SLU) dated October 25 and 27, 2004, October 31, 2005, May 24
and 26, 2010; Leroy E. Willie, The West Florida Revolution Controversy: 1810 (selfpublished ms., 2007); New Orleans Times Picayune, May 1, 2005 ; Baton Rouge
Advocate, December 30, 2007. For a scholarly assessment suggesting that the
Republic was merely a transition period to American control see J. C. A. Stagg,
Borderlines in Borderlands: james Madison and the Spanish American Frontier, 17761821 (New Haven: Yale University Press,2009) , 41-54.
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long confused history buffs and scholars alike. In the past some
have argued that the republic extended into the modern state of
Florida. Indeed, in Santa Rosa County and more specifically the
town of Milton, Florida, debate still surrounds the moniker "City
Six Flags."
·of
What is the sixth flag displayed in Milton that bears
the lone white star on a field of blue? The truth is the West Florida
rebels would have eagerly embraced the remaining portions ofWest
Florida east of the Pearl River if they could have. As the thoughts
of some rebels turned to the potential value of an independent
nation, their actions revealed the certainty of strength in numbers
and territory. After establishing a bicameral legislature, electing
a governor, suppressing Spanish loyalists, and initiating efforts to
advance their legal authority in the territory between the Mississippi
and Pearl rivers, the West Florida government dispatched a small
army under "Colonel" Reuben Kemper to bring the central Gulf
Coast, including the town of Mobile, under their authority. 11
The rebels had reason to believe that the "Star," as they titled
their cause, enjoyed considerable support east of the Pearl River.
Word had reached Baton Rouge that Anglo settlers in the vicinity
of Fort Stoddert, across the line in the Mississippi Territory north
of Mobile Bay, had formed the "Mobile Society" with the intent to
storm and sack the Spanish fort in that town. True to expectations,
as Kemper's force advanced across the modern Mississippi Gulf
Coast, significant numbers of settlers flocked to join while others,
especially French residents and friends of the Horton family who
had feuded with the Kempers earlier near Pinckneyville, Mississippi,
fled to the Spanish fort at Mobile. 12

11.

Santa Rosa's Press Gazette, April 15 and 19, 201; Official instructions authorizing
Reuben Kemper to proceed east of the Pearl River and induce the inhabitants
there "to support the independence of this Commonwealth," October 11, 1810.
See also entry dated October 10, 1810 in journal of the West Flarida Convention,
1810, West Florida Collection, Library of Congress, hereafter cited as LOC;
Harry Toulrnin to James Madison, November 28,1810, in Carter, The Territnrial
Papers, 4:140-43; Fulwar Skipwith to Joseph Collins, December 4, 1810, in James
A. Padgett, ed., "The West Florida Revolution of 1810 as Told in the Letters of
John Rhea, Fulwar Skipwith, Reuben Kemper, and Others," Louisiana Historical
Quarterly, 21 , no. 1 (January 1938) , 136-7.
12. journal of the West Florida Convention, 1810, October 10, 1810, LOC; Sterling
Dupree to Reuben Kemper and John Gray to Kemper, both November 18,
1810, James A. Padgett (ed.) "The West Florida Revolution," 118; Harry
Toulmin to James Madison, November 28, 1810 and December 6, 1810,
"Petition of Joseph Kennedy for Writ of Habeas Corpus," December 1, 1810,
all in Carter, The Territorial Papers, 4:140-143.
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These residents had good reason to be fearful. Not only was
Kemper known to maintain a "terrifying persona," but also during
the earlier expedition to cow opponents at Springfield, the rebels
had indulged in an "extravagance of brutality." Spanish loyalists
saw their homes burned and stock slaughtered. One Spanish
official report indicated that at least one man had been burned
alive by the rebels. The bulk of their wrath was directed at staunch
Spanish loyalist William Cooper who was known to have pleaded
with the Spanish governor at Pensacola, Vincente Folch, to send
aid to the Loyalists. Although tradition has it that Cooper was
murdered by the rebels, an interpretation included in even the
most recent studies, newly emerging evidence suggests that Cooper
may have only been wounded and cowed into silence by the rebels.
Regardless, Kemper's reputation and the acts of the rebels inspired
fear in the territory. 13
Kemper's aggression and legendary determination had served
him well in earlier efforts to intimidate those in opposition to his
adventures. As his small force advanced into modem-day Alabama,
he encountered perhaps his most formidable opponent in the form
of territorial judge Harry Toulmin. Raised in a Unitarian household
in Somersetshire, England, Toulmin was as highly cultured as he was
educated. Mter coming to America in 1792, he served as secretary
of state in Kentucky from 1796-1804. Appointed federal judge of the
Tombigbee district of the Mississippi Territory in 1804, Toulmin later
crafted the first codified law for Mississippi and Alabama. His term
of service at Fort Stoddert required determination and courage.
In addition to frequent brushes with regional Indians along with
brigands and deserters of many types, he famously arrested Aaron
Burr in 1807 for conspiracy to create an independent state in the

13.

Unsigned, undated official Spanish report that details outrages committed
against Spanish loyalists in the Natalbany River region including the
slaughtering of livestock, destruction of property, and the burning of "Mosen
Rofrey," Papales de Cuba, Legajo 1568, Letter No. 735. The 1820 Spanish
census of Pensacola lists a William Cooper whose birthplace, age, and the
names of his children are consistent with the Spanish loyalist in West Florida.
Moreover, the family tradition of Angela Pope Reid, direct descendant of
Cooper, holds that Cooper was wounded and threatened with death to remain
silent by the rebels before he fled to Pensacola. See Angela Pope Reid Letters,
West Florida Collection, SLU. Harry Toulmin to James Madison, December 6,
1810, in Carter, The TerritorialPapers, 4:149-51. For an example of the inclusion
of Cooper's murder in recent studies see, Davis, The Rngue Republic, 196.
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southwest. In short, he was exactly the type of man the United States
needed on the spot as Kemper's party reached the area.14
When Kemper arrived in November 1810, relations were initially
cordial between the two men. But when Kemper commissioned
Joseph Kennedy, leader of the Mobile Society, as a colonel in his
military force, Toulmin and the American officers at Fort Stoddert
recoiled at the thought of the regional instability such an alliance
would likely initiate. Increasing numbers of local residents eager
to be rid of the exactions required by the Spanish in order to
trade at Mobile, cautiously linked themselves to Kemper. Toulmin,
convinced that if the Spanish were driven from Mobile the British
would seize the territory, came out openly against Kemper's plan for
conquest. When Governor Folch arrived from Pensacola and failed
to stimulate visible support for the Spanish, Kemper concluded
that the mass of residents were eager to support "the Star" and
that only "the villainous exertions of Judge Toulmin, that base
devil filled with deceptive and bloody rascality" prevented a mass
uprising. At a stormy November 25, 1810, meeting with Toulmin,
Kemper advised the judge that he was determined to raise the Star
below the United States territorial line. In response, Toulmin wrote
President Madison that the Mississippi militia, which had been
loyal to the U.S. the previous summer, now sided with Kemper, as
did a majority of the people. He also urged the Spanish at Mobile
to request protection from the United States.15
An American delegation from Fort Stoddert sought to assure
Folch that American citizens participating in filibustering activities
against the Spanish would be punished. In return, Folch promised
to cease levying duties on American goods traded in his district.
Despite such efforts at cooperation, both sides realized that neither
exercised much influence or authority over the West Florida rebels.
14. J.D. Bowers, Peter Hughes, Dan McKanan, and Kathleen Parker, eds.,
Dictionary of Unitarian and Universalist Biography, "Harry Toulmin," http: / I
www25.uua.org/ uuhs/ duub/ articles/ harrytoulmin.html (accessed June 24,
2011); Cox, The WestFlorida Controversy, 176-7,203,461.
15. Harry Toulmin to James Madison, November 28 and December 6, 1810,
"Petition of Joseph Kennedy for Writ of Habeas Corpus, December 1, 1810,
Carter, The Territorial Papers, 4: 140-43, 149-51 , 158-59; Reuben Kemper to John
Rhea, December 16, 1810, Padgett, "The West Florida Revolution," 153; Cox,
The West Florida Controversy, 457-69. Not only was Kemper known to exact brutal
vengeance on those who interfered with his plans, but he was alleged to weigh
more than 200 pounds and to stand more than six feet tall. See James A. Padgett,
ed., "Official Records of the West Florida Revolution and Republic," Louisiana
Historical Quarterly, 21, no. 2, (April1938), 747.
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Indeed, Kemper moved to make clear his independence from
both the Spanish and the Americans. As the American delegation
returned from the meeting with Folch, a rebel patrol intercepted
_them and arrested two messengers from Toulmin accompanying
the delegation as alleged deserters. 16
In an effort to cow local residents into accepting the authority
of the West Florida government, Kemper's men went house to
house about the countryside forcing residents to state their loyalty
amid threats against those opposed to their efforts. When the rebels
learned that American officials north of the line planned to stop a
boat carrying supplies for the West Floridians, Kemper boldly dared
them to try. The rebels established a "moving camp" along the east
bank of Mobile Bay as Kemper frantically wrote Baton Rouge to
forward additional troops. The aggressive activities of the rebels
now made them their own worst enemy. As Kemper's men sought
additional adherents among the population, they inspired more
terror than sympathy. Frustrated, Kemper sent a final insulting
note to Folch, who belatedly moved to confront the rebels. The
moving camp strategy thwarted Folch's initial plan, but now under
pressure, Kemper agreed to a meeting with the Americans and
when he arrived, Toulmin had him arrested. Folch then moved
against Kemper's dwindling army of little more than two dozen
men near Saw Mill Creek. In the ensuing skirmish, two Spaniards
and four rebels were killed and Folch secured seven prisoners as
well as capturing the rebels' supplies and standard, ensuring the
demise of the Lone Star at Mobile. 17
The remnants of the rebel force withdrew toward Pascagoula
where additional supporters of the Star had gathered. This motley
army successfully repulsed and chased a pursuing party of Spaniards
back to Mobile which soothed their pride somewhat and offered a
bit of hope that the cause might yet be viable. While maneuvering
continued west of Mobile, the real coup was taking place along the
Mississippi River. William C. C. Claiborne's arrival at Pointe Coupee,
across the river from the West Florida capital at St. Francisville,
revealed American determination to seize the territory by any means
necessary. Claiborne, at the head of an American force augmented
by the Mississippi Territorial Militia and a five gunboat flotilla under
16. Cox, The West Florida Controversy, 4 72-5.
17. John Nicholson to John Rhea, December 17, 1810, Mills and Audibert to
Fulwar Skipwith, December 10, 1810, Padgett, "The West Florida Revolution,
150-2, 154-5; Cox, The West Florida Controversy, 477, 480-4.
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Captain john Shaw, quickly forced the lowering of the Lone Star at
St. Francisville and then advanced on Baton Rouge. As the gunboats
dropped anchor in the river and trained their guns on the fort,
~kipwith, who had promised to die in defense of the Star even if only
twenty men would support him, reluctantly agreed to lower the flag
to prevent a massacre. Thus fell the Lone Star republicP 8
The demise of the West Florida Republic may have been
inglorious, but the implications of its rise and fall were many.
Spanish colonial power was proven weak and unimaginative.
Moreover, even in a region where significant numbers of the
population were known to favor continued association with
Spain, a determined group of filibusters had achieved their goal.
Significantly, the Americans had proven willing to risk provoking
the wrath of international powers by supporting the Revolt, and
even more so by seizing the territory once it had succeeded.
The success of the enterprise also contributed significantly to
the emergence of a more assertive American foreign policy that
ultimately extended to the No Transfer policy and the Monroe
Doctrine, as well as offering a precedent for American imperialism.
Perhaps most significant, the Revolt and its resolution offered a
shining example to the world of the possibilities inherent in such
risk taking. It is no simple coincidence that the modern flag of
Texas bears the lone star. Finally, the Revolt initiated a long
tradition of suspicion of government, and concomitant willingness
to violently resist established authority, that would become the
defining characteristic of much of the territory that fell within
the borders of the fledgling nation. For more than a century after
the Revolt, Louisiana's Florida Parishes would endure some of the
highest rates of rural homicide recorded in American history, all
amid an ineffective and little respected legal system. The research
possibilities connected to the Revolt and its legacy seem boundless.
This edition of the Florida Historical Quarterly seeks to answer
questions and encourage critical thinking about a little publicized
event in American history that carried profound implicationsP 9
18.

19.

Fulwar Skipwith to William C. C. Claiborne, December 10, 1810,John Nicolson
to Rhea, December 17, 1810, Skipwith to John Graham, December 23, 1810,
Skipwith to Constituents,April1, 1811, Padgett, "The West Florida Revolution,"
149-50, 154-5, 156-7; 171-76; John Shaw to Honorable T. Hamilton, January
3, 1811 and Shaw to Lt. George Merrill, December 30, 1810, in John Shaw
Letterbook, SLU.
For discussion of the pattern of violence and contempt for authority that
endured in Louisiana's Florida Parishes see, Hyde, Pistols and Politics.
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Some Thoughts on Spanish East and West
Florida as Borderlands
by James G. Cusick
Andrew McMichael points out in Atlantic Loyalties, the
eastern Spanish borderlands of Louisiana and the Floridas
uffered constant upheaval in the 40 years between 1778
and 1818. During those years, some fourteen different episodes
of conspiracy, revolt, or invasion shook colonial society, beginning
with the raids ofJames Willing in 1778 and carrying on through the
First Seminole War of 1817-1818 (see Table 1) .1 Although several of
these upheavals stemmed from general warfare in the region, many
were instigated by fairly small groups of men who played upon the
discontent of fellow settlers or who drew on a base of support that
lay across an international boundary line and beyond the reach of
Spanish law. Often these upheavals took on the character of personal
feuds against Spanish functionaries and their friends rather than of
genuine political revolt. In 1804, for example, the Kemper brothers
of the New Feliciana district, West Florida, led a series of raids to
disrupt Spanish control of the area. McMichael, in his analysis of
their actions, concluded that " [their] raids were less about protorevolutionary sentiments among West Floridians than about the
nature of the people attracted to the borderlands." 2 What was that
nature? In part, it consisted of clan loyalty, contempt for authority,

A

James G. Cusick is Curator of the P.K. Yonge Library of Florida History at the
University of Florida. He is the author of The Other War of 1812: The Patriot War and
the American Invasion of East Florida (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2007) and
is currently President-elect of the Florida Historical Society.
1.
Andrew F. McMichael, Atlantic Loyalties: Americans in Spanish West Florida, 17851810 (Athens: UniversityofGeorgiaPress, 2008), 79
2.
Ibid., 77.
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Table 1. Upheaval in Louisiana and the Floridas 3
James Willing

West Florida and Louisiana

1778

Francisco de Miranda

Louisiana and the Floridas

1781

East Florida Rebellion

East Florida

1795

Kemper Revolt

West Florida

1804

William Augustus Bowles

East and West Florida

1788-1803

Aaron Burr

Louisiana and West Florida

1806

West Florida Revolution

West Florida

1810

Patriot War

East Florida

1812-1813

Col. George Nixon

West Florida

1814

War of 1812

West Florida and Louisiana

1812-1815

Destruction of Negro Fort

East and West Florida

1816

Gregor Macgregor / Luis Aury

East Florida

1817

American Occupation of Amelia Island

East Florida

1817

First Seminole War

East Florida

1817-1818

and a willingness to use violence to settle disputes. William Davis, in
his recent book on the West Florida revolt of 1810, rendered a similar
opinion of the Kempers. They were like many American settlers, he
noted, who entered the Spanish borderlands out of self-interest and
were inclined to show little patience toward any regulations that
blocked it. "A king's failure to treat an American citizen the way that
American expected to be treated in his own United States could be
the catalyst for rebellion," Davis observed, "especially if the king's
action resulted in the frustration of an individual's ambitions to
prosper." 4
Indeed, throughout the years in question, the Spanish
borderlands were plagued with individuals whose highest loyalty
was to self. In some cases, this led influential men into collaboration
with local Spanish officials. Take, for example, the case of James
Wilkinson, an American military officer. Upon passing into the
Spanish borderlands to enrich himself through commerce, he
found it relatively easy to set aside his fealty to the United States and
become an agent of Spain's monarchy. In 1787, he proposed a plan
to Spanish officials in Louisiana, arguing that he could persuade the
inhabitants of Kentucky to join the Spanish empire if Spain granted
3.
4.

Modified from Andrew F. McMichael, Atlantic Loyalties: Americans in Spanish
West Florida, 1785-1810 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2008), 79.
William C. Davis, The Rogue Republic, How Would-Be Patriots Waged the Shortest
Revolution in American History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011), xiv.
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them free use of the Mississippi River. He explained his shift in
allegiance in this matter-of-fact way: "Born and educated in America,
I embraced its cause in the last revolution, and remained throughout
faithful, until its triumph over its enemies. This occurrence has now
... left me at liberty, having fought for her happiness, to seek my
own. [But] circumstances and the policies of the United States
having made it impossible for me to obtain this desired end under
its Government, I am resolved to seek it in Spain." 5
Far more common than men like Wilkinson, however, were
men like the Kempers -Anglo-American settlers with strong desires
for self-aggrandizement and little regard for the morass of Spanish
regulations and bureaucracy that bedeviled their attempts to get land
or engage in commerce. The Spanish Floridas saw the rise and fall of
many agitators and malcontents, men like Edmund Genet, William
Augustus Bowles, George Mathews, and Gregor MacGregor, among
others. Yet few of them had the resources or the military credentials
to overthrow governments. In more settled and densely populated
places, their disruption of the social order would probably have been
crushed by the local sheriff or a band of energetic citizens with a
noosed rope. But no sooner did one disappear-into exile, death, or
a cell-than another came along. This article examines some of the
factors in borderland life that fostered such men.
Why were the Spanish Floridas such fertile ground for social
upheaval in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries? Some
of the circumstances that favored these movements came from the
general progress of events in Europe and their effects on colonies in
Spanish America. During the early 1800s, the Napoleonic wars rewrote
traditional alliances among the European powers, strained relations
between the United States, Britain, and France, and pealed out a death
knell for the Spanish empire. A weak Spanish government, constantly
under threat from French armies, forged a temporary alliance with
Britain. However, as battles went against Spain, its monarchy was
forced back into a policy of appeasing France and Napoleon. Part
of this policy included the promise to return the Louisiana territory
to French sovereignty. For a variety of reasons, this stratagem only
produced additional problems for Spain. France, having acquired
Louisiana, ignored stipulations against its transfer to another country
5.

Andro Linklater, An Artist in Treason, The Extraordinary Double Life of General
James Wilkinson, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Army and Agent 13 in the Spanish
Secret Service (New York: Walker Publishing Company, 2009) , 87.
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and sold it to the United States under the Louisiana Purchase. The
transfer of territory altered the balance of power in North America,
driving a wedge of American settlers between the Spanish colonies of
the Floridas and Texas. It also spawned acrimonious disputes between
Spain and the United States about the legality of the transfer and
about the boundaries of Louisiana. AsJ.C.A. Stagg has discussed, while
Spanish ministers protested the entire legitimacy of the Purchase,
American statesmen pushed forward a case for including West Florida
and portions of Texas within its provisions. 6
Ultimately, the loss of Louisiana undermined Spain's control of its
remaining possessions in North America and at the same time failed
to guarantee it any protection from French aggression in Europe. In
1808, Napoleon forced the Spanish royal family to renounce its rights to
the crown and placed Spain under military occupation. By 1810, when
portions of Spanish West Florida broke free of Spain by revolt, Spain's
future as an autonomous nation seemed on the point of political
extinction. Its monarch was a prisoner, the French were gradually
overcoming all opposition to control of the Iberian Peninsula, and a
regency government, established by Spanish loyalists to oppose French
rule, was besieged at Cadiz. For colonists in the Floridas, as for other
colonists throughout Spanish America, d1e future seemed to hold only
three possibilities: independence, attachment to Britain or France,
or incorporation into the United States. At the same time, American
citizens in the southern United States saw Spain's misfortunes as an
invitation to rid themselves of the unwelcome presence of Spanish
colonists and government officials at their borders. 7
Land hunger, and especially a desire to annex territory from
the Creek and other Native American powers of the Southeast,
also fed a willingness by borderland settlers to use armed force to
achieve their goals. "The ever-aggressive American frontiersmen ,
continuously pressing into Indian territory, always encroached on
6.

7.

Paul E. H offman , Florida's Frontiers (Bloomington : Indian a U niversity Press,
2002), 260-261; James G. Cusick, The Other War of 1812: The Patriot War and the
American Invasion of Spanish East Florida (Athen s: University of Georgia Press,
200 7), 16-1 9; J.C.A. Stagg, Borderlines in Borderlands: j ames Madison and the
Spanish-American Frontier, 1776-1821 (New H aven , CT.: Yale U niversi ty Press,
2009), 38-47.
Frank Lawren ce Owsley, Jr. a nd Ge n e A. Smi th, Filibusters and Expansionists,
Jeff ersonian Manifest Destiny, 1800-1 821 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama
Press, 1997), 181-190; Cusick, Other War, 38-55; McMichael, A tlantic Loyalties,
55-60. Gabriel H . Lovett, Napoleon and the Birth of Modem Spain, Vol. 1: The
Challenge to the Old Order (New York: New York University Press, 1965), 85-1 32.
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the weakly held Spanish borderlands," observed Owsley and Smith
in Filibusters and Expansionists. Other motives for destabilizing the
border zone stemmed from American antipathy toward British
interference in North America. As noted by William Belko in his
study of the First Seminole War, Americans distrusted and resented
even nominal British presence along the Gulf Coast. 8 Since Spain
relied heavily on British aid during the Napoleonic era, American
hostility to one often meant hostility towards both; and the place
where the interests of Spain and Britain seemed to coalesce was
on the borders of the American South. "The spectre of the British
presence in North America-always a mantra of antebellum
Americans-. . . provided a powerful impetus for Americans to
seize the Floridas," Belko notes. "In the end, however, it was the
Spanish and the Seminole who paid the heavy price." 9
These larger concerns certainly promoted and sustained a state
of social unrest in the Floridas and also fueled thoughts of forcibly
ejecting Spanish authorities from the region. "The weakening
Spanish empire acted as a magnet to expansionists in the United
States," observed Owlsey and Smith. "This troubled water offered an
excellent occasion for employment to anyone interested in seeking
his fortune as a soldier, privateer, pirate, or filibuster." 10 But were
the causes of unrest in the Floridas rooted solely in these particular
historical circumstances? As Owsley and Smith have noted, social
upheaval in the Floridas predated the Napoleonic era. For most of
the eighteenth century, the inhabitants of the borderlands from
the Florida peninsula to the Mississippi River knew few years of
peace.n Why was the area so prone to dispute and disruption?
The answer to this may be founded less in historical particulars
and more in the nature of borderland societies. When different
societies share a border, they cannot help but be affected by their
proximity. There are many definitions of "borderland" but one of
the most practical is that offered by Oscar]. Martinez in his classic
work Border People. As opposed to a frontier, which is an area out at the

8.

Previous quote, Owsley and Smith, Filibusters, 187. WilliamS. Belko, "Epilogue
to the War of 1812: The Monroe Administration, American Anglophobia,
and the First Seminole War," in America's Hundred Years' War: U.S. Expansion
to the Gulf Coast and the Fate of the Seminoles, 1763-1858, ed.William S. Belko
(Gainesville: University Presse of Florida, 2011), 54-102.
9.
Belko, "Epilogue," 55.
10. Owsley Jr. and Smith, Filibusters, 183.
11. Ibid. , Filibusters, 119.
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periphery of a state or empire, a borderland, he writes, is "a region
that lies adjacent to a border, a zone of transition, a place where people
and institutions are shaped by natural and human forces that are
not felt in the heartland." 12 Ellwyn R. Stoddard, writing like Martinez
about the modem U .S.-Mexican border, identified typical features of
borderland society this way: "Borderland communities traditionally
survive by ignoring [federal] regulations, circumventing them, or
translating them into border customs that are culturally, historically,
and functionally acceptable for daily border intercourse."13 In other
words, although settlers in border areas may live close to core areas
of a nation, rather than on a truly distant frontier, they can be similar
to frontier pioneers in one respect: they do not necessarily feel the
sense of unity or nationhood that prevails in the heartland. Moreover,
they are constantly negotiating with the people and culture just over
their border. Being removed from the heartland and in close contact
with "foreigners" fosters concepts of loyalty that are highly localized.
Border inhabitants tend to focus on objects of loyalty that are
immediately tangible and close at hand-self, family, local community.
If self-reliance is the characteristic of the pioneer, self-interest and selfprotection are the chief traits of the border resident. For example,
Gilberto Miguel Hinojosa, in his classic study of the residents of
the border town of Laredo, Texas, from 1755 to 1870, concluded
"Laredoans acted primarily out of concern for their own best interests
and only secondarily if at all to advance imperial or national goals." 14
All of these observations are applicable to the Spanish Floridas.
East and West Florida, by their proximity to the Caribbean, and to
first the British Atlantic colonies and later the United States, were
places that were politically and culturally within the sphere of the
Spanish empire but constantly under the influence of peoples
and economies operating just outside their borders. As with most
borderlands, the defining feature of life in the Floridas of the late
eighteenth century was the existence of the border itself. A border
may be only a line on a map, but it carries behind it the full weight
of international law and treaty. It demarcates the sovereignty of one
12.

Oscar]. Martinez, Border People: Life and Society in the U. S.-Mexican Borderland
(Tuscan: University of Arizona Press, 1994) , 12.
13. Ellwyn R Stoddard, Richard L. Nostrand, and Jonathan P. West, Borderlands
Sourcebook: A Guide to the Literature on Northern M exico and the American Southwest
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1983), 5.
14. Gilberta Miguel Hinojosa, A Borderlands Town in Transition: Laredo, 1755-1870
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1983), xv.
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state-level society from another and it is the existence of "the border"
that is the essential and defining characteristic of a borderland. 15
People living along a border have to deal with the political and social
consequences of this boundary line on a daily basis. The same does
not hold true for people living in a frontier. In contrast to a frontier
area, in a borderland there is no gradual transition of settlements
and peoples, no buffering effect of empty spaces. The boundary
line is abrupt. In the case of Spanish East and West Florida, the
cultural and legal precepts of Spain, and the Spanish language,
predominated on one side of the line, while on the other was AngloAmerican culture and law, and the English language. Moreover, as
the population of the United States expanded, the people on either
side of "the border" lived in increasing nearness to one another, and
were increasingly uncomfortable with this neamess. 16
Modern border problems, such as those along the U.S.-Mexico
15. Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, "From Borderlands to Borders: Empires,
Nation-States, and the Peoples in between in North American History," The
American Historical Review 104, no. 3 Qune 1999): 814-841, specifically 840.
16. As Daniel H . Usner,Jr., has noted, the term "borderlands" can mean a division
of study within American historiography, a region defined by the modern U.S.Mexico border, or the spaces where former colonial powers vied for control.
See Daniel H. Usner, Jr. , "Borderlands," in A Companion to Colonial America
by Daniel Vickers (Malden, MA.: Blackwell, 2003), 408-424. From the time
of Herbert Bolton, writers on this subject have frequently confounded the
term "borderlands" and "frontier," often treating them as synonyms. David
Hurst Thomas found the etymology of "borderlands" so frustrating that he
threw the term open to re-definition. See David Hurst Thomas, "Columbian
Consequences: The Spanish Borderlands in Cubist Perspective," in Columbian
Consequences, Volume 1, A-rchaeological and H istorical Perspectives on the Spanish
Borderlands West, ed. David Hurst Thomas (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian
Institution Press, 1989). David Weber, the premier scholar on the subject,
actually dropped the use of the term "borderlands" from his best-known and
award winning work and used the term "frontier" instead. See David]. Weber,
The Spanish Frontier in North America (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press,
1992), 6-10. Others also have preferred to avoid using the term "borderlands."
For example, in studies of Spanish Florida, Amy Turner Bushnell adapted the
concept of "periphery" to her history of the mission system. See Amy Turner
Bushnell, Situado and Sabana, Spain s Support System for the Presidio and Mission
Provinces of Florida, Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of
Natural History, Number 24 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1994) , 2328. Hoffman conceived of Florida's history in stages of wave-like frontiers. See
Hoffman, Florida Frontiers, xv. But it is hard to contextualize Florida's history
after 1670 without acknowledging the significance of "the border." To ignore
the border and the ramifications of its existence makes it virtually impossible to
understand the events of the time. For a discussion of "frontiers" as borderless
and examples of how borderlands can be transformed into frontiers, see
Adelman and Aron, "From Borderlands to Borders," 815-816, 821-823, 828,
and 831-832.
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border, are shaped by current political and economic conditions,
but they have parallels in earlier times and can starkly illuminate
the basic realities of border life. For example, to draw further on the
observations of Martinez and others, some general characteristics
of living near a border are:
1. Borders are places of international contention. Hostile
or strained relations between two state powers will
directly impact a border area and may alter sovereignty
in the area.
2. Control of a border is, at best, difficult. Far from being
barriers, borders tend to be permeable. People can
cross borders-to migrate and start new lives, to escape
persecution, to seek new opportunities, or to raid and
smuggle.
3. Because of the difficulties posed byenforcingjurisdiction,
borderlands are often beset with illegal activities. As
Martinez notes of modern borders: "International
borders are likely to be the scene of conflict due to such
basic factors as vague territorial limits, unclear title to
natural resources, ethnic rivalries, and restrictions on
the movement of goods and people over a political
line. Where frontier conditions exist, lawlessness is also
frequently a problem." 17
4. Administration of a borderland often requires
modifications in policy. Authorities may have to
selectively enforce or ignore national or imperial
policies to meet border realities. Put more succinctly
by]. Lawrence McConville, "from the point of view of
national integrity the Borderlands are an administrative
nuisance." 18
5. Borders, in anthropological terms, force people to deal

17.

18.

Oscar J. Martfnez,
US.-Mexico Borderlands: Historical and Contemporary
Perspectives (Wilmington, DE.: Scholarly Resources, 1996), xiii; McMichael ,
Atlantic Loyalties, 129-42. McMichael specifically discusses the problems of law
enforcement at "the line" dividing Spanish West Florida from the Mississippi
Territory.
J. Lawrence McConville, "Border Culture Overview," in Borderlands Sourcebook:
A Guide to the Literature on Northern Mexico and the American Southwest, eds.
Ellwyn R. Stoddard, Richard L. Nostrand, and Jonathan P. West (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1983), 247.
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with the "other"-with people whose customs, language,
and law differ from their own. Problems on one side of the
border are often beyond the control of people on the other
side, until they spill over. Whether a border is peaceful or
hostile, people along the border still have to deal with each
other on a daily basis-there is no avoiding it.
6. Because of this, lifeways in borderlands frequently
reflect a mix or syncretism of the peoples, cultures,
customs, religions, and languages that prevail to either
side of the border.
7. Borderlands can also foster the re-invention of self.
In places with low population density and scattered
settlement, social hierarchies are often less rigid and more
open to social advancement. According to McConville,
borderlands often attract outcasts. They do not draw "so
much from the 'core,' or central elements of the societies
which supposedly control the region, but instead from
the ragged edges of the social fabric, from the human
surpluses, and from the 'ravines' and 'gullies' of the social
order into which some have inevitably stumbled." 19 This
should not be overstated, since colonial borderlands often
had thriving merchant communities and their own form
of gentry. But social outcasts on one side of a border can
often manipulate circumstances to their own advantage
by crossing over. A debtor on one side of a border might
become an estate owner on the other, a slave crossing
the border might become a free person, an outlaw might
become a military leader.
8. All of these factors about life in borderlands affect the
loyalties of residents along the border. As Hinojosa
observed in his study of Laredo and as McMichael noted in
his examination ofloyalties in Spanish West Florida, border
people cannot always depend on a national or imperial
entity to render justice in their area. Their loyalties tend
to run along highly personal and local lines-to their own
families, lands, and immediate environs.
Accordingly, a borderland environment clearly prevailed in
Spain's Florida possessions at least from the time of the founding
of Charles Town in 1670 and certainly after the creation of
19.

Ibid, 246.
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Georgia in 1733. After 1670, there were almost always two statelevel jurisdictions prevailing in the American Southeast and
bordering one another. The border line itself might change but
it vanished only during the years between 1763 and 1775, when
British authority and law existed uniformly across the area, until
this uniformity evaporated during the American Revolution. Seen
in this light, the constant filibustering expeditions and upheavals
of the late eighteenth century are only later chapters in a story that
also included the inception of the slave sanctuary policy in Florida
in the 1680s, the destruction of the Spanish mission system in the
early 1 700s, and the ongoing tensions between Florida and Georgia
that dominated the area after 1733. There is, in other words, a long
view to the unrest and disruption that occurred in the area.
Aside from these general characteristics of borderland life,
however, two other factors seem to have been at play in the Spanish
Floridas after about 1780 and perhaps contributed to the volatile and
violent nature of attacks on local authority. The first, already noted
in the introduction to this article, was the concept of personal liberty
ingrained in many incoming American immigrants. Frequently
this was expressed by a disdain for officialdom. If the powers and
regulations of a border government clashed with this sense of personal
liberty among new arrivals, one or the other would have to give way.
A second factor was the cult of honor that suffused so many
aspects of male identity in these times and that was so closely linked
to violence. If the colonial cultures-French, Spanish, British,
American-had one thing in common in the eighteenth century, it
was the intense importance of honor to concepts of masculinity. "Few
travelers failed to notice the white Southerner's touchiness to insult,
his hair-trigger temper, which often resulted in outbursts of physical
force," commented James M. Denham in Rngue's Paradise, his study
on violence and retribution in Florida. But this "touchiness" was not
a characteristic of white Southerners alone. William B. Taylor, in
his work on violence in colonial central Mexico, recorded a series
of "fighting words" that provoked similar hair-trigger responses
among indigenous and mestizo men in Spanish America. In the face
of taunts about honesty, manhood, or race, lower class men would
throw a punch, deliver a beating, or pull a knife. 20
In the Spanish borderlands, where the cultural precepts
20.
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of Spanish society met those of Southern society, touchiness
about honor tended to reinforce a loyalty to self and family that
was already a prominent feature of border life. Wyatt-Brown, in
outlining defining elements of southern honor, observed that
it demanded a fierce defense of personal and family reputation
"particularly in the character of revenge against familial and
community enemies." This fierceness was a marked trait of life
in the New Feliciana district of Spanish West Florida, home turf
of the Kempers and scene of their 1804 revolt, and continued to
characterize life there long after the end of the colonial period. In
Pistols and Politics, Samuel Hyde traced incidences of violence in
the Florida parishes of Louisiana, including Feliciana, from 1810
into the later nineteenth century. For the piney woods dwellers
of these parishes, he noted, codes of honor called for immediate,
spontaneous redress of wrongs. "Every man knew that he risked his
life by insulting another. "21
As a borderland, then, the Spanish Floridas could be considered
inherently unstable, and additional circumstances made border
society especially vulnerable to disruption. Among the historical
circumstances was the contest between the United States, Spain,
and at times Britain, for control of the area. Most settlers saw
the status quo change at least once within living memory, and
this provided the precedent for changing it again. Demographic
circumstances also worked against a stable society. The population
of the Floridas was a mix of peoples arriving at a variety of times,
and included Native American polities, settlers of different
national origins, slaves and free people of color, and a constant
influx of new arrivals. These people lived under the rather weak
kind of governance and fluctuating loyalties that characterized
life in borderlands as a whole. They also lived in a time and place
where insults to personal honor and integrity could easily trigger

21.

and violence in the ante-bellum South:18, 62-66. Dueling in defense of honor
was well-recorded in Thomas Gamble, Savannah Duels and Duellists, 1733-1877
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violence. The typical difficulties of enforcing law and order near a
border probably exacerbated a predisposition on the part of many
settlers to exact private revenge for injury.
How did internal and external factors play out in the
borderlands? In some cases, they worked in favor of individuals
seeking escape from oppression. For example,Jane Landers, in her
works on slavery and free people of color, has repeatedly emphasized
that the political instability of the late eighteenth century
constantly opened up chances for people to assert themselves, take
risks or make choices, and in some cases escape the shackles that a
larger society wanted to impose on them. Writing of the American
Southeast and the Caribbean, she noted "in this multicultural
arena, many peoples and powers competed-Mricans of various
distinct ethnicities, a wide array of indigenous nations, European
powers such as Great Britain, France, and Spain, and, eventually,
the new government of the United States. Conflicts were frequent,
and there were many opportunities for Atlantic Creoles to 'take the
tide' and alter a life 's course." 22
At the same time, basic authority in the borderlands was
always subject to challenge, not so much by the oppressed as by
the ambitious or discontented. Three well-documented cases of
upheaval may serve to demonstrate how easily outside interlopers
or disaffected inhabitants could threaten a vulnerable status quo.
The first case is that of William Augustus Bowles, who may
well be considered the archetype of the free-wheeling individual
seeking his own power base in Florida. In a recent study, Gilbert
C. Din described him this way: "He was an ambitious and
uninhibited extrovert with an inflated ego, oozed charm and
braggadocio to disarm strangers and opponents, and possessed a
grim determination to persevere in his objectives regardless of the
odds or costs." 23 In many respects, this description of Bowles could
just as easily be applied to a number of other men of the same ilk
and era: James Wilkinson, who dabbled with thoughts of detaching
Kentucky from the United States; Aaron Burr, who envisioned
himself at the head of a country straddling the West and portions
of Mexico; George Mathews, instigator of the Patriot War in East
22. Jane G. Landers, Atlantic Creoles in the Age of Revolutions (Cambridge, MA.:
Harvard University Press, 2010), 5.
23. Gilbert C. Din, "William Augustus Bowles on the Gulf Coast, 1787-1803:
Unraveling the Labyrinthine Conundrum," Florida Historical Quarterly 89, no.1
(Summer 2010) , 3.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol90/iss2/1

28

Society: Florida Historical Quarterly, Volume 90, Number 2
FLORIDA AS BoRDERLAND

145

Florida, or Gregor MacGregor, self-proclaimed Spanish American
liberator. Bowles, although a unique individual, was hardly unique
as a borderland type and his clash with the authorities in colonial
Florida manifests patterns that repeated themselves in other
upheavals.
Although a native of Maryland, Bowles became well-acquainted
with northern Florida from military service with the British Army in
Pensacola between 1778 and 1781. He spent two of those years (as
a deserter) among the Lower Creeks, gaining skills that he would
later put to use as an agent of a trading firm out of the Bahamas.
Much of his career reads like a history of Spanish East and West
Florida in miniature. In the 1780s he introduced himself again into
Creek society, offering his services as an alternative to the Spanish
as a supplier of goods and arms. A rash miscalculation led him
to attempt an armed excursion to disrupt Spanish control of the
St. Johns River, but he found no support among settlers or native
peoples and his followers deserted him. His second major action,
the sacking of the Panton Leslie and Co. store on the Wakulla River
in 1792, proved threatening enough to provoke a military response
on the part of Spanish officials and resulted in his capture. His
grandest military success, the siege and capture of Fort San
Marcos in 1800, proved short-lived. In none of these cases did he
have the resources for a sustained confrontation with authorities,
although he was able to remain active against them for years by
taking refuge in the hinterlands. Din's final assessment of Bowles
portrays him as strikingly similar to others who would come in his
wake: "An accurate view of Bowles requires stripping him of all the
claptrap he disseminated about himself and considering him for
what he was-an adventurer who in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries strove to carve out an autonomous domain to
satisfy his personal ambitions in notice, stature, and power." 24
A second major case of upheaval occurred in East Florida in
1795 when the colony was rocked by a short-lived revolt. This revolt
was a more serious affair, as a challenge to Spanish authority, than
Bowles' hounding of outposts, but like the1n it never achieved
widespread support or a solid base of operations. In part, at least,
it sprang from foreign intrigue. During 1793 and 1794, Edmund
Genet, representing the government of revolutionary France,
24.
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began to recruit individuals in South Carolina and Georgia for
a possible seizure of East Florida. An offshoot of his efforts was
a plan under Elijah Clarke to move against the Creeks. These
plans came to naught. However, because of them, the governor
of Spanish East Florida, Juan Nepomuceno de Quesada, became
suspicious of a number of new arrivals in his territory-all AngloAmericans-and had them arrested for conspiracy to stage a revolt.
Among those suspected were John Mcintosh, scion of a leading
family in southern Georgia, Richard Lang, a former magistrate and
militia captain for Quesada on the Florida-Georgia border, along
with affiliates Peter Wagnon, William Plowden, Abner Hammond,
and William Jones. Suppressing this conspiracy posed all the usual
dilemmas of borderland jurisdiction. Quesada sent the principals
to Havana, but the Cuban courts later freed them for lack of
evidence. Distrusting the loyalty of border families, the governor
ordered settlers to evacuate from their lands between the St. Johns
River and the Georgia border. This resulted in the displacement
of 125 families. The arrests and evacuations caused a furor in both
Georgia and East Florida. 25
When the men detained in Cuba were released, they returned
to a border area that was now in ferment. Popular anger with
Quesada had increased. The detainees regained access to their
lands and homes, but visited the Georgia side of the border
frequently. Richard Lang pressed Quesada to compensate him
for his imprisonment, writing that this "will be the only means of
preventing me from cohorting myself with all my power to pull off
the yoke of despotism and spread abroad the liberty and freedom
that God has bestowed to all mankind. "26
On June 27, Lang, at the head of an armed party of seventy one
men, captured and burned FortJuana, a northern outpost in East
Florida. About two weeks later, he united his force with a hundred
additional men including John Mcintosh, Peter Wagnon, William
Plowden, and William Jones. They next attacked Fort San Nicolas,
which guarded the ferry station on the St. Johns River, taking the
fort by surprise, killing three Spanish soldiers (the commanding

25. Hoffman, Frontiers, 249-251 ;Janice Borton Miller, juan Nepomuceno de Quesada,
Governor of Spanish East Florida, 1790-1795 (Washington , D.C.: University Press
of America, 1981) , 137-166.
26. Charles E. Bennett, Florida's "French" Revolution, 1793-1795 (Gainesville:
University Presses ofFlorida, 1981) , 176.
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officer also dying in the fray) and capturing the entire garrison. 27
By taking an important fort, Lang and his associates
accomplished in 1795 what West Floridians would do fifteen years
later at Baton Rouge. Yet, whereas the capture of the fort at Baton
Rouge in 1810 led immediately to a declaration of independence for
portions of West Florida, the successful attack on Fort San Nicolas
ultimately ended in failure. Settlers in East Florida did not support
Lang's occupying force and, in the face of Spanish reinforcements,
the rebels had to retreat to a stronghold on Amelia Island and then
across the border into Georgia. 28
There are many parallels between this revolt in 1795 in East
Florida and the 1804 revolt of the Kemper brothers in West Florida.
Reuben Kemper and his brothers Nathan and Samuel held land
on either side of the border between the New Feliciana district
in Spanish West Florida and the Mississippi Territory. Like the
principals in the 1795 revolt, the Kempers were initially motivated
to take up arms because of grudges against Spanish officials and
law. Their resentments centered on an adverse court ruling that
stripped Reuben of his property in the Feliciana district. Between
June and August of 1804, this dispute escalated into a fight against
eviction, then into armed retaliation, and finally into a call for
rebellion. Nathan and Samuel Kemper, brothers to Reuben and
sharers in his legal and financial misfortunes, resisted Spanish
attempts to remove them from his premises in Feliciana. When
forced to flee, they returned a few days later to threaten residents
who had sided against them with Spanish officials. Then, to avoid
arrest, the brothers crossed the border into Mississippi territory.
But over the next two months, Nathan and Samuel, backed by
numerous supporters, skirmished with Spanish patrols detailed to
arrest them. Ultimately, they kidnapped a local Spanish official and
raised the flag of rebellion, calling for a general uprising. As in the
case of East Florida, their successes were short-lived. They failed
to muster enough adherents to offer serious challenge and were
constrained to stick close to the border and American territory for
their own safety. 29
Although the 1795 and 1804 revolts were not identical in
27.

28.
29.
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their sequence of events, both were typical border problems. Both
incidents centered on men who were not well-integrated into the
established gentry of the colony-the people with influence on the
government-and who had neither the trust nor the favor of local
officials. There was a clannish element, too, to the revolts; they
tended to congeal around a central gang or band of men who were
able to move fairly freely back and forth across the nearby borderor 'the line' as it was known in West Florida. Spanish authorities
were powerless to prevent this. Control of the border required
stringent measures on both sides, and while American officials
in Georgia and the Mississippi Territory responded to complaints
from Carlos de Grand Pre and Juan Nepomuceno de Quesada
about border control, they also declined to seize upon anyone
within their jurisdiction for actions they committed outside their
jurisdiction. The records on the revolts also indicate that there was
a strong element of personal revenge mixed in with rhetoric about
rebellion: both the Kempers and the adherents to the 1795 revolt
combined their military actions with retaliation against individuals
and families that they considered as enemies or betrayers. In
summarizing Reuben Kemper's evolution from would-be frontier
merchant to filibuster, Davis noted that it was linked closely to
his fierce desire to get even: "Kemper blamed the Spaniards for
putting him out of business. He felt a keen and unyielding sense of
justice. Years later, at the close of Reuben Kemper's life, one of his
close friends remarked that he was 'as sincere in his attachments
as he was implacable in his resentments, when he felt that he had
been injured or betrayed. "' 30
The aftermath of the revolts also had some parallels: they bred
into the participants a long-lasting enmity against Spanish rule.
John Mcintosh, for example, who lost all of his East Florida property
as a result of his involvement in the 1795 revolt against Governor
Quesada, nursed an active hatred for the Spanish authorities in
Florida, and returned some twenty five years later to join in the
Patriot War of 1812. Richard Lang returned to East Florida in 1799
only to be expelled a second time for his alleged affiliation with the
plots of William Augustus Bowles. Reuben and Samuel Kemper, in

30.
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the years after 1804, also took active roles against Spanish interests.
In 1810, following the revolt against Spanish rule, Reuben received
a commission from the convention in Baton Rouge to liberate
_Mobile and spent much of that year raising forces to threaten the
port. Samuel joined the Magee-Gutierrez expedition into Texas in
1812 and in 1813 briefly led itY
The general outcomes of these cases-Bowles and the two
revolts-were also similar, and again, related to features of the
borderlands. On the one hand, it was relatively easy for small bands
of men to ignite trouble. Yet none ever had a firm foundation for
overthrowing the local government. Whether seeking supporters
among the Creeks, or the planters of East Florida, or the general
population of Feliciana, the leaders met with failure. Both the ease
with which they took up arms and their difficulties in sustaining
support were related to their borderland environment. The
diverse population of Spanish East and West Florida had no
common ideology, no common language or religion, not even
similar personal histories to make common cause with the rebels.
McMichael, in analyzing the failure of the Kemper revolt, identified
three key factors that prevented the revolt from taking hold: (1)
West Florida was still generally prosperous in 1804; (2) Spanish
military power was still formidable in the area; and (3) the Kempers
did not come from the ruling gentry and did not represent their
interests. 32 These same factors prevailed in East Florida, and for
a longer period of time, since Spain had a military stronghold at
St. Augustine and the local economy remained strong in the first
decade of the nineteenth century.
This situation began to change by 1810 at a time when external
and internal factors were pushing the borderlands further towards
instability. Certainly by this time West Florida had developed into
a classic example of a borderland, as defined in this article. Its
population represented a mix of people-French, Spanish, Canary
Island, German, Anglo-American, Mrican American, and others.
The proximity of the border with the United States and the influx
of Anglo-American immigrants complicated local government.
Although sworn to uphold Crown interests, local officials could not
ignore popular sentiments and legal precepts had to be adapted for
31.
32.
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use in a border area. Spanish laws regarding manumission of slaves
and other rights accorded to slaves were enforced-but not to the
extent that they would undermine an agricultural system based in
slave labor. The Catholic faith was promoted and encouraged, but
Protestantism was allowed a kind of shadow existence, tolerated as
long as it was kept private. 33 Most important, the relationship of
settlers to government often ran through personal lines. Although
Spanish law accorded all subjects the right of petition and appeal
for grievances, there were also less formal means of redress for
settlers with influence: they might exploit their personal or family
ties to government officials or their general standing in local
society to get their concerns heard. Governing a borderland colony
was always a balancing act for the king's representatives. In a society
where loyalties often ran along families lines-to immediate kin
and also in-laws-it was important for Crown representatives to win
and keep the support of influential clans. Carlos de Grand-Pre was
a fixture in the government of Baton Rouge, well-connected, and
in office for two decades. For many settlers, as McMichael notes
in his study of West Florida, Grand-Pre was "the personification of
their loyalty to the Spanish Crown." 34
Control of the border also grew more difficult. Disruption in
West Florida tended to emanate from Feliciana and Saint Helena,
the areas close to the border. 35 Hyde, in characterizing over-theborder immigration into West Florida in the wake of the Louisiana
Purchase of 1803, noted: "Many army deserters and criminals
were among these Americans seeking a safe haven in West Florida.
The territory quickly became infested with undesirables who
disrupted settlement patterns and waylaid wagons and travelers
on the trails and highways. In addition, considerable numbers of
American filibusters, adventurers inciting revolution in Spanishheld area, were also counted among these migrants." 36 Many of
these newcomers had no connection or shared interests with the
established elites in West Florida and no loyalty to the status quo.
Even so, the failure of the Kemper revolt in 1804 demonstrated
33.
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that it would take more than mere discontent or a small armed
insurrection to undermine the overall legitimacy of Spanish rule.
A remarkably similar situation prevailed in East Florida, adding
weight to the argument that the borderland nature of the Floridas,
as much as particular events, created the dilemma of instability.
As in West Florida, the population was a mix of people-Spanish,
Cuban, Mediterranean, French, British, Anglo-American, and
Mrican American, among others. 37 As with West Florida, Spanish
regulations had to be adapted to meet local circumstances. In
particular, trade connections with the United States and Britain
had to be kept open. The gradual growth of a small population
of free people of color, as well as the mustering of free black men
into militia units, aroused even greater protest from neighboring
Americans than it did in West Florida. East Florida also had a
smaller population-about 4000 people altogether, free and slave.
The personal nature of government was more apparent than in
Baton Rouge. In 1795, after the colony was torn apart by rebellion,
the breach was only healed when the malcontents were exiled and
when a new Irish-born governor, Henry White, took control of the
colony. Like Grand-Pre in Baton Rouge, White came to symbolize
order and authority in the colony. He remained in office for
fifteen years and by the time of his death in 1811, many colonists
could remember no other governor. Within a year of his death, a
filibustering effort from Georgia attempted the armed overthrow
of Spanish authority. 38
Given these parallels, why did the 1810 revolt in West Florida
lead to a successful break with Spain and the Patriot War of 1812
in East Florida end in failure? In both cases, the colonists were
concerned about their future as Spanish subjects. Also in both
cases, the settlers lost the individuals who represented stabilityGrand Pre and White.
One major difference may be in the transfer of loyalties
to their successors. By all accounts, Charles de Hault Delassus,
who succeeded Grand Pre as governor and commandant of the
four western districts of West Florida, was seen as vacillating and
unreliable by many residents of Baton Rouge and Feliciana. Juan
Jose de Estrada, on the other hand, the Cuban military officer
37.
38.
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Charles de Hault DeLasuss, Governor of West Florida in 1810. Image courtesy of
the West Florida Revolt Collection, the Center for Southeast Louisiana Studies, Southeastern
Louisiana University.

who replaced White in East Florida, had roots in the St. Augustine
community and a solid reputation. 39
Another major difference was in the origin and progress of
the two insurrections. In West Florida, there was a long lead-up
to armed conflict, with inhabitants in the New Feliciana District
holding a series of meetings at Troy, Egypt, and St. Francisville, and
39.
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petitioning through Governor Delassus for selection of delegates
to a general convention. The Convention, when it met, included
not only delegates from the traditionally unruly border district
of Feliciana but from Baton Rouge and the other neighboring
districts as well. In July and August of 1810, the meetings of this
Convention allowed opposition to coalesce against the governor.
The Convention also put in place a provisional government for
the districts before disputes with the governor came to a test of
arms. By the time Philemon Thomas's forces captured the fort at
Baton Rouge, the Convention was in a position to consolidate its
authority over the rebel districts, issue edicts and proclamations,
and organize a defense against possible attack by elements still loyal
to Spain. This helped forestall a potential civil war in West Florida
between factions supporting the Convention and those adhering
to Spanish rule or hoping for British or French intervention.
Ultimately, a civil war might have come anyway. Governor Folch
at Pensacola was struggling to assemble sufficient forces to defend
that town and Mobile and reestablish Spanish control over Baton
Rouge. Spanish officials in the St. Helena District were openly
hostile to the Convention. The potential for a major confrontation
ended when President James Madison decided to assert American
sovereignty over Baton Rouge and to back it with American troops.
Instead of descending into civil war, West Florida was dividedthe western portions becoming part of the U.S., the eastern ones
remaining possessions of Spain. 40
In East Florida, the circumstances were different. When
George Mathews, an American citizen and former governor of
Georgia, staged an insurrection against Spanish rule in 1812, it was
40.
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impossible to mask it as an internal revolt. There was no equivalent
to West Florida's Convention to provide a local legislature and
provisional government inside East Florida. Moreover, Mathews
mustered and launched his Patriot forces from the Georgia side
of the border, stamping the action clearly as an invasion in the
eyes of practically everyone. The Patriots managed to seize the
border port of Fernandina but they failed to capture St. Augustine
or to win decisive American backing for their cause. The rapid
success of the West Florida Revolt in 1810 may have clouded their
thinking, lulling them into a belief that a large-scale insurrection,
with or without a groundswell of local support, would carry the
day through sheer momentum. In fact, George Mathews was so
confident that the Patriots would sweep through East Florida, and
so unprepared for strong resistance, that he contemplated a future
move against Pensacola. 41 Yet in the end the Patriot War of 1812
turned out to be just a longer and bloodier version of the abortive
revolt of 1795 in East Florida. It turned into a stand-off and civil
war. The Patriots, backed by U.S. regulars and Georgia militia,
pitted themselves against Spanish loyalists, backed by the garrison
and militia at St. Augustine. When this border conflict merged into
41.
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detail by Davis. See McMichael, Atlantic Loyalties, 159-164; Davis, Rogue Republic,
133-172.
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the War of 1812, both sides were stuck, unable to achieve outright
victory or to concede. For eighteen months they battled against
each other in an increasingly vindictive conflict until, worn out,
American forces withdrew from the colony and Spanish forces
gladly adopted a stance of neutrality in the larger warfare raging
between the United States and Britain.
Economic self-interest also played a role in determining
allegiances in these two cases. In West Florida, an unpopular
new governor and declining confidence in Spain's ability to keep
order persuaded many settlers to switch their loyalties. Plagued
by a collapsing political situation in Spain, a border district beset
with crime, and declining commercial prospects, settlers tied to
the trade and traffic along the Mississippi River had few reasons to
cling to Spanish sovereignty. The American Embargo Act of 1807
hurt residents of Baton Rouge and adjacent areas as badly as it
did the American commercial centers of the Atlantic seaboard. In
general, the first decade of the nineteenth century saw an increase
in discontent in West Florida. As McMichael summarized the
situation: "With the further constraints on economic opportunity
following the American embargo, the disastrous political chaos
brought on by the death of Grand-Pre, and the confluence of
international events, virtually every prop that might assure the
loyalty of a people to the existing government had disappeared. The
political loyalty shown by West Floridians, as applied in the layers of
community, region, province, and country, had been reduced one
by one, until only loyalty to the local community remained. West
Floridians chose their community, as they had to, because it was
the source of their prosperity, contentment, and independence." 42
By contrast, the same American embargo policies that were
causing economic hardship in West Florida ushered in an economic
boom in East Florida. Merchants in the port of Fernandina found
themselves at liberty to engage in open trade with Spain, Europe,
and the United States, while their major American competitors
in Charleston and Savannah suffered through a suspension of
trade with Britain. Contemporary accounts note that people
were "making money hand over foot" in East Florida in the years
between 1807 and 1812. 43 There were few economic reasons to
favor an American take-over of the colony. Indeed, the incursion
42. McMichael, Atlantic Loyalties, 159-164, 175.
43. Cusick, Other War, 56, 106-107.
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of the Patriots, far from bringing prosperity or stability to settlers,
plunged the area into chaos. As the Patriot conflict dragged on, it
more and more took on the character of revenge-of an attempt
by people out of Georgia to punish the core population of Spanish
East Florida for past wrongs. It became a showdown between two
different cultures and societies at the border. 44
At root, settlers' most basic loyalty-loyalty to self-interestbroke in different directions in East and West Florida. In comparing
the outcomes of American intervention in the two Floridas, and the
decisions of President James Madison with respect to them,J.C.A.
Stagg concluded: "[President] Madison was, perhaps, fortunate
that there proved to be a large enough number of American
settlers in West Florida and the surrounding regions to sustain
his actions in 1810, or at least to acquiesce in them, without the
province falling into the internal quarrels and dangers of civil war
that were to characterize the independence movements of many
other parts of the Spanish-American empire after 1810 ... East
Florida, on the other hand, escaped Madison's grasp . . . there
were never enough settlers or sympathizers in the province to give
sufficient reality to the claim made by George Mathews in January
1811 that the local population could stage a successful rebellion
without outside assistance." 45
Overall, the histories of Spanish East and West Florida seem
to illustrate the general difficulties of maintaining social order in
a border area, as well as the particular problems facing Spanish
colonies during an era of revolution and American expansionism.
The general argument of this article has been that the Spanish
Floridas, although certainly affected by historical circumstances,
actually typified problems that are common in border zones across
time. In fact, features of border life based in part on the modern
U.S.-Mexico border seem equally applicable to the colonial
borderlands and help to explain why colonies like East and West
Florida were so prone to unrest.

44.
45.

The reasons for the showdown are covered in Cusick, Other War, 38-54,297-300.
Stagg, Borderlines, 206-207.
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The Origins of the Monroe Doctrine Revisited:
The Madison Administration, the West Florida
Revolt, and the No Transfer Policy
by William S. Belko
ate in October of 1810, as citizens and statesmen
throughout the United States focused almost entirely on
an imminent conflict with Great Britain and apprehensively
monitored Napoleon's armies in Europe, the president of the
United States, James Madison, quickly convened an emergency
session of his cabinet members. Great Britain and Napoleon were
not, however, the reason for calling the secret cabinet meeting.
What occupied the attention of the executive branch was a little
recognized rebellion in a sparsely populated region south of the
Mississippi Territory. Two days after secretly conferring with his
cabinet, on October 27, Madison issued a pivotal presidential
proclamation authorizing the U. S. occupation of the territory
below the official U. S. border with Spanish Florida-the 31st
parallel-and extending from the Mississippi River eastward to
the Perdido River. Just weeks earlier, in late September of 1810,
rebellious citizens, mostly recent American immigrants to the
Baton Rouge area, declared their independence from Spain and
dubbed themselves the West Florida Republic-the original Lone
Star Republic. Within days of their precipitous declaration, the

L
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rebels requested the protection of and annexation by the United
States. President Madison, motivated by a number of "weighty and
urgent considerations," deemed it "right and requisite" that the
United States accept that invitation, and, accordingly, the Virginian
unilaterally ordered the governor of the Orleans Territory, William
C. C. Claiborne, to mobilize the territorial militia and enter into
and exercise over the newly acquired region the "authorities and
functions legally pertaining to his office." Under the protection
of the United States, the "good people" of the liberated Spanish
territory were thus "invited and enjoined to pay due respect" to the
new governor, and "to be obedient, to maintain order, to cherish
harmony, and in every manner to conduct themselves as peaceable
citizens, under full assurance that they will be protected in the
enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion."'
Few Americans know of this seemingly obscure presidential
action seizing the "boot heels" of the present states of Alabama and
Mississippi and the state of Louisiana east of the Mississippi River from
Baton Rouge to the Pearl River. But Madison's actions, taken only
seven years after the Louisiana Purchase and nine years prior to the
U. S. acquisition of all of Spanish Florida, initiated one of the more
consequential territorial acquisitions in American history. Indeed,
Madison's ostensibly innocuous exploit provided the ideological
foundation and the diplomatic justification for future annexation of
foreign territory, from Spanish Florida in 1818 to nearly all of Mexico
in 1848, and ultimately Alaska, Hawaii and Cuba in the late nineteenth
century. The pivotal policy which Madison ultimately handed
the United States-the No Transfer policy-served as an integral
ingredient of the famous Monroe Doctrine of 1823, and beginning
with the post-Civil War era, became a prominent component of U. S.
foreign policy extending well into the twentieth century.
As soon as Madison assumed the presidency in March of 1809,
activities and intrigues in Spanish Florida, and throughout the
entire Spanish empire in the Western Hemisphere for that matter,
attracted the attention of the U.S. government. From 1801 to 1809,
President Thomas Jefferson had undertaken a rather confused and
inconsistent foreign policy in relation to the region separating the
United States from the Gulf of Mexico east of the Mississippi River.
His secretary of state, James Madison, was intimately involved in
r

."f.
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1.

Madison to 11 ' h Congress, October 27, 1810, in James D. Richardson, ed. , A
Compilation of the M essages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897 (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1896), 1: 480-81.
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the diplomacy with Spain concerning the Floridas. Both Virginians
claimed West Florida as part of the 1803 Louisiana Purchase, a
sentiment commonly shared by most American statesmen, and they
pursued East Florida as recompense for existing spoliation claims
against Spain resulting from the quasi-war with France during
the late 1790s. Jefferson and Madison focused on the acquisition
of Spanish Florida from 1803 until the crisis with Great Britain
assumed the administration's full attention in 1807. There the
matter rested until Madison became president in March of 1809. 2
Within weeks of taking office as president, Madison received
correspondence that brought Spanish West Florida to his
attention. The seedy U. S. General James Wilkinson-also known
as Spanish Agent No. 13-met with the governor of Spanish West
Florida, Vincente Folch, while the latter visited New Orleans in
late April of 1809. According to Wilkinson, Folch declared that
West Florida should be transferred to the United States if France
assumed complete control over Spain, that he had asked the
Spanish Junta for permission to transfer possession, and that, if
the Junta collapsed in the wake of Napoleon's invasion of Iberia,
he would formally ask the United States to take possession of the
territory. Wilkinson also informed the Madison administration that
U.S. troops at Fort Adams, in the Mississippi Territory, "will be held
in readiness" to march into West Florida "on the shortest notice,"
and that he would take command of the Tombigbee River "should
any foreign force land at Pensacola or Mobile," and thereby "drive
every hoof from that quarter." The American general then asked
for guidance in the case of two events: "Pt.- if the Governor of
West Florida, should call on me, formally, for succor or protection,
what am I to do? 2dly.-If the Governor and government should
be demolished, either by an usurpation of Spanish subjects, or by
enterprise of the American settlers, what course am I to pursue?" 3
2.

3.

Clifford L. Egan, "The United States, France, and West Florida, 1803-1807," Florida
Historical Quarterly 47 (1968-1969): 227-52; FrankL. Owsley and Gene A. Smith ,
Filibusters and Expansionists: Jeffersonian Manifest Destiny, 1800-1821 (Tuscaloosa:
University of Alabama Press, 1997) , 7-31; Wa~ohi Waciuma, Interoention in Spanish
Floridas, 1801-1813: A Study in Jeffersonian Foreign Poluy (Boston: Branden Press,
1976), 11-98.
Wilkinson to Madison, May 1, 1809, in Robert A. Rutland, ed., The Papers of
James Madison: Presidential Series (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962),
1:155-56, hereinafter cited as Madison Papers; Wilkinson to William Eustis, May
12 and 18, 1809, in James Wilkinson, Memoirs of My Own Times (Philadelphia:
Abraham Small, 1816), 2: 350, 351, 357.
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If Madison responded, no correspondence exists, but evidence
of the administration's initial position regarding West Florida can
be gleaned from an official dispatch from Secretary of State Robert
Smith to U.S. Minister to France John Armstrong. Smith stated that
the United States would in no way be restrained from "interposing
in any manner that may be necessary" to prevent West Florida,
which the U. S. government "claimed under the Convention"
with France in 1803, from "being reduced under the possession
of another belligerent power." Yet, despite the absence of formal
instructions to Wilkinson, the Madison administration expected
the general to "avail himself of every proper occasion" to remove
any impression of U. S. hostility to "Spanish colonies" and to relay
always the pacific intentions and strict neutrality of the United
States in regard to Spanish American affairs. Neither Wilkinson
nor anyone else had been instructed or authorized to intermeddle
in any shape or form with the internal affairs of the local Spanish
authority, nor were they to violate in any way U.S. neutrality. At this
point, Madison called for caution and nonintervention regarding
West Florida. 4
Wilkinson, however, was not the only prominent official
contacting the Madison administration about events along the
Florida border during the spring of 1809. The same intelligence
came from a more trusted source, the Governor of the Orleans
Territory and staunch Jeffersonian Republican, William C. C.
Claiborne. The former Tennessee congressman informed the
Madison administration in March of 1809, nearly six weeks before
Wilkinson sent his correspondence off to Washington, that he
had a conversation with two Spanish officers who stated that the
Floridas were to be ceded to the United States as a consequence
of the French conquest of Spain. "These Gentlemen talked, as if
they were fully advised on the subject, and from the tenor of their
conversation, I considered the sentiments delivered were those of
Governor Folch, and with his assent, were communicated to me,"
Claiborne confided. "When speaking of East and West Florida, it
was observed, that detached as they were from the other Spanish
provinces, they were unimportant possessions, and ought and
would be ceded to the U. States," and that such was "the opinion of
4.

Smith to Armstrong, May 1, 1809, in William R. Manning, ed., Diplomatic
Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin American
Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1925) , 1: 3-4, hereinafter cited as
Diplomatic Correspondence.
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Governor Folch." The following month, Claiborne met with Folch
himself near Baton Rouge, where the Spanish governor "freely
and without reserve" revealed his intention to cede the Floridas to
the United States. According to Claiborne, Folch believed that the
Floridas "were alone important to the U. States" and must "from
the course of things, fall very soon into their possession." Still,
Madison maintained a position of strict neutrality and refused to
meddle in the affairs of Spanish America. Actual U.S. possession of
West Florida, or of all the Floridas, would have to wait. 5
But as 1809 turned into 1810, pressure to intervene in West
Florida persisted, and this time it arrived from American quarters,
not Spanish. In February of 1810, the territorial delegate from
Mississippi, George Poindexter, presented to the U. S. House of
Representatives a memorial from the citizens of the Mississippi
Territory "complaining of the enormous duty levied by the Spanish
Government on vessels navigating the Mobile." They believed that
the executive possessed the authority to remedy this evil and they
wished to know what, if any, steps had been taken on this subject.
The House promptly formed a committee to await Madison's
response about any actions taken to achieve the free navigation of
the Mobile River to its confluence with the Gulf ofMexico. 6
The Madison administration promptly responded. Secretary of
State Smith informed the House that in 1801 and 1802, President
Jefferson "endeavored to obtain" for U. S. citizens residing along
the Tombigbee and Alabama rivers the free navigation of the Mobile
River to the Gulf of Mexico, "first by claiming this navigation as a
natural right, sanctioned by the law of nations applicable to rivers
similarly situated," and, secondly, by "endeavoring to purchase
the country held by Spain on the Mobile." Smith reiterated the
American claim to the region based on the Louisiana Purchase,
but stated that the Spanish government had objected to this claim
in a manner which 'justified a belief that the question would not
be soon decided," and thus the U. S. minister to Spain had been
instructed to secure from Spain free access to the Mobile River
and a reduction of the duties levied on American commerce. No
other avenues would be entertained. At this juncture, Madison
5.

6.

Claiborne to Smith, March 19, April 21, May 14, 1809, in Dunbar Rowland,
ed., Official Letter Books of W. C. C. Claiborne, 1801-1816 Uackson: Mississippi
Department of Archives and History, 1917), 4: 332-33, 342-44, 351-54,
hereinafter cited as Letter Books.
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preferred negotiation with European powers and a policy of strict
neutrality regarding the Southern borderlands region . Patience
and prudence, diplomacy and deliberation, characterized the
Madison administration's West Florida policy. An approaching
conflict with Great Britain justifiably consumed the president's
greatest attention throughout his first two years in office, and,
thusly, any machinations, official or unofficial, to acquire the
Floridas remained on the backburner. 7
Events at home and abroad, however, quickly forced Madison's
hand, ultimately convincing the president to change drastically his
West Florida policy and adopt a new strategy-one that entailed
considerably more controversial tactics, one that involved the
administration in distasteful clandestine activities, and one that
intensified international rivalry and brought the country to the
brink of war. Conflict rather than peace characterized the new West
Florida policy, and rapid and forceful unilateral action replaced
calculated and friendly negotiation. Events unfolding thousands of
miles from U.S. shores compelled Madison to rethink his approach
to West Florida during the spring of 1810, as the impending
collapse of the Spanish empire precipitated an international
crisis that increasingly concerned U. S. national security. As
Napoleon's control over Spain tightened and the exiled Spanish
Junta crumbled, revolutions throughout the Spanish colonies of
the Western Hemisphere spawned independence movements
from South America to Mexico. Obviously, the disintegration of
Spain's American empire affected the Floridas, where Spain's
grip proved the weakest and where U. S. interests continued to
increase. When the Madison administration read in the columns of
its own organ, the National Intelligencer, the official proclamations
of Venezuela independence that had arrived from Caracas in early
June of 1810, the wheels of policy change were put into motion.
Rumors of discontent and grumblings among the inhabitants of
West Florida simultaneously reached the Madison administration,
7.

AnnalsofCongress, ll'h Cong., 2d sess., 1404-05, 1443. In April ofl810, Tennessee
congressman Robert Weakley presented two memorials from the citizens of his
state "praying that such measures may be adopted by the General Government
as will secure to them the free and unmolested navigation of the Mobile and
Tombigbee rivers, of which they are now deprived by the interposition of
Indians, through whose country the said rivers run; and that provision may be
made for extinguishing the Indian title to so much of the country adjacent to
those rivers as is necessary for settlements for the protection of boats passing
up and down the same." Annals of Congress, 11'11 Cong., 2d sess., 1761.
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adding to Washington's rising consternation over the crumbling
Spanish empire and further heightening anxiety over U. S.
national security throughout the Southern frontier. International
_considerations combined with border concerns to spur Madison's
change of policy regarding West Florida. 8
The president seized the opportunity in June of 1810. He
met at the executive mansion with Claiborne, who had come to
Washington on separate business. Already a chief proponent of
American acquisition of all of West Florida, the Orleans governor
proved to be a cardinal architect of Madison's designs on the
region to the Perdido. Madison and Claiborne decided upon a
course of action that would enlist the support of American-born
settlers in West Florida who would monitor events there, promote
pro-American sentiment, and quell any potential rebellion by
forces unfriendly to the United States. Central to the president's
plan was the key conspirator William Wykoff, a leading citizen of
the Baton Rouge area. As soon as the president and the governor
completed their grand design, the latter immediately issued
confidential instructions to Wykoff that elaborated more fully
upon the new West Florida policy. From all appearances, Claiborne
wrote, Bonaparte had taken Spain and thus, all hope for resistance
by the Junta was now lost and Ferdinand exiled. Although the
Louisiana Purchase gave the United States undisputed title to
West Florida, "it would be more pleasing that the taking possession
of the country, be preceded by a request from the inhabitants."
Claiborne then asked "can no means be devised to obtain such
request?" The people of West Florida, he continued, must adopt
measures which guaranteed their present and future security. The
collapse of the Spanish authority would most certainly instigate
intrigues and provoke competition throughout the region among
various factions tied to respective European powers. Silence the
factions, Claiborne ordered Wykoff, for the United States could
not tolerate instability so close to the southern border, and, most

8.

National lntelligencer, June 10, 1810. For assessments of the collapse of the
Spanish empire and its impact on the United States, see Charles C. Griffin,
The United States and the Disruption of the Spanish Empire, 1810-1822 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1937); Arthur Whitaker, The United States and the
Independence of Latin America, 1800-1830 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
1941) ; and John Lynch, The Spanish-American Revolutions, 1808-1826 (New
York: W. W. orton & Company, 1973). For the impact of these events on
Madison himself, see the editors' notes in the Madison Papers, 1: 305-20.
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WJLLlA)I C. C. CLAU301UlE.

William C.C. Claiborne, First Governor of the State of Louisiana (1812-1 816) . Image
courtesy of the West Florida Revolt Collection, the Center for Southeast Louisiana Studies,
Southeastern Louisiana University.

importantly, "to form for themselves an independent government
is out of the question!" But the "line of conduct which honest
policy points out" could not be mistaken-"Nature has decreed
the union of Florida with the United States, and the welfare of the
inhabitants imperiously demands it." Wykoff was to sound the views
of the citizens of West Florida and "impress upon their minds the
importance of the crisis, the expedience of scouting everything
like French or English influence, and assure them, I pray you, of
the friendly disposition of the American government." Claiborne
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surmised that the "most eligible means of obtaining an expression
of the wish of the inhabitants of Florida" was through the voice
of the people themselves, and the "more satisfactory" manner of
-accomplishing this was "through the medium of a convention of
delegates, named by the people." Every part of West Florida should
be represented, moreover, and Wykoff should also "prepare for
the occasion the minds" of the leading citizens of Mobile. Secrecy,
of course, was paramount. In fact, Claiborne later admonished
Wykoff that "I hope my dear Sir, that you will always consider
the correspondence between us, during my stay at the City of
Washington, as confidential. There are persons who would gladly
learn the whole contents of my letters to you in order to use them
to my injury, and to that of the Government." 9
A week after Claiborne's missive, Secretary of State Smith also
sent instructions to Wykoff essentially detailing the same course of
action. A "crisis is at hand," Smith declared, which would produce
dramatic changes in the Spanish empire, possibly dissolving the
colony's relations with Spain. The geographical position of these
colonies to the United States "and other obvious considerations"
necessitated an "intimate interest" with the Western Hemisphere
and particularly the Floridas. It was, therefore, "our duty" to focus
attention on this "important subject." Besides local considerations,
the United States also "consider themselves as holding a legal title
to the greater part of West Florida under the purchase made by
the Convention with France in the year 1803." Thus, Wykoff was
selected for the "confidential purpose" of proceeding into West
and East Florida "for the purpose of diffusing the impression" ofU.
S. goodwill and common interest, and, in the case of its separation
from Spain, "their incorporation into our Union would coincide
with the sentiments and policy of the United States." Gather
intelligence, Smith instructed Wykoff, and keep the president
apprised regularly. It was "particularly proper to draw their
minds to a contemplation of the obvious and very disagreeable
consequence, as well as to them as to us, should the dissolution of
their ties to the parent Country be followed by a connection with
any of the European powers instead of the natural one suggested
by their geographical and maritime relations to the United States."

9_

Claiborne to Wykoff, june 14, 1810, in Story of the West Florida Rebellion, 35-37;
Claiborne to Wykoff, March 26, 1811, in Letter Books, 5: 189-90_
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With this, the Madison administration had embarked on a new,
and undeniably more covert, policy regarding West Florida. 10
Events in West Florida appeared to proceed as planned
_throughout the summer months of 1810. During the third week of
June, the citizens of the Feliciana District met in convention and
formed a common council comprising four districts armed with
the general powers of government. During the first week of July,
the citizens of the Baton Rouge district followed suit and held a
similar convention. Other districts in the West Florida area held
popular conventions and selected delegates to a larger convention
scheduled to convene later that month. On July 25, the St. Johns
Plains Convention commenced, a representative body of leading
citizens composed of fourteen members-thirteen of whom were
born in the United States, and only three of whom supported
continued Spanish authority. Madison must have been heartened
to learn that his agents assigned to the task of promoting the proAmerican position were succeeding. Of those fourteen members
elected on July 14 to attend the St. Johns Plains Convention, four
were American settlers who had been recommended to Wykoff
by Claiborne-William Barrow, Philip Hickey, Thomas Lilley, and
George Mather. The fact that the West Florida militia was largely
composed of former U. S. citizens only bolstered Madison's hopes
of enticing, through voluntary popular movement, a peaceful
request by the inhabitants of West Florida to join the American
Union to the north.
During these same months, correspondence regularly arrived
at the executive mansion informing the Madison administration of
these portentous events and providing a more detailed description
and analysis of the sentiments and perspectives of the citizens of
West Florida. One such informant was David Holmes, Governor of
the Mississippi Territory, and another U.S. official entrusted by the
10.

Smith to Wykoff, June 20, 1810, in Clarence Carter, ed., Territorial Papers of the
United Stales: Orleans Territory (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1934-)
9: 883-84. On the very same day Smith instructed Wykoff, the secretary of
state also sent a missive to William H. Crawford requesting that the Georgian
appoint a confidential agent to go into East Florida and portions of West
Florida to encourage the population in these areas to agitate for admission
to the United States. Crawford, to the satisfaction of Madison, sought the
assistance of General George Mathews. For Mathews's activities, which resulted
in the infamous Patriot War of 1812, see the seminal study by James Cusick,
The Other War of 1812: The Patriot War and the American Invasion of Spanish East
Florida (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2007).
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president. In mid:June, for example, Holmes discussed the political
situation in West Florida, and reported that Spanish authority
in the region was virtually nonexistent, even to the point that a
"sense of common danger" induced some inhabitants to form a
"kind of neighbourhood police" whose conduct was "inefficient"
and "unjust." The local population, in addition, tended to be
factionalized, as various parties leaned towards either the United
States or several European powers. The Mississippi governor also
wondered how the "state of Anarchy and confusion" south of the
border would affect adjacent U.S. territory, including the possibility
of slave uprisings. Holmes's rendition of events most · certainly
unnerved Madison, as the president recoiled at the thought of
anarchy, rebellion, or a weak and independent West Florida so close
to American territory and so susceptible to foreign influence or
filibusters. Subsequent intelligence provided by Holmes during the
first weeks of July, however, proved less threatening and revealed
that Madison's desire for West Floridians' popular public desire
to join the United States was still working. Holmes reported on
the popularly-elected conventions, which "by an almost unanimous
voice" adopted plans to respond to "both foreign invasion and
internal disturbances," and whose proceedings proved "incipient to
the more decisive and important Measure of asking the protection
of the United States." 11
Still, the content of Holmes's letters convinced Madison that
another step, and thus another key operative on the U. S. side of
the border, was now necessary to accomplish the administration's
West Florida policy. On July 17, the president, who had retreated
from the summer heat of Washington to Montpelier, decided that
an additional precaution must be taken, one which necessitated
the inclusion of Holmes more directly in the administration's
plans. "I think Govr. Holmes should be encouraged in keeping a
wakeful eye to occurrences & appearances in W. Florida, and in
transmitting information concerning them," the president notified
his secretary of state. "It will be well for him also to be attentive
to the means of having his Militia in a state for any service that
may be called for. In the event either of foreign interference with
W. F. or of internal convulsions, more especially if threatening the
neighboring tranquility, it will be proper to take care of the rights
& interests of the U.S. by every measure within the limits of the Ex.
11.

Holmes to Smith, June 20 and july 11, 1810, in Madison Papers, 2: 420, 458.
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Authority." Smith promptly informed Holmes of his new duties as
territorial governor of Mississippi, and apprised him of Claiborne's
instructions to Wykoff of the preceding month, directives that had
been sanctioned by the president of the United States. Potential
military intervention now accompanied the original objective of
pursing the voluntary invitation of the inhabitants of West Florida.
In the case that the latter goal failed, the former remedy would be
applied to achieve the ultimate end of securing U. S. control of
West Florida and for protecting national security.12
Holmes zealously accepted the mantle offered by Madison. A series
of letters from the Mississippi territorial governor quickly became the
main source of intelligence for the administration. In late july, Holmes
notified the president that the "occurrences now passing in West
Florida appear to me in a light so important to the Government of the
United States, that I cannot omit using all the means within my reach
to procure and transmit to you the best information relative thereto."
He then forwarded a critical piece of information provided by one
of the delegates to the St. Johns Plains Convention that, although a
"large mcyority" of the inhabitants of the region desired to enter the
Union, they feared military suppression from Spanish forces arriving
from Cuba before the United States could come to their aid. In early
August, the Mississippi governor sent the administration a copy of the
Convention's address to the Spanish governor and two resolutions
adopted by the body. "From the style and tenor of these Documents,"
Holmes reported, "we might be led to believe that nothing more was
desired than to redress Grievances, and to strengthen and support
the administration of the present Governor." But the facts proved
otherwise, according to Holmes. Unfortunately, "a correct Opinion
cannot be formed of the real Views and Wishes of either the Governor
or the Convention from their public and official Acts." One thing
was certain, however, and that was the fear of military intervention
on the part of Spanish authorities putting an end to the deliberations
of the Convention. Still, a large portion of the population sought
U. S. protection. In early September, Holmes followed up on his
earlier missives. He informed Madison that the Spanish governor
had conceded to the protestations and demands of the Convention,
and that the governor had been divested of most of his powers and
all powers placed "either under the immediate or direct control of
.-.

.-

12.

Madison to Smith,July 17, 1810, Smith to Holmes,July 21, 1820, in Madison
Papers, 2: 419, 420-21.
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the representatives of the people." More importantly, and thus more
critically for the objectives of the Madison administration, "It is not
contemplated by the representatives of any part of the community
who think upon the Subject that the province can maintain an
Independent Government, they of course will look to some power for
aid and protection." This last piece of intelligence could only have
proven as much disheartening as heartening for Madison. All reports
indicated that the citizens of West Florida overwhelmingly desired
U. S. protection and eventually entrance into the Union, but the
Madison administration would have to act quickly in order to prevent
foreign influence from disrupting U.S. objectives. West Florida could
not survive independently, but acting precipitately could prove as
dangerous for administration objectives as waiting too long to act. 13
Throughout the summer months of 1810, the Madison
administration received correspondence from other important
sources confirming the contents of Holmes's missives. John
Bedford, tax assessor for the 5L11 collection district of Tennessee,
received a steady dose of information from his friend William
Barrow, an American citizen who settled in West Florida in 1798
and who participated in the St. Johns Plains Convention. Bedford,
in turn, reported to Madison the contents of Barrow's letters.
In early July, conditions and sentiments in West Florida strongly
convinced Bedford that "a revolution of some kind may be
attempted in that country, before a great while," and that two plans
to secure this end were in the works-declare independence and
follow the lead of other Spanish American provinces and form a
new nation, or, declare independence and create a new nation with
the immediate objective of becoming "an integral part of the U.
States." Like Holmes, Bedford indicated that a "large majority" of
West Floridians desired to join the Union. Late in August, Bedford
enclosed to Madison another of Barrow's letters in which the latter
figure expressed a "frank expression of concern and solicitude and
unpleasant suspense about their political situation," a sentiment
shared by many other citizens of West Florida. Bedford, who knew
13.

Holmes to Smith,July 31 andAugust8, 1810, in Carter, TerritrrrialPapers, Orleans,
9: 889-90, 891-92; Holmes to Smith, September 12, 1810, in Carter, Territorial
Papers, Mississippi, 6 :115-18. The editors of the Madison Papers correctly claim
that Holmes 's correspondence to the Madison administration from June
through October of 1810 was "probably the single most important source of
information about the situation in West Florida thatJM was to receive, both
during his summer vacation and after his return to Washington on 6 October
1810." Madison Papers, 2:313-14.
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nothing of Madison's West Florida policy, replied to Barrow that
the inhabitants of the region no longer owed any allegiance to
Spain, that they should "assume the rights of self-government,"
that their interests were those of the United States and thus Florida
"ought & must in time" become part of the Union, and that to
"secure & facilitate" this end they should "constitute a separate
& independent government" in West Florida which could be
maintained until it was "proper & consistent" with U. S. policy to
"protect or incorporate them" into the United States. Such counsel
undoubtedly meshed with that being disseminated by Wykoff and
others friendly to the cause of the Madison administration. 14
The territorial secretary of Orleans, Thomas B. Robertson,
also became an integral figure in the administration's evolving
West Florida policy. Just days before he informed Holmes of his
new role in the grand design to secure the region, Secretary of
State Smith also instructed Robertson to monitor events and
sentiments in West Florida and to report back the "most regular
and precise information." The Madison administration informed
the territorial secretary that the United States welcomed an
insurrection in West Florida to be conducted and led by former
American citizens residing there, and mentioned the instructions
to Wykoff and Holmes to encourage such an event, including the
use of the Mississippi territorial militia to occupy the area in order
to stimulate further rebellion among the inhabitants. Robertson
proved a faithful servant during the remaining summer months
of 1810. He notified the administration that the people of West
Florida "appear to be preparing to throw off their dependence on
Spain," and that news of Venezuela's actions had just arrived "to
hasten the event." Robertson also discussed the various political
allegiances of the population and forwarded the addresses of the
St. Johns Plains Convention. In sum, the Madison administration
received throughout the summer of 1810 ample and consistent
intelligence about the events unfolding and the sentiments of the
residents of West Florida. 15

14.
15.

Barrow to Bedford, June 4, 1810, Bedford to Madison, July 4, 26 August 1810,
in Madison Papers, 2: 399-400, 508-09.
Smith to Robertson, July 13, 1810, Graham to Robertson, July 30, 1810, in
Waciuma, Intervention, 145; Robertson to Smith,July 6, July 28, 1810, Madison
Papers, 2:458, 505-06; Robertson to Smith, August 26, 1810, in Carter, Territorial
Papers, Orleans, 9: 896-97.
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Not everything went so smoothly for the Madison
administration during that summer. The president's capable and
trusted agents were certainly in place and successfully carrying
out their assigned tasks, but a number of serious complications
threatened to undermine Madison's West Florida policy. For one,
rowdy American settlers in the Tombigbee region threatened a
filibuster against Mobile. Such a scenario undermined Madison's
objective of securing the voluntary request of the inhabitants of
West Florida. The president, therefore, took every precaution in
order to prevent American invasion of Spanish territory and the
disruption of his peaceful annexation of the region to the Perdido
River. First, Madison secured the direct assistance and intervention
of Mississippi Territory officials, primarily that of Territorial Judge
Harry Toulmin, who consistently and successfully thwarted the
militaristic intrigues of the American citizens-the Caller, Kennedy,
and Kemper clans-instigating an "unlawful expedition" ultimately
producing "injurious consequences" for U. S. policy. Second, the
president reinforced the U. S. garrison at Fort Stoddert, situated
just north of Mobile, and he even considered invoking the 1794
Logan Act to squash any movements made by Americans against
Mobile. "There can be no doubt of its unlawfulness," Madison
informed Toulmin, "nor as to the duty of the Executive to employ
force if necessary to arrest it, and to make examples of the Authors."
Fortunately for the Madison administration, the proposed filibuster
never materialized. 16
Another complication, however, directly concerned executive
authority. The president believed he had the constitutional power
to employ force against American citizens threatening foreignoccupied soil, but questions arose immediately about presidential
power to annex or occupy foreign-occupied soil, even in the event of a
peaceful request to do so by the inhabitants thereof. As the situation
within West Florida seemed to proceed according to plan during
tl1e late summer of 1810, Madison asked his cabinet to weigh in
on this most crucial subject. "Should it become necessary," he
16.

Madison to Eustis, August 10 and September 7, 1810, Eustis to Madison,
August 19 and September 14, 1810, Richard Sparks to Eustis, July 12, 1820,
Madison to Graham, August 10 and 24, 1810, Madison to Gallatin , August
22 , 1810, Graham to Madison, August 29 and September 3, 1810, Madison to
Toulmin, September 5, 1810, Madison Papers, 2: 466, 473, 474, 497, 501-02, 50405, 515-16, 522, 525, 529-30, 543; Toulmin to Madison , July 28, 1810, Homes
to Smith, September 12, 1810, in Carter, Territorial Papers, M ississippi, 6: 84-90,
117.
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stated to Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin, "for the Ex. to
exercise authority within those limits, before the meeting of Congs.
I forsee many legal difficulties." "Will you tum your thoughts to the
question," Madison concomitantly requested of Secretary of War
William Eustis, "what steps are within the Executive Competency, in
case the deliberations of the people of W. Florida should issue in
an offer to place the territory under the Authority of the U. S.?"
Both responded in the affirmative, that the president possessed the
constitutional authority to occupy West Florida. Gallatin maintained
that the "law which authorizes the President to take possession of
Louisiana will legally cover any other measures which policy may
dictate in relation to that part of West Florida which lies between the
Mississippi & the Perdido," but "what ground ought generally to be
taken consistent with justice, the rights and interests of the U. States,
and the preservation of peace is the difficult question." Eustis fully
concurred. "But as it is impossible to [divine] what course they might
take," he counseled the president, "it is equally difficult to determine
what part should be taken by [the] Government." Should the
deliberations of the citizens of West Florida result in a formal reg uest
to place the region under U. S. authority on terms deemed by the
latter to be admissible and justifiable, "protection of some kind will
[necessarily be implied]-protection under such circumstances
[implies force; how far], how near and to what extent must depend
on [events and] may not probably require to be determined before
the [next month]." As for the president's worries over the status of
the customs house in the event of an invitation to occupy the region,
Gallatin invoked the fourth and eleventh sections of the 1804 Mobile
Act, which the "laws having been so worded as to include the districts
of Orleans & Mobile whatever we may claim & possess," and which
provided for either annexation to the Mississippi Territory's revenue
district "all the navigable rivers ... lying within the United States,
which empty into the Gulf of Mexico, east of the river Mississippi"
or the creation of a separate revenue district for waters of "the bay
and river Mobile ... emptying into the Gulf of Mexico, east of the
said river Mobile." Such advice quickly convinced the president
that he indeed retained all the necessary authority to act on any
request emanating from West Florida. He mentioned to Jefferson
that West Florida presented "serious questions" as to the authority
of the executive, as well as to the "adequacy of the existing laws of
the U. S. for territorial administration," and the "near approach of
Congs. might subject any intermediate interposition of the Ex. to the
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charge of being premature & disrespectful, if not of being illegal."
Still, "there is great weight in the considerations, that the country
to the Perdido, being our own, may be farily, taken possession of, if
_it can be done ·without violence, above all if there be danger of its
passing into the hands of a third & dangerous party." 17
The threat of that "third & Dangerous" party offered a third-and
the most serious complication-an intense American Anglophobia.
Most Americans, Madison included, ardently believed that the British
bogeyman threatened to seize the initiative and add West Florida to
the British empire. Of course, American fears of British intervention
in or even occupation of West Florida was nothing new. Madison,
in fact, encountered this prospect from the very beginning of his
presidency. Wilkinson, for example, had suggested to Madison in April
of 1809 that if the United States "have not peace with Great Britain,"
then the "whole force destined to this quarter, should be pressed
forward, because she can, at her will, take possession of West Florida."
Claiborne, too, worried about the British specter during those early
days of the Madison administration. Despite Folch's assurances, made
during their visit that same month in 1809, that the Spanish colonies
would not fall into the hands of England, Claiborne still declared
to Secretary of State Smith that "it is greatly to be desired, that the
[Spanish colonies] may not fall either commercially or politically into
the hands of Great Britain or France, and without a severe struggle,
one or the other event, seems to me inevitable." The interests of
the United States, continued Claiborne, required that all European
influence in the Americas, and England's most of all, "should be
banished [from] the continent of America." 18
Madison most certainly shared these fears. At the same time
that the U. S. secretary of state informed Wykoff of his confidential
mission in West Florida, Smith also notified the U. S. minister to
Great Britain, William Pinkney, that the Madison administration
would not tolerate British interference in that region. The imminent
17.

18.

Madison to Gallatin, August 22, 1810, Madison to Eustis, August 30, 1810,
Gallatin to Madison, September 5, 1810, Eustis to Madison, September 7,
1810, Madison Papers, 2: 501-02, 516-17, 527, 531; U. S. Statutes at Large, 2: 25154; Madison to Jefferson, October 19, 1810, in J. Jefferson Looney, ed., The
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Retirement Series (Princeton,NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2004-), 3: 177, hereinafter cited as Jefferson Papers. Madison also notified
William Pinkney that the "occupancy of the Territory as far as the Perdido, was
called for by the crisis there, and is understood to be within the authy. of the
Executive." Madison to Pinkney, October 30, 1810, Madison Papers, 2: 605 .
Wilkinson, Memoirs, 2: 349; Claiborne, L etter Books, 4: 343, 353.
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disruption of the Spanish empire, Smith instructed Pinkney, made
it the duty of the United States to turn its attention to the Floridas,
"in whose destiny they have so near an interest." Besides the obvious
geographical situation, the U . S. government claimed a legal title
to "the greater portion of West Florida" based on the Louisiana
Purchase. Under these circumstances, Smith concluded, "it may
be proper not to conceal from the British Government (which may
otherwise form views towards these territories inconsistent with the
eventual ones entertained by the United States) that any steps on
the part of Great Britain interfering with these will necessarily be
regarded as unjust and unfriendly, and as leading to collisions."
Here, then, from the confines of the Madison administration,
came the germination of the No Transfer policy. 19
Fears of English intervention in West Florida also filled the 1810
summer correspondence to the Madison administration, as every
one of the president's agents broached the issue in nearly every
letter. Robertson, for example, informed the administration that if
the Spanish authorities refused to accede to the demands made by
the citizens ofWest Florida, then the refusal "might be attended with
serious consequences" as the "English who held most of the offices
in the province were the chief obstacle to their adopting measures
leading to independence" and that "unless the United States showed
some disposition to countenance them a messenger would be sent to
England to propose an alliance with that Govt." Holmes confirmed
the fears of his compatriots. He notified the administration that West
Florida could not maintain its independence and would thus "look
to some power for aid and protection." Either the United States
or Great Britain would be the obvious choice. "The friends to a
connexion with Great Britain are numerous, intelligent, and active,"
Holmes warned Madison, and "their endeavors to gain proselytes are
unremitting and the arguments brought forward in support of their
Opinions are of an impressive and operative Nature. The ability of
Great Britain to afford the best Markets for the productions of the
province and to promote in other respects the pecuniary Interests
of the Inhabitants are Urged as powerful inducements for forming a
connexion with that nation." These recurring admonitions certainly
did not fall on deaf ears back in Washington. 20
19. Smith to Pinkney,June 13, 1810, in Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1: 5-6.
20. Robertson to Smith, August 26, 1810, in Carter, Territorial Papers, Orleans, 9:
896-97; Holmes to Smith, September 12, 1810, in Carter, Territorial papers,
Mississippi, 6: 115-18.
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This same Anglophobia pervaded Madison 's administration.
At the same time that Holmes's and Robertson's correspondence
reached the nation's capital in the late summer of 1810, Gallatin
opined to President Madison, still at Montpelier, that "every
circumstance" corroborated his opinion that England will attempt
to govern the Spanish colonies through the medium of a nominal
Spanish regency, and that she will oppose the Spanish American
revolutionary movements by keeping up a war in some corner of
Spain. Gallatin also feared that England would take possession
of Cuba, and thus "English interest and prejudices against us"
arising from there would be the "principal obstacles" to American
interests in that region. "We may expect new sources of collision,"
the Treasury Secretary concluded. "Florida & Cuba are by the far
most important objects & will require some immediate decision."
The U. S. Charge de Affaires to Spain, George Erving, another
of the administration's trusted advisors, presented Madison the
sternest warning regarding British machinations concerning the
status of the Floridas. "It appears to me that G. B. is now playing
a deep speculating game with the poor Spaniards," he wrote the
president, and "taking it for granted that the English government
cannot overlook the Floridas, but that on the contrary for many
principal reasons, they will be disposed to make their first location
there, it occurs to me that the U.S. should anticipate any movement
of that sort, or any communication on the part of England of a
guarantee &c-by a formal & bold declaration that in a certain
state of things they will take possession of the Floridas"- or, in
sum, that the United States "will never suffer them to be held by a
European power other than that to which they now owe allegiance."
Erving presented, therefore, the first explicit appeal for what was
to become the No Transfer Resolution of 1811, and, arguably,
revealed the genesis of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823-and it all
started with U.S. concerns over the future of West Florida and the
threat of British intervention therein. 21
Matters changed abruptly for the Madison administration
in October of 1810, however, as a series of rapidly developing
events finally compelled the president to take action. The
first development concerned, as could be expected, American
Anglophobia. On October 14, the administration received
21.

Erving to Madison, September 2 and October 20, 1810, Gallatin to Madison,
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information that the Caracas Junta, which had earlier that year
declared its independence from Spain, had now granted to Great
Britain a series of lucrative commercial concessions. The following
day, the National Intelligencer published an official proclamation
Irom the government of Venezuela, in which the new nation not
only sought commercial relations with England, but also requested
"protection from G. B." On October 17, the editor of the newspaper,
Joseph Gales, called on Madison, now back in Washington, and
listened as the president bemoaned British meddling in South
America, which quickly turned to worries about British influence
in West Florida. Cabinet officials shared Madison's consternation.
Two days later, Madison confided to his friend Thomas Jefferson
that "the Crisis in W. Florida as you will see has come home to our
feelings and our interests." The "successful party at Baton Rouge,"
the president continued, "have not yet made any communication
or invitation to this Govt. They certainly will call in, either our Aid
or that of G. B. whose conduct at the Caraccas gives notice of her
propensity to fish in troubled waters. From present appearances,
our occupancy of W. F. would be resented by Spain, by England,
& by France, and bring on, not a triangular, but quadrangular
contest." But fears of English intrigues and potential international
conflict were not yet enough to compel Madison to seize the
initiative. As he intimated to Jefferson, the president still needed
the invitation of the inhabitants thereof-and they would certainly
not let him down. 22
Mter intercepting a communique from the Spanish governor
at Baton Rouge to Governor Folch in Pensacola requesting military
assistance, the president and delegates involved with the St. Johns
Plains Convention ordered the local militia commander, Philemon
Thomas, to seize the Spanish fort at Baton Rouge. Thomas,
with a small contingent of former American citizens, responded
accordingly, and on September 23, 1810, captured the fort. Three
days later, ten of the Convention members convened and declared
West Florida independent of Spain. That very same day, John Rhea,
president of the Convention, sent a copy of the declaration to
Holmes, further requesting that the Mississippi territorial governor
forward the document to President Madison. Almost two weeks
22.

Nationallntelligencer, October 15, 1810; Smith to Armstrong, November 1,1810,
in Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1: 7-8; Madison to jefferson, October 19,
1810, in Looney, jefferson Papers, 3: 177-78.
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later, on October 10, the Republic of West Florida formally asked
the U. S. government for "that immediate protection to which we
consider ourselves entitled." Finally, the Madison administration
had its invitation to take what it already had claimed. 23
As soon as Holmes received the much-awaited news from
south of the border, he sent it to Washington. In the meantime,
the Mississippi governor had yet to receive his orders, issued earlier
by the secretary of state, to occupy West Florida in the event of
independence and a request for protection. Holmes, however,
seized the initiative, and, "thoroughly impressed with the necessity
of taking immediate measures for the safety of the persons and
property of the Citizens of this territory who reside near the line of
demarcation," immediately ordered to the border two companies
of U. S. troops stationed near the territorial capital. The news of
the sudden events consuming West Florida most likely alarmed
Madison when it arrived at the nation's capital. For one, the
revelation that Holmes had not received his orders to enter and
occupy the region until September 29 could delay U.S. occupation,
ultimately undermining the ability of American forces to protect
the people of West Florida. Worse yet, Holmes also reported that
a significant number of the inhabitants, namely from the Mobile
district, were "inimical to the New order of things" and, bolstered
with Spanish troops from Pensacola, were quite likely to strike
back at the Convention. Rumors also circulated that pro-Spanish
forces in West Florida were actively seeking the support of local
Indians, and that "an insurrection of Slaves, who are very numerous
in the upper part of the Province," was very likely. Holmes's
correspondence during the first several weeks of the fall of 1810,
combined with a rabid Anglophobia, spurred Madison to action. 24
"News arrived today, that West Florida is declared independent,
by Convention," Joseph Gales noted in his journal entry of October
25, and "official information received same day." President Madison
23.

24.

For the various correspondence regarding the West Florida declaration of
independence and the request for U.S. annexation, see American State Papers,
Foreign R elations, 3: 395-96 or the Annals of Congress, 11 '" Cong., 3rd sess.,
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Holmes to Thomas Cushing, September 26 and 28, 1810, in Carter, Territorial
Papers, MississipjJi, 6: 120, 121-22; Holmes to Smith, September 26, October 3
and 17, 1810, Madison Papers, 318. For the content of Holmes's correspondence,
see also American State Papers, Foreign Relations, 3: 394-96 and the Annals of
Congress, 11 '11 Cong., 3rd sess. , Appendix, 1251-63.

Published by STARS, 2011

61

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 90 [2011], No. 2, Art. 1
178

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

immediately convened a three-hour, closed session of his cabinet,
Gales recalled. Two days later, President Madison issued his famous
October Proclamation, the first statement on what soon was to
become the No Transfer Resolution of 1811. The president declared
that a "Crisis has at length arrived" in West Florida, subverting
Spanish authority there, threatening the "tranquility and security of
our adjoining territories," and giving "new facilities" for the violation
of "our revenue and commercial laws and of those prohibiting
the introduction of slaves." Due to these "peculiar and imperative
circumstances," any hesitation or forbearance on the part of the
Unites States to occupy West Florida and thus prevent "confusions
and contingencies" undermining national security, would be seen
as nothing less than a "dereliction of their title" or an "insensibility
to the importance of the stake." In the meantime, aU. S.-occupied
West Florida would still be a "subject of fair and friendly negotiation
and adjustment." Madison also referred to the American claim to
the territory between the Mississippi and the Perdido rivers pursuant
to the Louisiana Purchase, and that the United States had merely
acquiesced in the "temporary continuance" of Spanish authority
in that particular region out of "their conciliatory views and by
a confidence in the justice of their cause and in the success of
candid discussion and amicable negotiation with a just and friendly
power," and not out of any "distrust of their title" to the region.
The "satisfactory adjustment" of the American claim had been "too
long delayed" and "entirely suspended" by events over which the
United States had no control. Existing acts of congress, in addition,
had already contemplated "an eventual possession" of West Florida
and were "accordingly so framed as in that case to extend in their
operation" to that region. The president, therefore, "in pursuance
of these weighty and urgent considerations" deemed it "right and
requisite" that the United States should take possession of the
territory and add it to the Orleans Territory. Madison then directed
Governor Claiborne to extend his authority over the area. "This
act of occupancy, which is merely a change of possession and not
a change of right," Secretary of State Smith summed it up to John
Armstrong, Madison 's U.S. minister to France, "will it is hoped, be
viewed only as the natural consequence of a state of things, which
the American Government could neither foresee nor prevent." 25
25. Joseph Gales, "Recollections of the Civil History of the War of 1812,"
Historical Magazine, 3rd series, 3 (March 1874), 158; Madison to the House
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The same day that the president signed his proclamation, he
ordered Governor Claiborne to proceed at once to Natchez, publish
and circulate the Proclamation in English, French, and Spanish, enlist
the protection and assistance of U. S. regulars stationed along the
southwestern fran tier, and enter in to and take possession ofWest Florida.
Once accomplished, Claiborne was to extend the laws of the Orleans
Territory, organize the militia, establish parish courts, and, "finally, to
do whatever your legal powers applicable to the case will warrant, and
may be calculated to maintain order; to secure to the inhabitants the
peaceable enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion; and to
place them, as far as may be, on the same footing with the inhabitants
of the other districts under your authority." The territorial legislature
of Orleans would provide any additional and necessary authority or
provisions. If, "contrary to expectation," U.S. occupation was met with
or opposed by force, the commanding officer of the U.S. regulars would
assist the governor, and, if deemed necessary, so would the militia of
the territories of Orleans and Mississippi. At the same time, should any
particular place in the newly acquired territory remain in the possession
of Spanish forces, no force was to be employed against them. The very
next day, October 28, Claiborne set out from Washington bound to
the Mississippi territory and thence on to Baton Rouge to carry out his
instructions. In the meantime, the administration apprised Holmes of
Claiborne's sundry duties and instructed the Mississippi governor to
coordinate and provide any necessary support. 26
Madison's October Proclamation in no way resolved who
controlled West Florida. American officials secured only the western
portions, including the Baton Rouge area; events in the eastern part,
the Mobile area, still proved chaotic. During the month of October,
for example, rumors circulated widely throughout the eastern portion
of a Convention army making its way from the western region, causing
the "utmost panic" and fomenting "a crisis to be fast approaching." The
Baton Rouge men indeed presented those from Mobile a "temperate

26.
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Claiborne, November 15, 1810, in Carter, Territorial Papers, Orleans, 2: 901-02,
902-03.
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& friendly" disposition to join the cause, but they also hinted that
force may be their only recourse. Wedded to this concern was
American interest in the future of the remaining portion of Spanish
West Florida, from Pensacola to the Apalachicola River, and to all of
East Florida, to which the United States had no legitimate claims. "E
Florida is of great importance to the U.S. and it is not probable that
Congs. will let it pass into any new hands," Madison wrote Pinkney at
the end of October. "It is to be hoped G. B. will not entangle herself
with us, by seizing it, either with or without the privity of her Allies
in Cadiz." The position of Cuba, too, gave the U.S. government "so
deep an interest in her destiny," and although the island "might be an
inactive" it "could not be a satisfied spectator, at its falling under any
European Govt. which might make a fulcn1m of that position agst. the
commerce or security of the U.S." Making matters worse, concluded
the president, with respect to Spanish America generally, Great
Britain "is engaged in the most eager, and if without the concurrence
of the Spanish [authority] at Cadiz, the most reproachful grasp of
political influence and commercial preferences." Deep concerns over
U. S. national security still kept the Florida question uppermost in
the minds of the Madison administration, despite U. S. occupation
of Baton Rouge. More must be done, they realized. But unilateral
presidential action would not remedy the situation, and the president
revealed another serious concern on the part of the administrationthe need for congressional assent to the October Proclamation, which
the administration had yet to reveal to congress. To such dire subjects,
the Madison administration turned its full attention in December of
1810. The logical end of the administration's efforts was the historic
No Transfer Resolution of the following month. 27
In his second annual message, President Madison finally notified
congress of the October Proclamation. It was December 5 and Governor
Claiborne was already on the scene in West Florida. Due to ongoing
disruptions within the Spanish empire, the administration necessarily
focused on "that portion of West Florida which, though of right
appertaining to the United States, had remained in the possession of
Spain awaiting the result of negotiations for its actual delivery to them." In
the meantime, however, Spanish authority had been subverted, exposing
that nation to "ulterior events" ultimately threatening U. S. "rights and
Welfare." The president, therefore, had to occupy the territory "to which
27.

Madison to Pinkney, October 30, 1810, Toulmin to Madison, October 31 , 1810,
Madison Papers, 2: 605, 606-08 .
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the title of the United States extends, and to which the laws provided for
the Territory of Orleans are applicable." The "legality and necessity of the
course pursued" by Madison assured him that congress would approve his
action in the most "favorable light," and, thus, that body would provide
any necessary legislation further protecting the "rights and equitable
interests of the people thus brought into the bosom of the American
family." West Florida's declaration of independence and the subsequent
request for U. S. protection accompanied the message to congress, along
with a copy of the October Proclamation. 28
Congress heeded Madison's call and commenced debate over the
future of West Florida that very month. The bill "declaring the laws
now in force in the Territory of Orleans to extend to, and to have full
force and effect, to the river Perdido, pursuant to the treaty concluded
at Paris on.the 30rh of April, 1803" generated a number of challenging,
and to some extent, irresolvable, questions, and produced equally
cogent arguments both for and against Madison's request for U. S.
annexation of the region. First, did the United States have "good
title" to the territory under question? Second, did Spanish perfidy
and spoliation claims provide justification for seizure? Third, did
national security and the "law of self-preservation," that is, the threat
of a foreign power seizing West Florida, necessitate U.S. occupation?
Fourth, did Madison's Proclamation transcend executive authority
and, thus, prove unconstitutional, namely as it concerned issues of
legislation and war? Congressional answers to these dicey questions
remained unanswered as 1810 turned into 1811. 29
28. James Madison, Second Annual Message to Congress, December 5, 1810, in
Richardson, Messages and Papers, 1: 484.
29. For the congressional debate over the West Florida bill, see Annals of Congress,
11 th Cong., 3rd sess., 37-66. For the full text of the bill, see Annals of Congress, 11th
Cong., 3rd sess., 25-26. The Federalist Senator from Delaware, Outerbridge
Horsey, went so far as to suggest that the Madison administration's policy of
economic coercion as retaliation against England 's commercial restrictions
violating U. S. neutral rights and damaging American commerce were
directly connected with the administration's actions in West Florida: "Let it
be remembered that Great Britain is now the ally of Spain, and, for aught
we know, may have guarantied her colonies. Would it not at least have been
prudent ... to have inquired what part she would take? If she is to act the
part of an ally, offensive and defensive, or of an ally at all, can it be expected
that she will revoke her Orders in Council, or even remain indifferent? It is
a singular circumstance, that the proclamation reviving the non-intercourse
with Great Britain and the one for taking possession of Florida were upon the
anvil at the same time. There is only five days difference in their dates, and the
Florida proclamation is the first. Sir, to me, they look a good deal like twin
brothers." Annals of Congress, IF" Cong., 3rd sess., 55.
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Madison's October Proclamation also directly affected
another spirited debate consuming congress at the same time as
the consideration of the West Florida bill-a bill for admitting
the Territory of Orleans to the Union. A number of congressmen
noted that the president's occupation of West Florida and the
immediate addition of the area to the Orleans Territory conflicted
with that portion of the proclamation calling for a "fair and
friendly negotiation and adjustment. " If Orleans became a state,
with West Florida as part of its domain, queried one congressman,
then "would not all right of negotiation on the subject be taken
from the President?" Another asked could the executive "convey
away any part of a State?" "What power have we to negotiate
about the territory of any of the States?" pondered several
others. Madison 's proclamation indeed carried with it a number
of important considerations of constitutional law, aspects not
readily perceived by the president in the fall of 1810. Despite such
reservations, congress voted in mid:January of 1811 to admit the
Territory of Orleans into the Union as the State of Louisiana. But
other than allowing Louisiana-West Florida included-a spot
on the Stars and Stripes, congress had yet to act on the Florida
question. Executive action during the first two weeks of january of
1811, however, quickly returned Washington's attention to events
unfolding immediately south of the American border. Once again
the Madison administration had taken the offensive. 30
Several documents simultaneously landed in the president's
hands in late December of 1810. The first set was rather
propitious; the second set proved considerably more ominous.
All of it convinced the administration that the Florida question
was far from settled. Together, the correspondence Madison sent
congress on January 3, 1811, prompted that body to address the
administration's concerns over the future of the Floridas and the
potential consequences concerning U. S. interests. As to the first
of the correspondence, Folch voluntarily offered Madison the
remainder of West Florida. The Spanish governor had hinted over
the previous years that he would do so, but now he made it official.
Unless succor arrived from Spanish authorities in Mexico or Cuba,
or unless the Spanish authorities had already opened negotiations
directly with the United States, Folch "decided on delivering this
province to the United States under an equitable capitulation."
30.

Annals oJCongress, 11 th Cong. , 3rd sess. , 482-83, 484, 496, 497, 519.
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"The incomprehensible abandonment in which I see myself, and
the afflicted situation to which this province sees itself reduced,
not only authorize me, but force me to have recourse to this
9etermination, the only one to save it from the ruin which threatens
it," he informed the Madison administration. "The United States
are also authorized to accept it; for as the disturbances which now
afflict this province, so near to them, must increase every day, they
cannot but have an influence on their tranquility, an object which
merits the first care of every Government." Madison could not have
stated it any better. 31
The other correspondence reaching Madison, however,
attracted more of the president's attention and obvious concernthe British government protested the U. S. occupation of West
Florida. In addition, the British considered the American claim
to the region as "manifestly doubtful," and even chastised the
lVIadison administration for using the West Florida rebellion as
"the pretext for wresting a province from a friendly Power, and
that in the time of her adversity." As a close ally of Spain, the British
government "cannot see with indifference any attack upon her
interests in America," and the "Mistress of the Seas" requested an
explanation from the president that "will at once" convince the
British government of the "pacific disposition" of the United States
towards its Spanish friend, and thusly to remove the "contrary
impression" that Madison 's annual message made upon the British
government. Relations with Great Britain were already considerably
strained, and such a response from His Majesty's minister in
Washington only irritated an already infectious Anglophobia. 32
Indeed, in Madison's special message to congress addressing
the correspondence of both Folch and Morier, the president
dwelled entirely on the British missive, not the Spanish one.
Although Madison believed that the British minister acted without
any formal instructions from his superiors, and although the
British government had never officially communicated to the
United States any agreement with Spain that required any British
interposition materially affecting the United States, and although
Spain had made no call for the fulfillment of any supposed
existing agreement, "the spirit and scope of the document, with
the accredited source from which it proceeds," demanded the
31. Folch to Smith, Folch to McKee, December 2, 1810, ASP: FR, 3: 398, 399.
32. John P. Marier to Smith, December 15, 1810, ASP: FR, 3: 399, 400.
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consideration of congress. President Madison then provided
the first explicit statement of the policy that would become the
famous No Transfer Resolution. "Taking into view the tenor of
these several communications, the posture of things with which
they are connected, the intimate relation of the country adjoining
the United States eastward of the river Perdido to their security
and tranquility, and the peculiar interest they otherwise have
in its destiny," the president recommended to congress "the
seasonableness of a declaration that the United States could not
see without serious inquietude any part of a neighboring territory
in which they have in different respects so deep and so just a
concern pass from the hands of Spain into those of any other
foreign power." Madison also recommended that congress consider
the "expediency of authorizing the Executive to take temporary
possession of any part or parts of the said Territory, in pursuance
of arrangements which may be desired by the Spanish authorities,
and for making provision for the government of the same during
such possession," and, more importantly, "to provide for the event
of a subversion of the Spanish authorities within the Territory in
question, and an apprehended occupancy thereof by any other
foreign power." One of the most important and consequential
documents of American foreign policy, therefore, originated
with the Madison administration, and, although directed at areas
of Florida not currently under American control, this policy was
conceived, developed, and matured as a direct result of the events
unfolding in West Florida during the summer of 1810. 33
No sooner had Madison made his appeal to congress,
then the British bogeymen quickly materialized in another, yet
equally, menacing manifestation. Exactly a week after sending to
congress the Spanish governor's propitious request and the British
minister's ominous one, Madison disclosed another startling
piece of intelligence, one that merely fueled an already fervent
Anglophobia consuming the administration and its supporters
in congress. The revolutionary government of Venezuela had
intercepted a letter written by Luis de Onis, the Spanish minister
representing the Cadiz government in America, bound for the
Captain General of Caracas. In a fit of vituperation unbecoming
a diplomatic official of his station, Onis insinuated that military
33.

Madison to Congress, January 3, 1811, in Richardson, Messages and Papers, 1:
488.
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force may be a viable option to neutralize U. S. influence in the
Western hemisphere. The Spanish minister angrily declared, albeit
in rather sarcastic and dismissive tones, that "if England should
display her energy, in however small a degree, and if, on our part,
some vessels should be sent to their coasts, and some troops should
draw near to Louisiana, there is reason to believe that we should see
these provinces separated and divided into two or three republics,
and, consequently, they would remain in a state of perfect nullity."
The letter passed into the hands of an American agent, who then
promptly sent it straight to President Madison. Such a threatening
charge coming from such a high-ranking source only justified in
the minds of the administration that Florida was indeed a serious
security concern, and, ultimately, confirmed their fears that a
foreign power-England namely-could and most likely would
acquire the territory. 34
But the administration had prodded enough. Congress finally
responded, and quickly. Less than a week after the Madison
administration notified congress of Onfs's imprudent missive,
and undoubtedly as concerned as the president about national
security along the southern border with Florida and as fueled by
fears of English intrigues in that region, congress enacted the No
Transfer Resolution. Much of the wording was Madison's: "Taking
into view the peculiar situation of Spain, and of her American
provinces; and considering the influence which the destiny of the
territory adjoining the southern border of the United States may
have upon their security, tranquility, and commerce," congress
resolved that the nation, "under the peculiar circumstances of the
existing crisis, cannot, without serious inquietude, see any part of
the said territory pass into the hands of any foreign power" and
that a "due regard to their own safety compels them to provide,
under certain contingencies, for the temporary occupation of the
said territory," an occupation which shall "remain subject to future
negotiation." As the Madison administration requested, congress
authorized the executive "to take possession of, and occupy, all or
any part of the territory lying east of the river Perdido, and south
of the state of Georgia and the Mississippi territory," in the event
that "an arrangement has been, or shall be, made with the local
authority of the said territory, for delivering up the possession of
34.

Onfs to Captain General of the Province of Caracas, 2 February 1810, ASP: FR,
3:404.
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the same, or any part thereof, to the United States," or in the more
menacing event "of an attempt to occupy the said territory, or any
part thereof, by any foreign government." In either case, congress
empowered the president to employ the armed forces as deemed
necessary to secure these ends, appropriated a hefty sum of money
to cover the expense, and provided that a "temporary government"
be established under U. S. occupation. 35
Six weeks later, congress ordered, through a supplementary
piece of legislation, that the No Transfer Resolution would not be
printed or published until the end of the next session of congress,
or unless directed by the president to do otherwise. In other words,
the act was to remain a secret for the time being. Not until February
of 1812, as war with Great Britain loomed just over the horizon,
did congress authorize the president "to occupy and hold all that
tract of country called West Florida, which lies west of the river
Perdido, not now in possession of the United States." The Madison
administration would not achieve this objective until U. S. forces
seized Mobile from Spain in 1813, as war raged with England. 36
The Madison administration wasted no time in promulgating
the new American policy to the world. Exactly a week after congress
confirmed Madison's West Florida policy and redirected it eastward
and hence southward, the president informed the U. S. minister to
England of the No Transfer Resolution that had "passed with closed
doors." ''You will thence perceive that the United States are not
disposed to acquiesce in the occupation on the part of any foreign
power of any part of East or West Florida, and that Congress have
provided under certain contingencies for the temporary occupation
of the said Territory," Smith apprised Pinkney. "This proceeding is, on
the part of the United States justified by national interest and national
policy; an interest founded upon a recognized though unliquidated
claim on Spain for indemnities; and a policy imperatively prescribed
by a legitimate principle of self preservation." The secretary of state
then reviewed the history of U. S. interest in acquiring Spanish
Florida, from the negotiations prior to the Louisiana Purchase for its
"peaceable acquisition," to the diminished "geographical extent of
West Florida" as result of the 1803 treaty with France, and, finally, to
the "increased solicitude of the United States for the Sovereignty of
a tract of Country, whose contiguity rendered it vitally important in a
35.
36.

U. S. Statutes at Large, 3: 471-72.

Ibid., 3: 472.
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military, naval and commercial point of view." Now mingled with these
considerations were claims by the United States against Spain, "the
final adjustment of which, it was believed, might be facilitated by a
-purchase for a fair price, of all the Territory of Florida east of the River
Perdido." The conquest of Spain and the consequent revolutions
convulsing the Spanish empire in America, however, intervened, and
thus made it "more natural" and "more conformable to justice" that the
United States "seek security" for the indemnities Spain owed America
and which payment had been so long delayed. A newly-established
government in Spain, moreover, which may absolve itself from its debts,
demanded that the United States make a "pledge in possession" for the
remuneration of"so many losses" experienced by American citizens at
the hands of Spain. Of course the Madison administration disavowed
any wanton extension of territory, and promised that the "future
peace and safety" of the nation upon "honorable and reasonable
terms" dictated American policy. "The United States cannot see with
indifference a foreign power, under any pretext whatever possess
itself of the Floridas," Smith concluded to Pinkney. "The prospect of
danger to the Union from such a step would be too imminent, the real
object too apparent for them either to disguise their sentiments or to
hesitate a moment as to the conduct which they would be inevitably
compelled to pursue." This "explicit declaration," moreover, ought to
admonish the British from any inclination "of gaining a footing in the
Floridas." Throughout the spring and summer months of 1811, other
American diplomats transmitted to European courts the very same
line of reasoning devised by the Madison administration in 1810 and
confirmed by congress in 1811. 37
Although the Madison administration applied the No Transfer
Resolution to East Florida and the remaining Spanish portion of
West Florida from the Perdido to the Apalachicola rivers, the policy
originated in the events unfolding in West Florida during the
summer and fall of 1810. Of course the justification for occupying
the region east of the Perdido River differed somewhat from that
which justified U. S. occupation of the region west of the Perdido.
The Madison administration emphasized a legal American
claim to the territory from Baton Rouge to Mobile, based on the
Louisiana Purchase, as the basis for the October Proclamation and
37.

Smith to Pinkney, January 22, 1811 , in Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1:
9-11. See also Monroe to Foster,July 8 and November 2, 1811 , ASP: FR., 3: 543,
544-45, and Jonathan Russell to Duke of Bassano, April 30, 1811 , in Waciuma,
Intervention, 191-9 3.
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subsequent occupation. But no such claim applied to the rest of
Spanish Florida. Eventually, Madison stressed claims owed by Spain
to the United States as a reasonable foundation for putting the
No Transfer policy into effect. In either case, however, national
security concerns and a bout of Anglophobia provided the
ultimate justification for the seizure of any portion or even all of
the Spanish Floridas. The "law of self-preservation" had replaced
a "rightful and legal claim," but the spirit of it all remained
unchanged. Throughout the remainder of 1811 and right up
to the outbreak of war with England in the spring of 1812, the
administration applied its West Florida policy-the peaceful and
voluntary request of the inhabitants of Florida, spurred, of course,
by furtive prodding from American circles, into, as Madison so
eloquently put it, "the bosom of the American family"-to Florida
east of Pensacola. Using the No Transfer Resolution as a pretext, as
a sort of congressional mandate for acquiring all of Florida in the
name of national security, the Madison administration employed
the clandestine services of General George Mathews and, when
that failed, of Georgia Governor David Mitchell to seize Amelia
Island and St. Augustine, the capital of East Florida. This unsavory
affair became known as the Patriot War, or more accurately, as one
scholar so aptly labeled it, the "other War of 1812." U. S. forces
briefly occupied Pensacola in 1814, destroyed Negro Fort on the
Apalachicola River in 1816, invaded Spanish Florida in 1818, and
wrested it by treaty in 1819-and all along, U. S. officials involved
in these events based their actions on the same language drafted by
the Madison administration as early as the summer of 1810.
The No Transfer policy eventually evolved into a viable and integral
feature ofU. S. foreign policy long after the acquisition of all of Spanish
Florida. The first step in this evolutionary process centered on the
promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine and the correspondence that
accompanied the famous 1823 presidential statement. Here again, the
events erupting throughout Spanish America provided the foundation
for another round of official pronouncement of the No Transfer
principle. In 1823, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams notified the
Russian minister to the United States that the Monroe administration
"could not see with indifference, the forcible interposition of any
European Power, other than Spain, either to restore the dominion
of Spain over her emancipated Colonies in America, or to establish
Monarchical Government in those Countries, or to transfer any of
the possessions heretofore or yet subject to Spain in the American
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Hemisphere, to any other European Power." With U. S. possession
of Florida, the island of Cuba emerged as the next great concern for
American national security, and, as expected, Anglophobia served
once again as a catalytic force. Also in 1823, Adams informed Hugh
Nelson, the U.S. minister to Spain, that the U.S. government feared
that the British would take advantage of Spain's continued weakness
and force a cession of the island to Great Britain, which the United
States would not tolerate. 38
Two years later, President John Quincy Adams's secretary of
state, Henry Clay, again invoked the No Transfer policy. Responding
to rumors of French seizure of Spanish Cuba and Puerto Rico, Clay
informed the French government in Octoberof1825 that the United
States "could not see, with indifference, those islands passing from
Spain to any other European power" and "could not consent to the
occupation of those islands by any other European power than Spain
under any contingency whatever." The president, Clay instructed the
U.S. minister to France, "cannot suppose a state of things in which
either of the great maritime powers of Europe, with or without the
consent of Spain, would feel itselfjustified to occupy or attempt the
occupation of Cuba or Porto Rico without the concurrence or, at
least, the knowledge of the United States." Clay had connected the
No Transfer policy with the noncolonization and nonintervention
principles enunciated in Monroe's famous message of 1823. 39
38.

Adams to Baron Tuyll, October 16 and November 8, 1823, in Perkins, Monroe
Doctrine, 87-88, 203; Adams to Nelson, April 28, 1823, in Worthington C. Ford,
ed., Writings ofjohn Quincy Adams (New York: Macmillan Company, 1913-191 7),
7: 369-421.
39. Henry Clay to James Brown, October 25, 1825, ASP: FR, 5: 856; Dexter Perkins
contends that the declarations made by Adams and Clay "clearly indicate a
nexus between the no-transfer conception and the Monroe Doctrine," but the
statements "do not mark the clear development of a general principle" and that
"for a long time to come this principle, either expressly stated or even implied,
is absent from the American diplomatic documents." Dexter Perkins, The
Monroe Doctrine, 1867-1907 (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins Press, 1937), 5-6. Some
scholars of the Monroe Doctrine include President James K. Polk's messages
of December 2, 1845, and April 29, 1848, as another evolutionary step in the
No Transfer policy, but Perkins argues that the first of Polk's declarations
"awakened comparatively little comment, and the second aroused perhaps
the bitterest criticism that has ever been expressed" in connection with the
Monroe Doctrine. "Furthermore, it is to be observed, neither the one message
nor the other deals with the type of situation most commonly connected with
the no-transfer corollary" as neither of the declarations concern the transfer
of sovereignty from a European power to another. Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, 6.
On Polk's corollaries to the Monroe Doctrine, see Dexter Perkins, The Monroe
Doctrine, 1826-1867 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), 77-83, 174-78.
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Despite these diplomatic utterances, however, the No Transfer
principle remained for the next few decades in a rather embryonic
status. As one noted scholar declared correctly, it may be stated "with
some definiteness that the no-transfer corollary was very far from
fully developed in the period before the Civil War." The Republican
Party's expansionistic impulse in the years immediately following the
Civil War-acquisition of Alaska, negotiations with the Dominican
Republic, and efforts to annex Hawaii-finally linked the No
Transfer policy of 1811 with the principles outlined in the Monroe
Doctrine of 1823. The administration of Andrew Johnson fought the
possible transfer of the Danish West Indies to Austria in 1865 based
on this reasoning. The United States, declared Secretary of State
William H. Seward, "would not desire to see the islands in the hands
of any other power," and that "no transfer of colonies in West Indies
between European powers can be indifferent to the United States." 40
But the decisive steps in the evolution of the No Transfer policy
directly incorporating the principle into the Monroe Doctrine came
during the Grant administration. In response to the outbreak of
revolution on Spanish controlled Cuba, Grant declared in his 1869
annual message that "these dependencies are no longer regarded as
subject to transfer from one European power to another." Also in 1869,
Italy desired to transfer sovereignty of the island of St. Barthelemy to
Sweden, a possibility that Secretary of State Hamilton Fish warned
against as "adverse to that cardinal policy of the United States"
established in the Monroe Doctrine. Another instance instigating the
Grant administration to invoke the No Transfer policy arose from U.
S. efforts to annex the Dominican Repub1ic in 1869 and 1870 in the
wake of rumors that the North German Confederation would take
possession of the island, an action which the president himself asserted
to be simple "adherence to the 'Monroe Doctrine'." The doctrine
promulgated by President Monroe, Grant told congress, "has been
adhered to by all political parties, and I now deem it proper to assert the
equally important principle that hereafter no territory on this continent
shall be regarded as subject of transfer to a European power." This was,
in the words of the historian Dexter Perkins, "the first statement of the
no-transfer concept in unqualified and entirely general terms by any
American statesman, most certainly by any American President."41
40.
41.

Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, 8-11.
Ibid , 11-21. For Grant's message to congress, see Richardson, Messages and
Papers, 7: 61-63 .
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The formal wedding of the No Transfer policy to the Monroe
Doctrine, however, and thus the official acceptance of both as
keystones ofU. S. foreign policy, came with the Fish Memorandum
. of 1870, in which Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, in response
to a congressional inquiry about the state of U. S. commercial
relations with Latin America, seized the opportunity to elaborate
on the history of the Monroe Doctrine and to provide the most
"distinct affirmation of the no-transfer concept in general terms."
Although the secretary took some liberties with the historical
record, employing history as propaganda for promoting U.
S. foreign policy, Fish declared that the United States stood
"solemnly committed by repeated declarations and repeated acts"
to the Monroe Doctrine and "in its application to the affairs of
this continent. " In his annual message to congress, Fish continued,
President Grant, "following the teachings of all our history,"
stated that "the existing dependencies are no longer regarded
as subject to transfer from one European power to another....
This is not a policy of aggression; but it opposes the creation of
European dominion on American soil, or its transfer to other
European powers, and it looks hopefully to the time when, by the
voluntary departure of European governments from this continent
and adjacent islands, America should be wholly American." The
Madison administration and the authors of the 1811 No Transfer
Resolution could not have agreed more. 42
In the "mostspecific and definite language," therefore, Secretary
of State Fish connected inextricably the No Transfer principle with
those declared in the Monroe Doctrine. A "new landmark" had
been passed, conjectured Perkins, and the Fish Memorandum of
July 14, 1870, "has an historical importance not to be denied." The
pronouncement, moreover, not only incorporated the No Transfer
policy into the Monroe Doctrine, but "it is the starting-point for its
frequent application" in the decades that followed. Both Grant and
Fish were avowed proponents of the Monroe Doctrine, and their
immense appreciation for the principles outlined in Monroe's
1823 declaration necessarily and comfortably allowed them to add
the No Transfer policy as an essential ingredient of this antebellum
hallmark of U. S. foreign policy. In the final analysis, the 1870
Fish Memorandum merely ensconced the 1811 No Transfer
42.

Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, 21-26. For the Fish Memorandum of 1870, see 41 "
Cong. , 2"d sess. , Senate Executive Document No. 112.
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Resolution as an integral and explicit foundation of American
foreign policy. Samuel Flagg Bemis, the renowned scholar of
U. S. diplomatic history, summed it up perfectly when he stated
that "like Washington's Farewell Address earlier and the Monroe
Doctrine later this was an historic contribution to the formulation
of a distinct American foreign policy." The events unfolding in
West Florida during the summer and fall of 1810, therefore,
proved just as important for the course of American history, and
specifically for the development of a distinct American foreign
policy, one that continued well into the 20th century. The original
Lone Star Republic established the precedent for the addition of
other stars to the blue canton of the Stars and Stripes. The Madison
administration's reaction to the West Florida revolt in 1810 and the
consequent passage of the No Transfer Resolution the following
year arguably set the standard for further American territorial
acquisition. Manifest Destiny commenced not with Tyler and Polk,
but with Jefferson and Madison, and Spanish West Florida, not
Texas or Mexico or Oregon, served as the beachhead. 43

43.

Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, 25, 26; Samuel Flagg Bemis, john Quincy Adams and
the Foundations of American Foreign Policy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949),
301. Bemis also asserted that the "No-Transfer Policy, stated in the diplomatic
documents ancillary to Monroe's message but not in the message itself, was
to become just as important a part of the Monroe Doctrine as the three dicta
proclaimed in that celebrated state paper. Older than the Doctrine itself, it
lay from the beginning in the same bed with the principles of the message. "
Bemis, Adams, 395. The historian George Dangerfield likewise connected
the No Transfer policy directly with the principles of noncolonization and
nonintervention espoused in Monroe's 1823 message. George Dangerfield,
The Era of Good Feelings (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1952) , 303.
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The Rise and Fall of the Original Lone Star
State: Infant American Imperialism Ascendant
in West Florida
by Cody Scallions

T

o many scholars, the West Florida Revolt of 1810 served
merely as a transitional period in American history.
Referenced as a time when a few social elites rose to
challenge Spanish colonial authority in southeastern Louisiana,
the West Florida Revolt has been viewed as a necessary step
in the annexation of the territory by the United States. Recent
research suggests this perspective should be qualified. Much like
the Republic of Texas, the Republic of West Florida exhibited
characteristics common to more successful independent states,
including a functioning written constitution, a judicial system,
a treasury, an army, and important elements of foreign policy.
Rather than focus on the eventual annexation of the region, this
article examines how a faction of the social elite of West Florida
was able to stage a successful revolt, develop a government
while still under Spanish control, and build an independent
nation, despite the many obstacles faced by those involved.
Understanding this process provides a different context for
evaluating the eventual submission of the Republic to infant

Cody Scallions recently secured his M.A. in History at Southeastern Louisiana
University. He is currently expanding his research on West Florida.
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American imperialism and nation building in the Americas
during the nineteenth century overall. 1
The 1810 West Florida Revolt had its origins in the Louisiana
Purchase of 1803. The purchase passed possession of all French lands
west of the Mississippi River and New Orleans to the United States.
American leaders believed that gaining control of the vast territory
granted them unhampered access to the Mississippi River and
surrounding territories, a boon to expanding trade opportunities.
Not included in the purchase was a strip ofland east of the Mississippi
River and below the 31st parallel known as West Florida. 2 Spain did
not cede West Florida to the French before the Purchase, therefore
the territory did not pass into U.S. control and remained a Spanish
colony. 3 Comprised of four districts, Baton Rouge, Feliciana, St.
Helena, and Chifoncte (later known as St. Ferdinand), ownership of
the West Florida territory and boundary lines sparked confrontation
between the United States and Spain. James Monroe, the U.S.
ambassador to England during Thomas Jefferson's administration,
claimed that the Purchase included all Florida lands west of the
Perdido River. William Pinkney, the American commissioner in

1.

2.

3.

For a comprehensive review of the West Florida Revolt see Isaac Joslin Cox, The
West Florida Controversy, 1798-1813: A Study in American Diplomacy (Baltimore:
The John Hopkins Press, 1918); Stanley Clisby Arthur The Story of the West Florida
Rebellion (St. Francisville, LA: The St. Francisville Democrat, 1935); J.C.A.
Stagg, Borderlines in Borderlands: james Madison and the Spanish-American Frontier,
176-1821 (Hartford: Yale University Press, 2009), Andrew McMichael, Atlantic
Loyalties: Americans in Spanish West Florida 1785-1810 (Athens: The University of
Georgia Press, 2008); David A. Bice, The Original Lone Star Republic: Scoundrels,
Statesmen, and Schemers of the 1810 West Florida Rebellion (Clanton, AL: Heritage
Publishing Consultants, Inc., 2004); William C. Davis, The Rogue Republic: How
Would-Be Patriots Waged the Shortest Revolution in American History (New York:
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011); and Samuel C. Hyde, Jr. , Pistols and Politics:
The Dilemma ofDemocracy in Louisiana's Florida Parishes, 1810-1899 (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1996). For historiography on the Republic of
Texas see Paul D. Lack, The Texas Revolutionary Experience: A Political and Social
H istory, 1835-1836 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995); T.R.
Fehrenbach, Lone Star: A History of Texas and the Texans (Cambridge: Da Capo
Press, 2000); and Randolph B. Campbell, Gone to Texas: A History of the Lone Star
State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) .
Some do not agree with the perspective that West Florida was not included in
the Louisiana Purchase. If true that possession is nine-tenths of the law, Spain
was the rightful claimant to West Florida for the Spanish maintained actual
possession of the territory.
Letter from William C.C. Claiborne to Thomas Jefferson August 24, 1803,
Thomas Jefferson Papers General Correspondence, 1651-1827, Library of
Congress.
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Madrid, reported that the Spanish refuted Jefferson's claim, and
maintained that France sold land that it did not own. 4 Debates over
land claims had a profound effect on the West Florida inhabitants.
_Many residents expected to become citizens of the United States
and fall under the governance of William C. C. Claiborne and the
Territory of Orleans. Claiborne 's jurisdiction extended north only
to Manchac, however, leaving those above lakes Pontchartrain and
Maurepas under Spanish rule. 5
The population of West Florida consisted of multiple ethnicities
indicative of Louisiana's complex colonial past. By 1810, West
Florida included French, Spanish, English, Anglo-American, Mrican
American, and Indian factions dispersed throughout the territory.
The French were the first to colonize the area, but lost their claim
to the British after the Seven Years War. British imperial control
lasted less than two decades. Acquiring the region in 1763, Britain
controlled the area until 1779 when a Spanish military expedition
led by Bernardo De Galvez ended British occupation of the region.
The new Spanish regime allowed non-Spanish colonists to remain in
the territory with their land claims intact, provided they took an oath
to remain loyal to Spanish authority and converted to Catholicism.
Many refused, placing their land holdings injeopardy. 6
Prior to the Spanish period, Anglo American colonists migrated
to the rich soil along the Mississippi River and established cotton
and sugarcane plantations. Generous Spanish land grants and lax
administration lured many settlers to West Florida. Another factor
that increased the Anglo American population in West Florida was
the aftermath of the American Revolution. British loyalists feared
retaliation from the Articles of Confederation government and
many fled to West Florida. By 1810, pro-American, loyal Spanish,
and independent factions seeking self-governance became
increasingly prominent in the region. 7
4_
5.

6_
7.

Ibid. For secondary sources see McMichael , Atlantic Loyalties, 55-60 and Cox,
The West Florida Controversy, 86.
Letter from William C.C. Claiborne to Thomas Jefferson , August 24, 1803,
Thomas Jefferson Papers General Correspondence, 1651-1827, Library of
Congress. Secondary reference found in Arthur, The Story of the West Florida
Rebellion, 25.
H yde, Pistols and Politics, 18-19.
For details on the three factions and their roles during the West Florida Revolt,
see Samuel C. Hyde, Jr., "Consolidating the Revolution: Factionalism and
Finesse in the West Florida Revolt, 1810," Louisiana History: The Journal of the
L ouisiana Historical Association 51 , no.3 (2010): 261-283.
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From 1807 to 1810, Spain's control over West Florida weakened
significantly. In 1807, Don Carlos Dehault De Lassus arrived to lead
the Spanish government at Baton Rouge, inheriting a territorial
government of corrupt officials and inadequate law enforcement. 8
A limited number of the Spanish troops remained at forts in Baton
Rouge, Mobile, and Pensacola with only small patrols covering the
territory. The absence of significant Spanish forces and no local
militia left remote regions unprotected from bandit and Indian
raids. Governor De Lassus compounded the problem through
his appointments of delegates as alcaldes, or local magistrates. He
approved the appointment of men from British loyalist backgrounds
who were often less popular with the residents of their district and
he frequently proved absent minded when it came to addressing
the concerns of the people. By his appointment of men favorable
to monarchical rule, the pro-American and independent factions
lost faith in De Lassus and the Spanish government. A rumor that
Napoleon Bonaparte had entered negotiations to reclaim the
territory sold through the Louisiana Purchase further weakened
Spanish authority. West Floridians feared a return of French
assertiveness in Louisiana because it would allow France to open
a claim and take, forcefully if necessary, Louisiana, placing them
under Bonaparte's tyrannical rule and jeopardizing land claims. 9
Facing political and social turmoil, De Lassus contended with
a growing number of rebellious Anglo Americans who favored U.S.
control. The roots of Anglo discontent emerged in 1804 with the
Kemper Rebellion. The Kemper rising, led by brothers Reuben,
Nathan, and Samuel Kemper, known vagrants and disturbers of the
peace who lived on the territorial border, targeted Spanish authority
in West Florida. The revolt centered on a land dispute between the
Kempers and John Smith, a merchant and land speculator. Smith
and Reuben opened a joint trading business in West Florida that
failed, leaving Reuben in debt to Smith. In order to retrieve lost
profit, Smith filed an injunction with Spanish authorities against
Kemper that claimed his land as payment. Already unhappy that
West Florida did not pass into U.S. possession after the Louisiana
Purchase, the Kemper brothers attacked Spanish officials and
8.

9.

Arthur, The Story of the West Florida Rebellion, 30. For an in-depth analysis of
crime and government in West Florida under De Lassus see McMichael,
Atlantic Loyalties, 127-168.
McMichael, Atlantic Loyalties, 153, and Arthur, The Story of the West Florida
Rebellion, 30.
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burned their homes. 10 They then advanced on Baton Rouge, but
their force was too weak and carried little support among the West
Florida populace in the area. This caused the rebellion to falter
.and its supporters to disperse. The Kemper Rebellion, though
unsuccessful, was a constant reminder to De Lassus of the fragility
of Spanish authority in West Florida. Spanish weakness led some
members of the West Florida elite to advocate for a change in
administrative responsibility to secure the protection of local
inhabitants. 11
In July of 1810, Philip Hicky, an appointed Spanish official,
circulated a letter to his constituents advising them to appoint
delegates to meet with Governor De Lassus in order to address
Indian and bandit raids in the area. Days later, an assembly consisting
of men from each district agreed to send delegates to Governor De
Lassus to discuss the raids in the region, the absence of natural
rights for the citizens of West Florida, and the inability of Spain to
protect the lives and property of the inhabitants. 12 The assembly
drafted a small list of grievances to accompany the delegates on
their mission to De Lassus. John Rhea, a local proprietor from
Feliciana, and other members counseled delaying the meeting
because De Lassus was currently absent from his post and they
wanted to present their grievances to the governor personally. 13
To their chagrin, a lower level government official presented their
claims to De Lassus and ignored the delegates.
The delegation's failure to achieve their aims led to the first
Convention meeting of West Florida. The participants appointed
delegates to represent West Florida before the governor. These
delegates pledged "fidelity to the government, whose interest
and attachments were that of the people and who are opposed to
10. Andrew McMichael, "The Kemper 'Rebellion ' : Filibustering and Resident
Anglo American Loyalty in Spanish West Florida," Louisiana History: Thejournal
ofthe LouisianaHistoricalAssociation43, no. 2 (2002): 147.
11. For additional discussion of the Kemper Rebellion, see Cox, The West Florida
Con troversy, 152-168; Arthur, The Story of the West Florida Rebellion, 25-29; Andrew
McMichael, "The Kemper 'Rebellion ,"' 133-165; McMichael, Atlantic Loyalties,
88-97; and Davis, The Rogue Republic, 1-52. Davis provides the most current
analysis on the Kemper Rebellion.
12. Letter from Philip Ricky to constituents, july 1, 1810. Philip Ricky and Family
Papers, Mss. 2007, 2035, Louisiana and Lower Mississippi Valley Collections,
LSU Libraries, herein noted as LLMVC LSU.
13. Letter from john R .Johnson, William Barnes, john Maissis, and john Rhea to
Philip Ricky, john Mathews, Richard Duvall, and Thomas Lilley, july 3, 1810.
Philip Ricky and Family Papers, Mss. 2007, 2035, LLMVC LSU.
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innovation or light changes in the government or other motives
not in the interest of the people." 14 Although wealthy landowners
dominated the appointments, some residents questioned certain
~elections for ideological reasons. Philip Hicky and his neighbors
challenged the selection of Joseph Sharp, a local proprietor. They
believed Sharp to be "too ignorant and involved in French politics
to run the position."15 These men wanted delegates sympathetic to
the inhabitants of West Florida and not tainted by foreign affairs.
Despite the conflicts, fourteen members, including Chairman John
Rhea, convened at St. John's Plains on July 25, 1810, marking the
first meeting of the West Florida Convention. 16
The delegates attending the Convention drafted a set of
resolutions defining its powers of self-government under Spanish
administration .
. . . this Convention created by the whole body of the people
of the government of Baton Rouge, and by the previous
consent of the Governor, is therefore legally constituted
to act in all cases of national concern ... to provide for
the publick [sic] safety, to create a revenue, and with
the consent of the Governor, to create tribunals civil and
criminal, and to define their own powers relating to other
concerns of the government, when to adjourn, when to
meet again, and how long to continue their sessions. 17
The draft addressed to De Lass us revealed West Floridians' multiple
concerns regarding his leadership and their first attempt to create
a territorial legislature. By addressing De Lassus as a "whole body"
and referencing the previous consent by the Governor allowing
them to convene, the Convention spoke for the public welfare of
the inhabitants of West Florida while remaining within the legal
boundaries of the Spanish government. The Convention in this
excerpt notified De Lassus of their intentions to improve the quality
of life by restoring tranquility, but in the process, the Convention

14.

Letter from Philip Hicky to constituents, July 1, 1810. Philip Hicky and Family
Papers, Mss. 2007, 2035, LLMVC LSU.
15. Letter from Philip Hicky toR. C. Fowler July 8, 1810. Philip Hicky and Family
Papers, Mss. 2007, 2035, LLMVC LSU.
16. For a complete list of delegates, see Cox, The West Florida Controversy, 17981813, 346; and Arthur The Story of the West Florida Rebellion, 49.
17. Resolution defining the power of the Convention, July 25, 1810. Reprint in
Arthur, The Story of the West Florida Rebellion, 49.
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planted the roots of a sustaining self-government that could
create and administer laws without the assistance of the Spanish
officials. Though small and weak in judicial and legislative power,
_the Convention was comprised of the wealthy and social elite in
West Florida. Their political and social status secured for them the
support of many residents and the attention of the Governor. 18
The first Convention continued for two days and compiled
a list of grievances that referenced the growing population of
vagrants and deserters from the U.S. territories seeking refuge,
the lack of a sizeable militia to protect the people and land, the
absence of a tribunal to hear criminal cases, and the deprivation
of land claims. 19 Prior to adjourning, the Convention nominated
Philip Hicky, Manuel Lopez, and Joseph Thomas as a committee
to present the grievances to De Lassus before the next Convention
meeting in August. In presenting their complaints, the committee
called attention to the misdeeds occurring in the region even as
they remained loyal citizens under the Spanish crown. When De
Lassus received the list, he acknowledged the "general fidelity
of those who have not ceased giving Proofs of it since they have
pledged themselves by solem [sic] oath to the Spanish Flag." 20
De Lassus believed the people to be loyal subjects who looked to
him to resolve their concerns. However, this was not the case. By
agreeing to the Convention meeting and permitting a conference
to hear grievances, De Lassus unknowingly allowed the West Florida
delegates to gain a permanent foothold as a colonial administration
within the Spanish government that De Lassus could not ignore. 21
The meeting between De Lassus and the committee reduced
Spanish fears of an Anglo-American uprising in the territory as
no anti-Spanish agitation emerged. Viewing the Convention as a
positive element in the territory, De Lassus praised the assembly for

18.

Letter from Philip Hicky to constituents, July 1, 1810. Philip Hicky and Family
Papers, Mss. 2007, 2035, LLMVC LSU.
19. Davis, The Rogue Republic, 21-52. Davis explains the ease with which the raiders
could cross into the West Florida territory, raid, then slip back across the
border to escape Spanish authorities. Even though these attacks focused on
Spanish administration and property, the people were subjected to collateral
damage from attacking parties.
20. Correspondence from Carlos Dehault De Lassus to the Delegates, July 30,
1810. Reprint in Arthur, The Sto1y of the West Florida Rebellion, 53.
21. Resolution defining the power of the Convention, July 25, 1810. Reprint in
Arthur, The Story of the West Florida Rebellion, 49.
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its management of local matters and allowed them to meet again in
August to receive his communication on the grievances. 22
In August, the second Convention addressed the region's
s~paration from Spain. Prominent planters from
the St.
Francisville area recommended to Convention members that it
was "necessary" to "act for our selves" because the Convention
possessed overwhelming power over the Spanish government via
their legislation and popular support. 23 Colonel Joshua G. Baker,
an officer of the Mississippi Territorial militia proposed to John
H. Johnson, a Convention delegate, that a break with Spain would
allow them to join the United States and fall under its protection.
His proposal never reached the floor because Johnson fell ill
and was unable to attend the second meeting. In any case, both
propositions called for a break with Spain. 24
In addition, the delegates discussed the arming of the local
militia to operate under the Convention as a private military force
to reduce their reliance on the Spanish army for securing the area
from hostile threats. As for their previous requests, De Lassus failed
to act despite his conciliatory nature. In mid-August, De Lassus
fell ill and was unable to personally monitor or respond to the
demands sent in July. He sent correspondence to the Committee of
the Convention through William Harris, resident of the Feliciana
District, stating that the Governor wanted to avoid any problems
that could lead to the imitation of the beginning of the French
Revolution. 25 De Lassus was content to settle and negotiate with
the delegates to avoid an uprising, but his reluctance to respond to
the grievances sent in July caused the delegates to take alternative
measures that demanded De Lassus approve the Convention's
actions in organizing a militia. De Lassus refused the orders of the
Convention for a decision until he could consult his superiors on
the matter.
22. James A. Padgett, ed., "Official Records of the West Florida Revolution and
Republic," Louisiana Historical Quarterly 21, no. 1 (January-October 1938): 695699. Letter from De Lassus to the Convention at St.John's Plains, August 13,
1810.
23. Address to the Members of the Representative Convention assembled at St.
John's Plains from prominent planters, August 13, 1810. Reprint in Arthur, The
Story of the West Florida Rebellion, 58.

24.

Cox, The West Florida Controversy, 365; and Arthur, The Story of the West Florida

25.

Letter from William Harris at Montesano to the Committee of the Convention
of Delegates of the People of Upper Florida-St. John's Plains-August 12,
1810. Elizabeth K. Dart Collection, Mss. 5023, LLMVC LSU.

Rebellion, 58-60.
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By ignoring the demands of the Convention, John Johnson,
a wealthy planter and Convention supporter, believed De Lassus
came to embody the corrupt and "villainous Court sycophants"
~ who "batten on the spoils of the land." De Lassus, he argued,
thought the population had to be "under the conduct of a wise
guardian who will transform them from slaves to men." 26 In an
attempt to avoid measures that could lead to armed conflict,
George Mather and Philip Hicky tried to persuade De Lassus to
accept the demands of the Convention. His approval would ease
revolutionary tension because the Convention operated in the best
interest of the people. De Lassus refused. 27
As friction increased between the Convention and Spanish
government, an anonymous "Friend of West Florida Citizens"
circulated revolutionary propaganda throughout the territory. The
pamphlets originated from Bayou Sara and urged the people of
West Florida to claim independence from their Spanish oppressors
and seek allegiance with the United States. At the same time, De
Lassus learned that the Convention militia had secretly organized
and encouraged others to join a march on Baton Rouge to depose
him. 28
On August 15, the Convention sent a second committee to meet
with De Lassus and insist that he establish a " ... Bill providing for
the public safety and for the administration of justice within their
jurisdiction of Baton Rouge in West Florida." 29 The committee
delivered the order with a proviso stating that De Lassus had until
Wednesday, August 22 to respond. There was no ultimatum if De
Cox, The West Florida Controversy, 365.
See Draft from Convention to De Lassus, August 15, 1810, Libby Dart
Collection, Box 4b LLMVC, LSU; Letter from the Convention Representatives
to Carlos Dehault De Lassus Governor of the Royal Americas and Governor
and Military of the Place of Jurisdiction of Baton Rouge, August 15, 1810,
Libby Dart Collection Box 4b, LLMVC, LSU ; Draft from Convention to De
Lassus, August 15, 1810, Libby Dart Collection Box 4b, LLMVC, LSU. Each
references the Convention providing for the security and tranquility of the
populace.
28. Letter from Officers of Militia to His Excellency Charles Dehault De Lassus
Colonel of the Royal Armies, Governor Civil and Military of the place and
jurisdiction of Baton Rouge August 25, 1810, West Florida Rebellion Papers
1810,1816, 1845,LLMVC,LSU.
29. Letter from the Convention Representatives to Charles Dehault De Lassus
Governor of the Royal Americas and Governor and Military of the Place of
Jurisdiction of Baton Rouge. August 15, 1810, Libby Dart Collection Box 4b,
LLMVC, LSU. The Committee comprised ofJohn W. Leonard, Manuel Lopez,
William Spiller and Joseph Thomas.
26.
27.
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Lassus refused, but the Convention closed the letter containing the
proviso by stating "no sentiment prevails amongst the inhabitants
hostile to the wise laws and government under which they have lived
~o happily." 30 The Convention was playing a two-fold game. In public,
delegates pledged their allegiance to the Spanish government and
seemed docile, but behind closed doors the Convention continually
devised plots and legislation that granted it absolute administrative
power. With the capacity of drafting a military force capable of
overthrowing the Spanish regime and the power to legislate, the
Convention emerged as the new colonial government.
Following this Bill for Public Safety, the Convention drafted
a second list of demands that transitioned the remaining Spanish
power to the Convention in hopes of expanding self-government
in West Florida. This action occurred on the same day that
representatives delivered their demands to De Lassus. In part,
these demands stated:
... In adopting these measures we are aware of the possibility
which we have taken upon ourselves and trust that our
situation and our distance from any efficient force on which
to depend for safety and our sincere desire to open as much
as possible the burthens [sic] of a country engaged in a dire
contest for her own preservation ... we became responsible
for the support of a government among us sufficient for the
preservation of peace and tranquility at home, and for our
defense against external violence with which we have but
too much reason to apprehend. 31
West Florida, according to the Convention, suffered from a
similar form of salutary neglect that existed between Britain and
the American colonies prior to the American Revolution. Spain
neglected its North American territories because the French
Revolution that threatened the Spanish borders in Europe shifted
resources away from West Florida, leaving the Spanish forces short
on food supplies, gunpowder, and money to patrol the territory. 32
30.
31.

Ibid.
Draft from Convention to De Lassus, August 15, 1810, Libby Dart Collection

32.

Louisiana, Survey of Federal Archives, Archives of the Spanish Government of
West Florida, vol. 18 (Baton Rouge: Survey of Federal Archives in Louisiana,
1973-1940), 78-80. Meeting of the officials and report of the happenings at the
beginning of the Revolution. No. 54, August 21, 1810.

Box4b , LL~C,LSU.
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Left to protect and govern themselves, the delegates altered
preexisting Spanish authority without the consideration or approval
of De Lass us. Their proposed changes included provisions:
... To establish an uniform mode of taxation, to organize
the militia to act with sufficient promptitude in case of
emergency, and to admit as residents among us persons
of known integrity, who will be intensified in maintaining
order and obedience to the laws, it becomes necessary to
exercise the legislative power to a certain extent. 33
The inhabitants ofWest Florida sought a just and uniform tax to
replace the twenty-four percent they paid to the Spanish officials.34
The taxes limited the amount of goods bought and sold at market
and according to merchants and settlers, the existing tax system
was prohibitive if not ruinous. 35 Spanish use of the tax revenue was
another concern. Portions circulated back to the crown in Europe,
which helped finance the war effort against hostile European
powers, while fractions remained in West Florida. The taxes would
be altered successfully after West Florida declared independence
and drafted a constitution .36
These changes placed the power and jurisdiction of the territory
m the hands of the Convention, which created an administrative
system mirroring a democratic republic hostile to Spanish
administration. Through legislation, the Convention introduced
suffrage in West Florida, a right limited under Spanish law. The draft
sent to De Lassus stated that all individuals, poor and rich, should
have a voice in the administration of laws. 37 The right of suffrage
changed with the ratification of the Constitution of the State of West
33.
34.

35.
36.

37.

Ibid.
Clarence Edwin Carter ed., The Territorial Papers of the United States, vol. VI of
The Territory of Mississippi 1809-1817 Continued (Washington: United States
Government Printing Office, 1938), 30.
Stagg, Borderlines in Borderlands, 57.
Under Article 1, Section 25, Numbers 1-6 of the Constitution for the States of
Florida, taxes would be uniform and aid in paying the state debt and provide
for the common defense and general welfare of West Florida. Furthermore ,
West Florida would develop a standard coins of weights and measures, and
to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and all other
debts to or by the state . Copy at the Center for Southeast Louisiana Studies,
Hammond, La., original housed at the Louisiana State Archives, Baton
Rouge, La.
Draft from Convention to De Lassus, August 15, 1810, Libby Dart Collection,
Box4b,LLNrVC,LSU.
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Florida in 1810 by granting the right to vote to privileged citizens only,
but the proposed idea aided in gathering support for the movement
of self-government, especially for non-political landowners that were
not members of the Convention. 38 Although Convention delegates
continued to call themselves loyal subjects of the Spanish crown
in the draft, the outcome of their work belied their statements. By
August, the delegates had called for the altering of Spanish laws,
defied the chain of command by not addressing or seeking De Lass us'
approval of the changes, and begun appointing judges without the
governor's consent. The West Florida delegates manipulated the
Spanish administration and developed an independent government
acting in opposition to Spanish interests. 39
In response to the ultimatum, De Lass us called a Spanish Junta,
or governmental council, on August 22 to consider the situation
of West Florida. 40 Many of the Spanish officials who participated
disapproved of how De Lassus was handling the Convention. They
believed that the Convention was a revolutionary faction that should
be disbanded at once. De Lassus, on the other hand, approved of
the Convention's right to exist in order to avoid confrontation and
open revolt. He sought to negotiate with Convention delegates
due to the status of defensive fortifications in West Florida. If
Convention forces attacked in August, the Governor had no
substantial military force and resources to combat the rebels.
Therefore, De Lassus believed he must approve of the Convention
to keep it under his authority. The governor and his officials agreed
to the provisions of the Convention, but refused to accept the
salaries offered by the Convention. By declining payment through
the Convention, the Spanish officials would not be subject to the
38.

The establishment of the Republic of West Florida altered the requirements
of suffrage. Under Article 1, Section 15, of the Constitution for the States of
Florida, suffrage applied only to "free white man at the age of twenty one years
and upwards, having resided six months, or from the time of the adoption
of this Constitution, and possesses in his own right any real property of the
value of two hundred dollars in any District of this State, shall be considered a
freeholder and be entitled to the right of suffrage accordingly."
39. See Draft from Convention to De Lassus, August 15, 1810, Libby Dart
Collection, Box 4b, LLMVC, LSU; and Letter to Carlos Dehault De Lassus
Governor of the Royal Americas and Governor and Military of the Place and
Jurisdiction of Baton Rouge , August 15, 1810, Libby Dart Collection, Box 4b,
LLMVC, LSU. Both provide examples of the delegates pledging allegiance to
Spain, but continuing to legislate freely.
40. For a complete list of the Spanish junta attendees, see Arthur The Story of West
Florida, 64-66; and Cox, The West Florida Controversy, 375-377.
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authority of the delegates, but instead would act in conjunction
with them to preserve the tranquility of the territory. This option
of working jointly with the Convention would remain in effect as
_long as the Convention and its delegates maintained their loyalty
to the Spanish crown and abandoned all revolutionary activities. 41
In light of these decisions, the delegates met and passed a set of
resolutions that publically defined and created a new form ofgovernment
ostensibly under the control of De Lassus. The proclamation addressed
public safety and admission of immigrants, the organization of the
militia, a new government structure comprised of tribunals and laws,
litigation over existing land grants, and a uniform mode of taxation.
The signature of De Lassus authorized the Convention to enact their
proclamation on August 25. In essence, the Convention assumed
control of the territorial government with the governor's approval, a
development that allowed it to appoint officials and construct a court
system to govern the territory without Spanish overseers. 42
On August 28, the Convention directly challenged remaining
Spanish authority with the appointment of Fulwar Skipwith,
former U.S. Consul to Paris, as a Judge of the Superior Court
in West Florida. 43 Skipwith had extensive experience in foreign
and domestic affairs as well as personal financial support to aid
the Convention. With the establishment of a Superior Court
and judicial system, the Convention developed an autonomous
government. The Convention quickly named officers of the
Conventional militia. On September 4, Philip Hicky, along with
Manuel Lopez,John Morgan, and Edmund Hawes, signed an order
calling for an election of eight alcaldes from the area to assist in the
better administration of justice and public safety in West Florida. 44
41.

Letter from John F. Gillspie, Martin L. Haynie, F.A. Browden, John P. Comly,
Amos Nibb, James H. Ficklin, B. Collins, James Geulny, William Field, Sam S.
Crocker, T.B.Stuart, H. Peiser, L.A. Hewitt, Jon E. Loman, James Gray, Grace
Smith, Wlliam Leson, and John Borwden to the members of the Representative
Convention assembled at St. Johns Plains, August 13, 1810, West Florida
Rebellion Papers 1810, 1816, 1845, LLMVC LSU. For a complete review of the
Jun ta, see Cox, The WestFlorida Controversy, 375-377; and Arthur, The Story ofthe
West Florida Rebellion, 64-66.
42. Letter from Convention to De Lassus, August 25, 1810, West Florida Rebellion
Papers, LLMVC, LSU.
43. Letter from Convention to De Lassus, August 28, 1810, Elizabeth K. Dart
Collection, Mss. 5023, LLMVC, LSU.
44. Order signed by Philip Ricky, Manuel Lopez, John Morgan, and Edward
Hawes, September 4, 1810, Philip Ricky and Family Papers, Mss. 2007, 2035,
LLMVC, LSU.
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The elections applied to free white men above the age of sixteen
that held residence in West Florida. 45 By appointing alcaldes, the
delegates co-opted all administrative power from pre-existing
Spanish officials and shifted it to the Convention. Control of the
iocal government, including all legislative, judicial, and executive
power in West Florida, was in the hands of the Convention.
Initially the West Florida territory, including the turbulent
Feliciana District, which housed the most fervent supporters for
independence, remained peaceful. However, serenity ended
abruptly when De Lassus rejected two of the appointments
made by the Convention. The appointments of Fulwar Skipwith
as a judge to the high court and Philemon Thomas as brigadier
general, rather than colonel of the militia, proved unacceptable to
the Spanish governor. De Lassus argued that Spanish law required
anyone appointed to office must reside in West Florida for at least
two years. Skipwith had only recently returned from his post in
France leaving him ineligible for office. As for the appointment
of Thomas, his title as brigadier general outranked De Lassus'
command of the territorial militia. Mter losing control of the
government and administration, De Lassus retained power only as
the head of the territorial militia; the loss of his rank would leave
him powerless. 46
The governor's rejection of Skipwith and Thomas offended
Convention members. In a written response, the delegates defended
their appointment of Skipwith as justifiable, claiming that the
deviation in established laws for his appointment served the best
interest of the people. They highlighted numerous accounts in
which Spanish law regarding aliens in government was deliberately
overlooked under the Spanish administration. 47 As a compromise,
the Convention reconsidered the appointment of Thomas.
Tensions in West Florida increased when De Lassus made
a second effort to regain administrative power in September.
The Governor received six thousand pesos from Captain Louis
45.
46.

47.

Ibid.
Letter dated August 28, 1810, from Baton Rouge appointing Fulwar Skipwith
as judge of the Superior Court, Elizabeth K. Dart Collection, LLMVC LSU. For
additional appointments made by the Convention and De Lassus' rejection,
see Arthur, The Story of the West Florida Rebellion, 95-97.
Letter dated August 28, 1810, from Baton Rouge appointing Fulwar Skipwith
as judge to the Superior Court, Elizabeth K. Dart Collection, LLMCV LSU and
Letter from Convention Delegates to Governor De Lassus, August 28, 1810,
Reprinted by Arthur, The Story of the West Florida Rebellion, 96.
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Piernas, a Spanish army officer, sent by Vicente Folch, the Spanish
official in control of the army in Spain's American colonies, to
aid in the administration of West Florida. During Piernas' stay,
pe Lassus informed him of the recent transition in government
and his plan to appease the Convention until he received orders
from the Captain General, the Marquis de Someruelos in Havana.
Mter Piernas left Baton Rouge in route to Pensacola, De Lassus,
addressed the Convention with a written request. The governor
sought to amend a section of the proclamation signed on August
25 that stated, in the absence of De Lassus from the territory, the
senior judge of the Superior Court would lead the government.
Instead, De Lassus requested that direction of the government
should pass to one of his subordinate military officers. Since the
Convention was not in session, his request passed to an executive
committee comprised of Philip Hicky, Manuel Lopez, and Thomas
Lilley. The committee objected to the request and chose to
present the matter to the Convention at the next meeting. Rather
than submit to the request, the delegates chose to preserve the
tranquility of the territory from foreign and domestic enemies by
separating themselves from Spanish rule. 48
With Spanish authority greatly diminished, some Convention
officials decided to reevaluate their political allegiance to Spain.
Some, such as William Cooper and Benjamin C. Williams, persisted
in their loyalty to Spain. Upon realizing that the Convention
planned to rebel against Spanish authority, Williams resigned his
seat in the Convention. 49 Cooper emerged as a unique individual
during the last tranquil moments in West Florida. An early
supporter of administrative change, he agreed to the compiled
grievances sent to De Lassus before and after the creation of the
Convention. By mid-September, Cooper discontinued his activities
with the Convention as it moved closer to declaring independence.
Being a wealthy landowner, Cooper benefitted from the lax land
taxes and received benefits for service as a Spanish alcalde. As the
pro-Spanish faction lost influence in the Convention, Cooper and
his associates conspired with Vicente Folch, in a letter sent through
Captain Piernas, to keep the Spanish government in power.

48.
49.

Letter from Convention to Don Carlos Dehault De Lassus, September 12,
1810, Elizabeth K. Dart Collection, Mss. 5023, LLMVC LSU.
Letter from Benjamin Williams of St. Helena to John Rhea Esquire, September
22, 1810, Elizabeth K. Dart Collection, Mss. 5023, LLMVC LSU.
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Cooper explained in his correspondence how the Convention
developed a code of laws to limit Spanish jurisdiction and De
Lassus' power with plans to overthrow the existing system. 50
Cooper claimed that the people of West Florida did not want to
-fall under Convention rule, but because De Lassus had agreed in
writing to the demands of the Convention, he placed the fate of
the territory in the hands of a radical government. To prevent the
Convention from pursuing independence, Cooper urged Folch
to send a detachment of troops to reinforce the Spanish military
in Baton Rouge and put down any revolutionary sentiment. Folch
agreed to Cooper's plea, but the letter signifying his agreement did
not arrive until October, after De Lassus lost complete control of
the Convention and West Florida.
The controversy in West Florida reached its climax in the last
weeks of September. John Ballinger, a Convention supporter from
Springfield, informed the delegates that William Cooper received
instructions from Shepherd Brown, the Spanish commandant at
St. Helena, to construct a fort on the Natalbany River to house
Vicente Folch and his troops. In addition, Convention members
also learned of De Lassus' plan to incite slaves and Indians to rebel
against the Convention. 51
Hopes for a peaceful outcome dissolved after men under
the command of Philemon Thomas seized two letters from De
Lassus, one addressed to Shepherd Brown and the second to
Governor Folch. The letter to Folch contained a request to send
an armed force to West Florida to put down the Convention and
any revolutionary sentiment in the territory, while the second letter
instructed Brown to arm every Spanish loyalist in the area, construct
forts, and be ready to strike at the order of the Governor. 52
The Convention took aggressive action against the Spanish on
September 21. Orders were sent to Philemon Thomas instructing
him to arm the militia and attack Baton Rouge. Thomas dispatched
riders to assemble dragoons and soldiers from the surrounding
50.
51_

Arthur, The Story of the West Florida Rebellion, 99.
Bice, The Original Lone Star Republic, 184; and Cox, The West Florida Controversy,
411. Bice and Cox only provide a passing remark to slave incitement in West
Florida. For a full and current examination of slavery and slave resistance in
West Florida, see McMichael, Atlantic Loyalties, 102-126.
52_ Journal of the West Florida Convention, 1810, entry dated September 22, 1810,
Library of Congress herein noted as LOC; Cox, The West Florida Controversy, 394395; Arthur, The Story of the West Florida Rebellion, 101; and Hyde, "Consolidating
the Revolution," 269_
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West Florida Revolt, 1810. Image courtesy of the Edwin Davis Collection, the Center for
Southeast Louisiana Studies, Southeast Louisiana University.

region. He then moved to Springfield, rendezvousing with John
Ballinger who drafted and organized a grenadier company to join
the assault. The men assembled from Springfield marched under
the cover of darkness to Baton Rouge, arriving in the early morning
hours. In total, Thomas 1nustered about seventy-five men to assault
the lightly guarded fort. 53

53.

Davis, The Rogue Republic, 179; and Cox, The West Florida Controversy, 397.
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The Spaniards received word that armed men were mustering
in the Bayou Sara area and prepared the fort for an impending
attack. The Baton Rouge fort was in a severe state of disrepair.
Overlooking the Mississippi River, it was a formidable wood and
-mud structure, but the lack of maintenance left the defensive
position with multiple flaws. The stockade consisted of open holes
allowing an attack to occur from any side of the structure, it had
no moat or ditch to hamper the invaders before reaching the fort,
and the main gate resembled a dilapidated tower rather than the
primary defensive section. The fort was but one problem for the
Spanish defenses. Munitions were short and supplies to counter
any future attack were almost entirely absent. 54 Cannons offered
the only intact and fully functional defense, but few of the soldiers
operating the fort knew how to use them properly. 55
The months of raised tensions concluded with a quick ambush.
At two o'clock in the morning on September 23rd, Philemon Thomas
led the revolutionary forces on the attack. With Thomas Ballinger
commanding the grenadier contingent from Springfield, and Captain
George Du Passau leading the dragoon squad from Bayou Sara, the
attack was well coordinated and outnumbered the Spanish forces.
Approximately eighty rebels assaulted the 28 soldiers defending the
fort. The rebels moved under the cover of darkness and fog leaving the
Spanish disorganized and confused. Before the Spanish could get to
their defensive positions, the rebels had stormed the fort, forcing the
defenders to surrender. The rebels suffered no casualties. De Lassus
and his fellow officers failed to get to the fort in time. Instead, they
were arrested in the street and confined inside the fort. The rebels
moved quickly to find the remaining Spanish officers and placed
them under arrest. Mter the fray, rebels confiscated Spanish property
and replaced the Spanish colors with a blue flag containing a single
white star in the center. Before daylight cast its beams over the fort and
town, the Republic of West Florida was born. 56
54.

55.

56.

Louisiana, Survey of Federal Archives, Archives of the Spanish Government of West
Florida, 18 (Baton Rouge: Survey of Federal Archives in Louisiana, 1973-1940),
78-80. Meeting of the officials and report of the happenings at the beginning
of the Revolution. No. 54, August 21, 1810; and Letter from Carlos Dehault De
Lassus to the members of the House of Representatives, August 25, 1810, West
Florida Rebellion Papers 1810, 1816, 1845, LLMVC LSU.
A complete description of the fort can be referenced in Cox, The West Florida
Controversy, 390; Arthur, The Story of the West Florida Rebellion, 103; and Davis, The
Rogue Republic, 183-184.
Report from Philemon Thomas Commander in Chief of the Fort of Baton
Rouge and it dependencies to the Honorable John Rhea, President of the
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Several days passed before the Convention made an official
proclamation to the public on September 26, 1810. Sent from
Baton Rouge, the document assured the populace that the shift in
_control of the country was "in order to secure to our constituents
and to our country, the blessings of liberty and equal rights, and to
establish those rights on the most permanent foundation." 57 The
Convention ratified the rights drafted on August 22 and signed into
effect by De Lassus prior to the revolt. The attack and proclamation
signified the full authority and power of the Convention
government. In a matter of months, the people of West Florida
overthrew the colonial authority of an international state and
established their own government. In making the proclamation,
and declaring a state of independence, the Convention established
the basis of a republic.
The drafting of the declaration signed by John Rhea and
the delegates on September 26 nominally made West Florida
an independent nation. Once it ratified the declaration, the
Convention sent dispatches that contained copies of the declaration
to Governor David Holmes of Mississippi Territory and Governor
Claiborne of the New Orleans Territory. Governor Holmes
replied swiftly to the acceptance of the declaration stating that
he forwarded the letter to the President of the United States and
wanted to be informed of every occurrence within the West Florida
territory. 58 Holmes later assisted those in favor of joining with the
United States in their negotiations with President James Madison.
The announcement to other territories and the United States was
a public statement that West Florida was an independent republic
on American soil. 59 The British soon thereafter acknowledged
the changing situation in West Florida. In Washington, British
diplomat to the United States James Philip Marier commented that
the new regulations restored tranquility and that the West Florida

57.
58.

59.

Convention, September 24, 1810, West Florida Rebellion Papers 1810, 1816,
1845, LLMVC LSU. For secondary sources of the attack on Baton Rouge, see
Cox, The West Florida Controversy, 397-403; Arthur, The Story of the West Florida
Rebellion, 105-108. For a contemporary analysis, see Bice, The Original Lone Star
Republic, 190-194; McMichael, Atlantic Loyalties, 164-168; and Davis, The Rogue
Republic, 183-187.
Arthur, The Story of the West Florida Rebellion, 112.
Letter from Governor David Holmes to John Rhea Esq. President of Convention
at Baton Rouge, September 30, 1810. Elizabeth K. Dart Collection, Mss. 5023,
LLMVCLSU.
Ibid.
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government "approximates, as nearly as possible to a republican
form of government, and they wish to become a part of the United
States." 60
The break with Spain created unforeseen problems for
the new country. The government had few funds in its treasury.
Many of the men who joined in the attack on the fort provisioned
themselves at their own expense. If a man could not cover his own
cost, his commanding officer paid for the supplies. Mter the revolt,
the Convention wanted to maintain a militia for the protection of
the territory, but grievances arose from officers concerned about
their accrued debt. 61 Many residents of the new republic did not
support the break with Spain. Representatives from Baton Rouge,
the Bayou Sara region, and many among the wealthy aristocracy
supported annexation by the U.S., but there were objections to such
an action throughout the territory. Sam Baldwin, the commanding
officer stationed at Springfield, had difficulty controlling the
populace in the region. 62 Some prisoners of the recent revolution
and Spanish loyalists refused to sign a proclamation recognizing
the Convention and made threats on Baldwin's life for trying to
force their signatures. 63 In addition to the prisoners, the people
of Springfield disapproved of the late changes in West Florida.
Springfield's population included supporters of both Spain and the
Convention. Those who rejected the revolution rebelled against
the new government and refused to do patrol duty in their districts
and frontier regions. 64 Baldwin, responding to the resistance,
petitioned the Convention to send a small regular force to the
area to assist in maintaining control of the disgruntled populace. 65
Some others residing in the eastern districts did participate in the
60.

61.
62.

63.
64.
"·~

65.

ewspaper clipping for Washington City dated October 5, Reel 27, Foreign
Office Records, John Philip Morier Correspondence, 1810, William Research
Center, The Historic New Orleans Collection, herein noted as WRC THNOC.
Letter from Stephen Winter to the President and Gentlemen of the
Convention, October 5, 1810. Elizabeth K. Dart Collection, Mss. 5023, LLMVC
LSU.
Traditional historiography for Indians in Louisiana can be found in Paul A.
Kunkel, "The Indians of Louisiana About 1700,"Louisiana Historical Quarterly
33-34 ( 1950-51): 177-203.
Letter from Sam Baldwin to Philemon Thomas, October 13, 1810, Elizabeth K.
Dart Collection, Mss. 5023, LLMVC LSU.
Letter from Sam Baldwin Captain Commanding, Springfield, to Philemon
Thomas Esquire Brigadier General, October 12, 1810, Elizabeth K. Dart
Collection, Mss. 5023, LLMVC LSU.
Ibid.
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revolution against Spain, but preferred to remain an independent
country rather than join the United States because annexation
introduced new taxes and regulations. 66
Native Americans, primarily Choctaw, posed another problem
for the administration and eastern territories. Mter the change
of power, the allegiance of the native population was uncertain.
Previously, the natives allied themselves with the Spanish in West
Florida, but the transition of power severed all political loyalty
between the Convention and Indians. The Convention wanted
to control the Indians living on the frontier region through
official orders forcing them to recognize the new state and laws.
Enforcement of the orders led to reports of hostile Indians in
the remote areas of West Florida. Sam Baldwin reported Indians
in the "Tanchipiho [sic] to have hostile intentions toward the
populace." 67 Daniel Quitting from Springfield reported to General
Thomas that the Convention's orders to the Indians were not well
received. He stated that there were Indians "all ready painted for
war" who "would immediately fall upon those that did not comply
with the orders that they were to be commanded by white men." 68
In a letter to the residents of Springfield, the Convention advised
the people of a large group of Indians encamped on the west side of
the Amite River urging that preparations should be made in case of
an attack. 69 The fringe and remote areas of West Florida remained
segregated from centralized government, but the Convention sent
troops upon request to protect the people and their borders. 70
Aware of the ongoing hostile threats in the frontier region,
the Convention did not stop from advancing its ultimate goals:
organizing the administration and petitioning for annexation
by the United States. And while many delegates favored joining
the United States, U.S. interest in occupying West Florida was not

66.
67.
68.
69.

70.

Le tter from Frederick Kimball to Andrew Wade, December 9, 1810, Frederick
Kimball Letters 1804-1812, 1833, LLMVC LSU.
Ibid.
Letter from Daniel Quitting to General Thomas, October 10, 1810, Elizabeth
K. Dart Collection, Mss. 5023, LLMVC LSU .
Letter from the Committee of Convention at Baton Rouge to Brigadier
General Philemon Thomas, Commanding the militia of th e state of West
Florida, October 16, 1810, Elizabeth K. Dart Collection, Mss. 5023, LLMVC
LSU.
Letter from Sam Baldwin Captain Commanding, Springfield, to Philemon
Thomas Esquire Brigadier General, October 12, 1810, Elizabeth K. Dart
Collection, Mss. 5023, LLMVC LSU.
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clear in October or November. In order to maintain stability and
prepare for any eventuality, the Convention continued to legislate
as an independent nation.
In November, the government moved the capital ofWestFlorida
-f rom Baton Rouge to St. Francisville and held an election for a
bicameral legislature. John W. Leonard was elected as president
pro tempore of the upper house, while Dudley L. Avery was selected
as Speaker of the House of Representatives. The assembly then
elected Fulwar Skipwith as Governor of West Florida. 71 Skipwith
took complete control of the government after his election, acting
as supreme commander. He sent out envoys to incorporate regions
of West Florida still under the control of Spanish authorities,
organized a military excursion against Spanish-controlled Mobile,
improved the judicial system, and developed a uniform tax. By
November 1810, West Florida possessed many of the key elements
of an independent republic in the nineteenth century. 72
As Skipwith helped form the new government into a viable
entity, the United States advanced plans to annex the territory.
Using Governor Holmes as mediator, the Madison administration
attempted to assert U.S. influence in West Florida. Mter receiving
the Declaration of Independence and correspondence from
Governor Holmes, President Madison officially granted Governor
Claiborne full authority to incorporate West Florida into the
United States as a means of fulfilling the Louisiana Purchase. 73 By
claiming that the United States had original claim to West Florida,
the Madison administration undermined and disregarded the
development of the West Florida Republic and proceeded with
plans to take the territory. Holmes emphasized to Claiborne that
the inhabitants of Baton Rouge, not the entire territory, would
receive the U .S. authority with pleasure, but others would oppose
Claiborne's attempts to occupy West Florida. For that reason,
71_

Cox, The West Florida Controversy, 432 and Arthur, The Story of the West Florida
Rebellion, 125_
72_ Davis, The Rogue Republic, 193-200_ Davis examines the forceful removal
of Shepherd Brown, William Cooper, and those still loyal to Spain_ See the
Constitution of the State of Florida, Article 1, Sections 1-23 for a complete
examination of the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial branches of the West
Florida Government and Article 1, Section 25 for the establishment and
implementation of taxes in West Florida_
73_ Letter from William Claiborne to Robert Smith, December 1, 1810_ Official
letter books of W. C C Claiborne, 1801-1816. Edited by Dunbar Rowland (New
York: AMS Press, 1972). Herein noted as Claiborne Letters.
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Homes advised Claiborne to prepare a detachment of troops to
"move at a moment's warning" in case negotiations went awry. 74
Claiborne's mission sent him down the Mississippi River from
Washington, Mississippi, to Baton Rouge. During his advance
through the territory, he circulated the President's proclamation
that authorized him to incorporate West Florida as part of the
Orleans Territory. 75 Claiborne contacted Colonel Leonard
Covington, regional commander of United States troops, with
orders to send two hundred and fifty to three hundred men,
including a detachment of light artillerists with two field pieces,
to Pointe Coupee to wait for further orders from Claiborne. 76
Claiborne was adamant in his desire to secure the territory by any
means necessary. With orders from the President, his first option
was to negotiate terms for the territory, but if discussion failed,
Claiborne had a military force ready to assault Baton Rouge and
seize control.
Word of the President's proclamation and Claiborne's
mission reached Skipwith in early December. Previously, Skipwith
welcomed incorporation by the United States, but took offense
to a deal between Holmes and Claiborne being made without
his acceptance. The Republic of West Florida's governor decided
it was best for West Florida to remain an independent nation,
or at least make a show of force to the Americans. Holmes
reported that Skipwith and other members of the assembly were
actively employed in raising troops to counter any show of force
by Claiborne. 77 Skipwith organized a defensive front against the
American expedition in order to protect the new nation. Claiborne
believed that the territory was ready to welcome the United States,
but was met with a different view from Robert Smith who reported:
... some intelligent Citizens here, who are intimately
acquainted with many influential characters of the

74.
75.

76.

77.

Ibid.
The Proclamation issued by Presidentjames Madison on October 27, 1810,
proclaimed that West Florida was to fall under the authority of the United
States in order to secure America's adjoining territories. Reprinted by Arthur,
The Story of the West Flo-rida Rebellion, 134-135.
Letter from William Claiborne to Colonel Leonard Covington, commanding
the U.S. troops near the town ofWashington, Mississippi Territory, December
1, 1810. Claiborne Letters.
Letter from William Claiborne to Mr. Robert Smith Secretary of State,
December 2, 1810. Claiborne Letters.
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Convention party ... that however anxious a majority of the
people may be, to be recognized as part of the American
family, yet some of their Leaders will not be disposed to
acknowledge the Authority of the Government of the
United States. 78
Smith's reportsshowashiftofpowerin the WestFloridagovernment.
Previously, the Convention members openly sought incorporation
by the U.S. government. Philemon Thomas, Dudley Avery, John
Leonard, and several other constituents addressed to Skipwith that
the representatives and legislators of West Florida should make
provisions for a union with the Territory of New Orleans, but now
many favored remaining an independent state. 79
Reports by Robert Smith urged Claiborne to reconsider his
plans of enforcing the President's proclamation in Baton Rouge.
Fearing that residents of West Florida would turn to their weapons
instead of pens, Claiborne sent correspondence to Colonel
Covington, ordering him to send an additional four to five hundred
men to wait at Pointe Coupee for his orders. 80 With a contingent
force mobilized, Claiborne initiated a propaganda attack on
the inhabitants of West Florida. He distributed one hundred
leaflets announcing the President's proclamation regarding West
Florida. Claiborne's plan was to win over the population with the
proclamation and slowly incorporate the territory. The Convention
at that time was in session in St. Francisville, therefore its members
were absent from their respective districts and unaware of the
circulating leaflets.
Claiborne arrived in Natchez on December 5 to wait for a
barge that would take him down river to Baton Rouge. Prior to his
departure, he dispatched two West Florida citizens with copies of the
President's proclamation to Baton Rouge and to the Convention at
St. Francisville. 81 Their mission was to observe the response to the
78. Ibid.
79. Journal of the West Florida Convention, 1810, letter signed by Philemon Thomas,
John Scott, Joseph Thomas, Benjamin Williams, John Pennon, Benjamin
McWaters, Edmund Hawes, James Neilson, C. Henry, Dudley Avery, Speaker
of the House of Representatives, andJohn Leonard, President pro term of the
Senate to Fulwar Skipwith, Governor of the State of Florida, September 27,
1810, LOC.
80. Letter from William Claiborne to Colonel Leonard Covington, December 2,
1810. Claiborne Letters.
81. Letter from William Claiborne to Robert Smith, December 5, 1810. Claiborne
Letters.
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proclamation and deliver a sound assessment back to Claiborne.
Reluctant to believe that the people of West Florida were ready to
resist the U.S. claim to the region, Claiborne believed that a force
would not be necessary for him to complete his mission. However,
he also believed that having such a force would persuade the
Convention to recognize his authority and "silence the disaffected
inhabitants. "82
On December 7, Governor Holmes and Audley Osborne,
Claiborne's negotiator, greeted Claiborne at Pointe Coupee to
make plans for his arrival. Following the meeting with Claiborne,
Holmes met with Skipwith. In the meeting, Skipwith proclaimed his
dissatisfaction with the circulation of the President's proclamation.
Mter heated debate, Skipwith and several delegates left the
Convention in St. Francisville, travelled to Baton Rouge, and
assembled the whole West Florida militia the following day. 83
Following the meeting between Holmes and the Convention,
Skipwith sent a message instructing John H. Johnson, a convention
legislator, to meet with Holmes, Osborne, and Claiborne. Johnson
supported incorporation by the United Sates, but acting as a
messenger and under orders from his governor, he informed the
men of Skipwith's position, which rejected Claiborne's mission
and the President's proclamation. Claiborne sent a reply stating
that, "Mr. Skipwith would be respected, but I could not recognize
him as Governor and Commander in Chief of Florida, nor enter
into correspondence with him." 84 Claiborne continued that it was
his duty and authority to enact the President's proclamation on
West Florida. The reply by Skipwith was less than supportive to the
negotiation efforts. Skipwith stated that rather than surrender his
country unconditionally and without terms, he would, "with twenty
men, if a greater number could not be procured surround the flag
staff and die in its defense." 85
In response to Skipwith's threat, Claiborne ordered Osborne
to journey to St. Francisville and learn how Claiborne's presence
would be received by the Convention of West Florida. Mter
receiving a favorable word that the residents in St. Francisville
82.
83.

Ibid.
Letter from William Claiborne to Robert Smith, December 7, 1810. Claiborne
Letters.
84. Letter from William Claiborne to Robert Smith, District of Baton Rouge, St.
Francisville, December 7, 1810. Claiborne Letters.
85. Ibid.
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would welcome him, Claiborne, accompanied by Holmes, crossed
the river to meet the citizens and militia. Some residents escorted
Claiborne to town where he saw a West Florida flag guarded by the
militia. Claiborne approached the Flag and ordered a citizen to
read the U.S. President's proclamation. Claiborne addressed the
militia as their Governor and Commander in Chief charged by the
President of the United States to "protect them in the enjoyment
of their liberty, property, and religion." 86 Claiborne then ordered
the West Florida flag to be taken down and replaced with the U.S.
flag. The militia and citizens of West Florida agreed to the process
without resistance. Claiborne's victory in St. Francisville allowed
him to pacify the most populous and wealthy region in West Florida
that carried the most support for incorporation.
The victory in St. Francisville facilitated Claiborne's move to
enforce the president's orders on Skipwith in Baton Rouge. If
conciliatory measures failed, the troops of the United States would
descend on Baton Rouge and take the fort. Skipwith garrisoned
the fort at Baton Rouge and prepared for Claiborne's arrival.
Claiborne believed that Skipwith's actions were in response to
feeling "wounded and betrayed" by the President's proclamation
and because Skipwith and the people of West Florida were not
personally or virtually represented during the negotiations. 87
Claiborne advanced toward Baton Rouge ordering Colonel
Covington to land a force approximately one mile north of the city
as a precaution. Skipwith maintained his position that Claiborne's
assault on West Florida was an outrage against the West Florida flag
and the constitution of the country but did not call for bloodshed. 88
He refused to have his troops lower the flag, but ordered them
not to resist the American arrival. Skipwith organized a "peaceful
protest" with the arrival of Claiborne and the proclamation.
In return, Claiborne promised not to assault any deserters or
vagabonds, the men that made up Skipwith's personal force, but
rather presided over a peaceful and respectful ceremony while the
West Florida flag was lowered and replaced by the U.S. colors. Mter
seventy-four days, the new nation and independent republic no
longer existed.
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Ibid.
Le tter from William Claiborne to Robert Smith, December. 12, 1810. Claiborne
Letters.
88. Cox, The West Florida Controversy, 504.
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Most of the West Florida residents expressed optimism in
regard to U.S. intervention in West Florida, but there were those
that saw a disastrous outcome resulting from incorporation into
the Orleans territory. Many of the old aristocrats, or those allied
with Skipwith, that lived in West Florida rejected occupation by the
United States out of fear of falling under the nation's territorial
laws and a new administration set up by Claiborne. 89 Frederick
Kimball, a cotton planter from Pinckneyville, Mississippi, believed
West Florida could have grown into a successful nation if time
would have allowed. Kimball thought that the government of West
Florida could have pushed the Spanish out of every port east of
the Mississippi River, but that the region's incorporation into the
Orleans territory would destroy their way of life. 90 He alleged that
their elected members sent to New Orleans would not be received
well by the American government and that the area could become
poor under American jurisdiction, which was true as the territory
was incorporated into the United States. 91 Lastly, Kimball assumed
that the Americans would make the people of West Florida "devils,"
or give them back to Spain once the United States took everything
they needed from the people. His hatred for Claiborne and the
United States was deep. Kimball wrote that if he had known that
Claiborne was descending the river to destroy their way of life, he
would have "taken control of the fort and blew him out the water"
thus preserving his beloved nation. 92
Kimball firmly believed that prosperity and growth would grace
the fledgling West Florida Republic over time. Strategically located
near the mouth of the Mississippi River, the Republic of West
Florida contained an organized government that administrated
the region, established a series of laws, developed a uniform tax
system to generate wealth, and created a military force to protect its
inhabitants. Moreover, West Florida did not need the assistance of
the United States to break away from Spain or create a government.

89. Le tter from Frederick Kimball to Andrew Wade, December 9, 1810, Frederick
Kimball Letters 1804-1812, 1833, LLMVC LSU.
90. Ibid.
91. Letter from Frederick Kimball to And rew Wade, March 5, 1810, Frederick
Kimball Letters 1804-1812, 1833, LLMVC LSU. Also, see Samuel C. H yde Jr.
Pistols and Politics. For an explanation of the political and economic situation
of the Florida Parishes after American control.
92 . Letter from Frederick Kimball to Andrew Wade, May 11, 1811 , Frederick
Kimball Letters 1804-1812, 1833, LLMVC LSU.
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Instead of independence, West Florida became one of the first
victims of an expansionist United States whose imperialistic policies
were only beginning. The fall of the republic to American hands
derived from three factors: the initial response for incorporation,
the drafting of a Declaration of Independence, and the short
amount of time West Florida had to develop as a republic. Even
though West Florida possessed many of the key components of a
republic, it only existed for seventy-four days as compared to the
Republic of Texas, which had many years to develop. West Florida
was indeed an independent nation progressing to the status of a
viable republic rather than a mere transitional stage in continental
development. To regard the Republic of West Florida's existence as
anything less obscures the contributions of those who participated
in the Revolt as well and the complicated process of nation building
that took place in the region prior to U.S. imperialism.
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Book Reviews
Daniel Murphree, Book Review Editor
Indian Slavery in Colonial America. Edited by Alan Gallay. (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 2009. Maps, list of contributors,
index. Pp. 448. $60 cloth.)
Indian Slavery in Colonial America, edited by Alan Gallay, focuses
on Indian slavery during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
in North America north of Mexico. This volume makes a compelling case that "Indian slavery was not peripheral in the history of
Native America, but central to the story" (3). Slavery existed in
North America prior to European contact, but it was the international slave trade orchestrated by European colonizers that led to
the demise of entire groups of Indians and the depopulation of
certain regions. Gallay argues persuasively that, "For many Indians,
their engagement in slaving, or their victimization, was the critical
moment in their history" (7).
European involvement in regional politics forced some Indian groups to face the choice of either becoming victims of slave
raids or becoming the enslavers. Some, such as the Westos of the
Southeast, were formidable slave traders catering to the English
only later to be destroyed by Savannah Indians at the encouragement of English colonists. Joseph Hall discusses this situation in his
essay "Anxious Alliances: Apalachicola Efforts to Survive the Slave
Trade, 1638-1705." Slaving also facilitated the emergence of powerful Indian confederacies, including the Choctaws, Chickasaws,
Cherokees, and Creeks.
For readers interested in the history of Florida and the surrounding region, this volume is particularly relevant because it
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showcases some of the newest scholarship on Indian slavery and
the Indian slave trade in the Southeast. The Southeast and Southwest receive more coverage because foundational works such as The
Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South,
1670-1717 (2002) by Alan Gallay and Captives and Cousins: Slavery,
Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands (2002) by James
F. Brooks have laid the groundwork for more focused studies of
these regions. Alan Gallay contributes an essay about South Carolina and the slave trade, as well as a deftly written introduction that
places Indian slavery in the broader context of slavery in early modern history and in the historiography of New World slavery. Other
contributors that examine the Southeast include Joseph Hall, Jennifer Baszile, Denise I. Bossy, and Robbie Ethridge.
The essays in this volume highlight the varied nature of slavery-which Gallay associates with "a denial of freedom"-in native
America (5). Slavery and other fom1s of unfreedom differed according to time and place, and no singular definition of slavery
encompasses the way people experienced slavery. An enslaved woman in New France may have had a remarkably different experience
of enslavement than a male slave who labored in South Carolina. In
her essay, "Apalachee Testimony in Florida: A View of Slavery from
the Spanish Archives," Jennifer Baszile maintains that there were
"competing practices of slavery" and multiple meanings of slavery in
the region Spanish colonists called La Florida (187). Her research
reveals that contemporaries used the term slavery selectively and
that "consensus about the nature of slavery was elusive" (201).
Even with its varied nature, Indian slavery was different from
the enslavement of Mricans in that it generally served political purposes, and labor extraction was not usually its primary motive. Many
Indians lived in what Gallay calls "non-slaving slaveholding societies"
in which slavery "existed as a peripheral institution" and where the
society did not seek out large numbers of slaves. Captors held the
enslaved, who were often women and children, for the purposes of
"degradation and revenge" (8). Gallay makes a distinction between
non-slaving slaveholding societies and "slaving societies" in which
captured people served the distinct purpose of "performing heavy
labor." Pursuing captives "was central to the culture and economy"
of slaving societies. In her essay, "Indian Slavery in Southeastern Indian and British Societies, 1670-1730," Denise Bossy argues, "native
slavery was not a labor-based system. Native slaves worked, but often
to support, rather than enrich, their masters" (213). Although the
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various forms of unfreedom Indians experienced were horrendous
in their own right, slavery was neither based primarily on labor extraction, as was the enslavement of Mricans, nor was slavery a central
~ element of these societies. Widespread European influence in North
America, however, eventually prompted Indians to engage in slave
raiding and warfare for the purposes of procuring large numbers
of slaves to trade to European allies. It also meant that the nature of
Indian enslavement on much of the continent evolved to encompass
the European purpose of slavery -to extract labor. Alternately, Brett
Rushforth's article "'A Little Flesh We Offer You': The Origins of
Indian Slavery in New France," reveals that Indian slavery could also
transform European practices such as when French settlers slowly
adapted to Indian customs of captive exchange in order to create
and maintain alliances (366).
This volume is valuable to students and scholars who study
North American Indians, New World slavery, European expansion
and colonization, and the history of colonial North America more
generally. Indian Slavery in Colonial America uncovers the complexity, variety, and ubiquity of Indian slavery in North America. It also
reveals the work scholars need to do on this topic. Gallay notes,
"With so much left to uncover on Indian slavery in early America, it
is still too early to take full measure of its entire significance" (27).
This relatively young field of historical inquiry will continue to benefit from detailed studies of individual societies and regions, much
like the essays in this volume provide. Research that further elucidates the various meanings of "slavery" and "freedom" will also
provide an enhanced understanding of how Indians understood
these and related concepts. Gaining this insight will ultimately lead
to a fuller and more complex picture of Indian societies and of
colonial America.
Heidi Scott Giusto

Duke University

America's Hundred Years' War: U.S. Expansion to the Gulf Coast and
the Fate ofthe Seminole, 1763-1858. Edited by WilliamS. Belko.
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2011. Illustrations,
bibliography, index. Pp. vii, 320. $65.00 cloth.)
The title of this book proclaims its bold intention - America's
Hundred Years' War, holding until the subtitle the mention of
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Florida. Potential readers will immediately wonder what is this
Hundred Years' War and why don't we know about it? Editor William S. Belko and the University Press of Florida are counting on
readers succumbing to the mystery and opening the pages. Those
who do will be richly rewarded with an assemblage of impeccable
scholarship, both comprehensive and intricately detailed, weaving
together the historical, political, economic, and cultural contexts
that frame the interactions between the Florida Seminole Indians
and U.S. expansionism between 1763 and 1858. Given that the central and most dramatic event of this period, the Second Seminole
War of 1835-1842, barely rises to footnote status in standard presentations of U.S. history (Daniel Walker Howe's ten-page treatment
of the First Seminole War with virtually nothing on the second
conflict in his monumental What Hath God Wrought (2007) providing odd support for this contention), editor Belko and his authors
have quite a challenge in elevating these Florida-based dynamics to
national status. But they go at this challenge systematically, framing
each case within the larger perspective of an emerging American
power, unrelenting in exerting its strength in its encounters with
Spanish, British, and Native American interests in the Florida Gulf
Coast region.
One immediate challenge comes with the 1763 start date
which begins the 20-year period of British rule in Florida. Pre-Revolutionary and well before the creation of the formal United States
of America, this date makes overt American action hard to see. The
challenge is deftly met in Susan Parker's essay which argues that
indirect American pressure on a fragile, volatile international border, first British and then Spanish after 1783, inevitably locked the
Seminoles in its grip. The vise becomes tighter in 1812 when the
new U.S. and Great Britain are again at war, providing easy justification for armed offensives against British sympathizing Seminoles
in Spanish Florida. James Cusick focuses on the ultimately unsuccessful diplomatic efforts on the part of the Seminole known as
King Payne in the area now known as Paynes Prairie, just south
of Gainesville, where Payne was to fall mortally wounded at the
hands of invading Georgia militia. William Belko focuses on the
international significance of these events, fighting the parochial
bias that has plagued Florida history for many years, again bringing
the Seminoles into a global sphere of relations. The intrigue and
intricacies of the so-called First Seminole War, Andrew Jackson's invasion of Spanish Florida and subsequent destruction of Seminole
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towns south to the Suwannee River, are described in chapters by
Belko and David and Jeanne Heidler. In discussions of the Monroe
administration and jackson's duplicity, they cover politically familiar ground, but provide additional depth for understanding the
border tensions that Jackson thought he could solve by attacking
the Seminoles and their maroon allies.
The formal Indian Removal policies that follow the legal control of Florida by the U.S. in 1821 foreshadow the looming national
rift about the legitimacy of slavery and a national moral commitment to human rights. The resulting seven-year Second Seminole
War, erupting late in 1835 and exhausting itself in 1842, required
a major military commitment and a governmental infrastructure
paid for by Congress to support it, and brought the first-ever West
Point trained officers to the wilds of Florida to enforce the removal
policies through the barrel of a gun. The strategies and tactics of
the two sides of this conflict are ably explicated by Joe Knetsch
and Samuel Watson. Both are careful to usefully distinguish strategy
vs. tactics before going on to critique the relative effectiveness of
waging war by both sides. I am hugely sympathetic with Watson's
call for research designed to improve our understanding of the
Seminole side of the hostilities and can say that there has been
slow but impressive progress on this front. Kevin Clark's 2000 M.A.
thesis at the University of North Carolina titled Hard Corps: Native
American Resistance, Leadership, and Tactics in Florida, 1835-1838 is a
solid step forward as is David Butler's 2001 thesis at the University
of South Florida titled An Archaeological Model of Seminole Combat Behavior. Portions of my own research on this topic appear in a 2007
article in the journal Historical Archaeology. So Watson is not alone
and should find an eager group of collaborators ready to craft the
plan. His chapter is also distinctive within the volume in attempting
to present a Seminole perspective on the strategy and tactics of war.
Matthew Clavin's chapter "It is a negro, not an Indian war,"
titled after a quote from the very frustrated General Thomas jesup,
reopens the controversy around the correct (historically and culturally) name for the Black Seminoles or maroons, mostly (but not
all) escaped plantation slaves who found refuge among the Seminoles. Calling them Black Seminoles, as has become customary in
the literature, implies that they are Seminoles who happen to be
Black, a view not shared by the Seminoles themselves then or now,
nor really supported by a close reading of documentary sources.
The archaeological record of material culture brings ambiguity
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rather than clarity to the picture, and shows considerable sharing
of technology, dress, and the habits of daily life between Seminole
and Black. Calling them maroons, on the other hand, implies freeranging communities, somewhat adrift, and with far less formal
and symbiotic connections to the Seminoles than they apparently
had. Proper compensation to the Seminoles for the loss of these
people as property in the Removal process was, after all, one of the
major flashpoints igniting the Second Seminole War. The chapter
by James Denham and Canter Brown and the last chapter by Brian
Rucker continue the focus on a Florida torn by Indian wars and
also further the book's theme by situating the impacts and contributing circumstances beyond her territorial borders.
This volume is largely historical in scope and approach and
is successful in placing this relatively small-scale history on the national and international stage. The scholarship of Florida history
desperately needs this approach, and William Belko's book serves
this cause very well. Anthropologists and archaeologists will be less
satisfied and still await a grander, integrated historical and anthropological synthesis. But when that does come, this book will be one
of the primary ingredients.
Brent R. Weisman

University of South Florida

Captured at Kings Mountain: The Journal of Uzal Johnson, A
Loyalist Surgeon. Edited by Wade S. Kolb III and Robert M.
Weir. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2011.
Illustrations, bibliography, index. Pp. Iii, 248. $39.95 cloth.)
Loyalist accounts provide a different and valuable perspective
on the American Revolution, yet they are often neglected by both
academic and popular historians. This is frequently the result of
inaccessibility; the vast majority of Loyalist material has never been
published and is often available only on microfilm or in archives,
with many of the latter located outside the United States.
Fortunately for those with an interest in gaining a broader view
of the War for Independence, WadeS. Kolb III and Robert M. Weir
have published an important Loyalist journal covering the Revolution in the South from March 5, 1780, to March 7, 1781. The
author of the journal, Uzal Johnson, was a native of Newark, New
Jersey, and worked there as a surgeon before the war. Mter a brief
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period of service in the American army, Johnson switched allegiance to the British and accepted a commission as surgeon in the
Loyalist New Jersey Volunteers. He began his journal after his unit
arrived in the South to participate in the British campaign against
Charleston, South Carolina. When his service ended in 1782, he
returned to Newark, repaired his relationships with his neighbors,
and resumed his surgical practice.
In addition to piecing together the available information on
Johnson's life, the editors concisely summarize the southern campaign in the volume's introduction, providing the necessary context
for Johnson's journal. They also address the issue of the similarities
between the better known diary of Lieutenant Anthony Allaire and
Johnson's journal. Since the two were friends and served together,
it is not surprising that the journals share many similarities; however, some entries are virtually identical. Kolb and Weir conclude
that in the latter cases, it was likely that Allaire copied Johnson's
entries, and that Johnson's is the more original of the two sources.
Johnson'sjournal comprises only forty-three pages of the book,
a shorter section than either the introduction or notes. Nevertheless, the journal contains accounts of a variety of topics. Coverage
of military matters includes the New Jersey Volunteers' march from
Georgia to Charleston, information on the siege operations, reports of battles that Johnson did not witness, such as the Waxhaws
(May 29, 1780) and Camden (August 16, 1780), and the frustration
of the Loyalist troops with duty in the South Carolina backcountry,
as they marched alongside the loyal militia pursuing their elusive
American foes through difficult terrain.
The most important military event Johnson recorded was the
Battle of Kings Mountain on October 7, 1780. Johnson describes
the battle and its harsh aftermath for the captured Loyalist regulars
and militiamen, which included the hanging of nine prisoners on
October 14, the shooting and hanging of others later, and Johnson's own beating at the hands of American Colonel Benjamin
Cleveland for treating a wounded Loyalist. The brutality Johnson
recounts is an aspect often overlooked in histories of the battle and
the southern campaign.
Johnson does not confine his observations to military affairs.
He also provides fairly detailed descriptions of towns such as
Ninety Six, South Carolina, and Hillsborough, North Carolina. He
discusses his attempts to continue his medical practice while a prisoner, which aroused the wrath of Continental Colonel John Gunby
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even thoughJohnson's alleged malfeasance consisted of providing
smallpox inoculations to North Carolinians at their own request.
Included too are anecdotes and brief descriptions of individuals
such as Henry Melcolm, an eighty-one-year-old Loyalist whose possessions had been plundered by the Americans and who walked
over a hundred miles to seek help from Johnson's detachment.
"What is more remarkable," Johnson noted, was that the old man
"left a Child at Home only two Years old" (18).
The wealth of information Johnson recorded on a host of topics can be difficult to follow, as the journal is filled with the names
of unfamiliar individuals, places, waterways, and military units.
Fortunately, Kolb and Weir have gone to great lengths to remedy
this problem. Johnson 's journal is followed by ninety-five pages of
notes, more than twice the length of the journal itself. The notes
are listed by date to matchJohnson'sjournal entries, and identify
the people and places Johnson mentions, along with providing
other relevant information. Thus, the reader is not left wondering to whom or what Johnson refers, and can form an idea of his
location at any particular time with the aid of the book's maps. The
notes transform a journal that can be confusing, even to specialists,
into an account that is accessible to any reader. The editors deserve
credit for the extensive research that was required to produce such
thorough notes.
Kolb and Weir have not only published a valuable Loyalist document of the American Revolution, they have succeeded through
their introduction and notes in contextualizing Johnson's journal
and multiplying its value as a historical source. Readers interested
in the War for Independence, particularly the southern campaign,
and those wishing to learn more about the often overlooked Loyalist experience will find this volume of immense value.
Jim Piecuch

Kennesaw State University

Contentious Liberties: American Abolitionists in Post-Emancipation
Jamaica, 1834- 1866. By Gale L. Kenny. (Athens: University of
Georgia Press, 2010. Acknowledgements, notes, bibliography,
index. Pp. Xi, 212. $44.95 cloth.)
In her aptly titled book, Contentious Liberties, Gale Kenny analyzes the efforts and unintended consequences of male and female
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missionaries in Jamaica from the 1830s to the early 1870s. Her focus is on the men and women organized under the auspices of
Oberlin College in Ohio, the first co-educational and interracial
institution in the United States. The conflicts she addresses include
competing views held by the missionaries and administration about
abolition and emancipation and post-emancipation strategies and
tactics. At the same time, she addresses the larger context of change
in the U.S. and the British colony in reference to the meaning of
freedom and rights in slave societies as they approached and accomplished the legal end of slavery.
Kenny divides the study into three parts that cover the background of Oberlin College and the development of ideologies and
activities in the northeastern United States, the move toward abolition in Jamaica, the challenges faced by U. S. missionaries, and the
transformations that occurred in Jamaica for both missionaries and
former slaves as Jamaica became a Crown colony. Kenny's central
theme is explaining levels of success and failure of missionaries in
transforming emancipated slave communities into the equivalent
of pious New England farm families. Drawing on missionaries' letters, pamphlets, addresses, and other published works of the period
-as well as recognized scholars of Jamaican and early nineteenth
century U. S. history- Kenny is able to explore the problems missionaries faced in attempting to persuade Jamaicans that outsiders
should follow their prescription for economic and spiritual success.
In some cases, such as the issue of acquiring land, Jamaican
and missionary objectives coincided; what differed were the means
and ultimate motives of the land-seekers. Oberlin missionaries
hoped to instill in Jamaicans self-sufficiency, reduced dependence
on wage labor, and love of manual labor. They also hoped to reinforce a patriarchal family structure and ethos that, they assumed,
would reduce or eliminate what they viewed as "licentious" behavior plaguing society. Jamaicans, on the other hand, also saw land
ownership as intrinsic to freedom and subsistence, but approached
the issue of acquiring land and/ or participating in wage labor from
the perspective of opportunity and past experience. Moreover, they
hoped to reduce external interference in their expression of religious and cultural practices, much to the dismay of the missionary
workers.
The U. S. experiences and predilections of the missionaries
shaped goals and discourse about how best to "civilize" Jamaicans,
who were viewed as disadvantaged not only because of slavery, but
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also because of their British colonizers' attitudes and systems. Missionaries wanted to acculturate ex-slaves to a godly, productive life
of freedom that was nevertheless limited by dictates regarding appropriate behavior. Part of that appropriate behavior, of course,
was to reject elements of Mrican-based beliefs that had become
synchronized with European-based religions. Male founders' views
of gender roles also reflected prevailing (as well as changing) attitudes about the roles of men and women in the institutions of
home, school, and church. While the Oberlin missionaries never
held the same views of slavery and Mrican-origin people as southern slaveholders, their more subtly-expressed racism - indeed
perhaps the missionary project itself -limited their achievements.
Like others involved in emancipation projects, they did not ask Jamaicans what they wanted or needed; instead, they forged ahead
with projects and agendas that could not be implemented as yet
in the U.S., projects that were guided by their perceptions of superiority and by paternalism and that could be tested in another
English-speaking country.
As other studies of evangelism have demonstrated, the advocates of and participants in these "civilizing missions" were often
frustrated in their efforts. Understandably, in the process of attempting to implant foreign values and systems, the missionaries'
efforts to accommodate to and/ or alter local customs fostered
questions about their own values, methods, and ideologies. One
example Kenny provides of these tensions is the case of a married male missionary and a single female missionary who joined
him in his rejection of established dogma and advocacy of a more
"spiritual" journey. The case not only provided insights about how
patriarchy affected the mission hierarchy's interpretation of and
response to events, but also reinforced fears about missionaries
"going native." Ultimately, the free sex, wife-swapping scandal adversely affected missionary dominance in decision-making and no
doubt contributed to Jamaican skepticism about missionaries' persistent criticisms of their sexual behavior.
Contentious Liberties fits into the scholarship on Atlantic and
transnational studies, offering perspectives on the interaction between abolitionist and post-emancipation efforts in the U.S. and
Caribbean. It also fits into scholarship about the Second Great
Awakening and women's history. U.S. and Caribbean historians,
particularly scholars of the nineteenth century missionary movement and gender history, will find this well-written book valuable,
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but the style of writing also makes it accessible for the general reader. Mter the combination of Civil War in the U.S. and the Morant
Bay Rebellion in Jamaica changed the two regions' priorities and
offered new solutions to old problems, the U.S. missionaries from
Oberlin returned home to address the needs of post-emancipation
societies. For those interested in the history and present popularity
of U.S. missionaries in the Western Hemisphere before and since,
this book is essential.
Susan]. Fernandez

University of South Florida St. Petersburg

A Small but Spartan Band: The Florida Brigade in Lee's Army ofNorthern
Virginia. By Zack C. Waters and James Edmonds. (Tuscaloosa:
University of Alabama Press, 2010. Acknowledgments,
illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. Pp. xiii, 199. $29.95
cloth.)
A Small but Spartan Band is an outstanding brigade history
of the Florida units that served with the Confederate Armies in
Virginia beginning with the 2nd Florida infantry which joined in
September 1861. Another Florida brigade was created upon the
arrival of the 5th and 8th regiments in August 1862. Mter battle and
disease withered those units to less than 300 men, reinforcements
in the form of the 1st, 2nct, 4th and 6th Florida battalions joined the
brigade at the end of May 1864. The 6th, l 5 t, and 4th battalions were
subsequently re-designated as the 9th, 10rh and 11th Florida infantry
regiments, respectively. All seven units fought together in a single
brigade during the finallO months of the war.
Previous scholarship on the Florida brigade, or Florida soldiers
in the Civil War in general, is sparse. Waters and Edmonds write
that "fewer than ten titles still comprise the entire published library
dealing with the Florida regiments that served in the Confederacy's
major armies" (2). They include several Master's theses, two firsthand accounts by veterans, and recent monographs on the 9th and
1Oth Florida regiments, but nothing on the three units who served
three to four years in Virginia and nothing on the brigade as a
whole. Waters and Edmonds' A Small but Spartan Band does indeed
"fill a void" in the scholarship ( 1).
The book is limited by source material but not by any shortage of research. For a brigade that might have counted 4,000-5,000
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soldiers, the authors located twenty-seven manuscript collections
and twenty-four contemporary newspapers with relevant information. Forward author Robert K Krick, himself a respected Civil War
researcher, noted the Floridians left "an archival vacuum" (xi). In
response to this challenge, the authors used other primary materials to complete the narrative of the Florida soldiers' experience
when the extant material from Floridians fell short. Comparisons
with notable scholarship on the demographics of Civil War soldiers
are included throughout the book to give readers an understanding of the similarities and differences of the Florida brigade in
respect to their Confederate comrades.
Readers will find the portrayal of Florida soldiers' wartime
experiences to be a strength of Waters and Edmonds' work. Not
content to describe the war through the eyes of commanders who
wrote official reports alone, the authors follow officers and enlisted
men. Readers meet men such as Private David R. Geer, who had an
outspoken hatred ofYankees, and Lt. Francis P. Fleming, a prolific
writer and postwar governor, in addition to brigade leaders such a
General Edward Perry and Colonel David Lang. In addition to statistics concerning the ages, origins, and occupations of the soldiers,
the authors include great material about the soldiering experience
and pastimes. Floridians who considered 40 degrees Fahrenheit a
frigid temperature and struggled through the Virginia winters found
relief by initiating brigade size snowball fights. Other accounts provide soldiers' opinions on the hardships of burial detail and crossing
old battlefields that had become impromptu cemeteries. Floridians
also offered opinions on the construction of rifle pits and soldiers
learning to trace the trajectory of shells fired from a Union howitzer
during the Battle of Petersburg. Combined, these anecdotes tell us
not only what the soldiers did, but they also tell us-as much as possible-how the men felt about their experiences.
Waters and Edmonds write clear battle descriptions with detailed accounts of the Florida brigade's action. Readers are given
a narrative on the movements of each army, providing context to
the specific action in which the Florida soldiers engaged. Maps are
provided to give a visual depiction of where and against whom the
Floridians fought. Unfortunately, the book does not include any
maps detailing campaign movements or the full scope of any major
battle. The authors provide good detail on army movements at the
Battle of the Wilderness and throughout the Overland Campaign
that an experienced reader can follow. However, this level of detail
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can be confusing to those reading about the battle for the first time
as well as those who prefer to have big-picture maps accompany the
text. Strangely, the text labels on two of the maps are upside down.
_This is probably a publishing error, but readers will likely wish to
find good battle maps to follow along when reading this book.
Although the battle descriptions are informative, the analysis
of controversial situations is inconsistent. Like any unit, the Florida
brigade found itself in situations where others made claims about
their performance that insinuated or charged dishonor. Waters
and Edmonds devote a full chapter to such a scenario concerning Gettysburg, where a nearby brigade commander accused the
Floridians of fleeing the field. Yet the authors fail to give a detailed
assessment of the 2nd Florida at the Sunken Road (Antietam) or the
8th Florida in the town (Fredericksburg), when portions of the unit
were accused of failing to perform their duty. It would be beneficial to read Waters and Edmonds' conclusions about those events
similar to the detailed assessment they wrote about the Gettysburg
controversy.
A Small but Spartan Band is an excellent work and a strong addition to any Civil War library. It is a must read for scholars of Civil
War soldiers and regimental or brigade histories. The writing style
is both pleasant and sophisticated in a way that will reach audiences
who want to read about the experiences of soldiers and audiences
concerned with the latest contributions to scholarship. It will make
for an excellent addition to collegiate history courses on Florida or
the Civil War. With additional maps provided by an instructor, it is
easily accessible to high school students who will hopefully find the
stories of the men interesting as well.
Daniel James Flook

University of Florida

Cooking in Other Women's Kitchens: Domestic Workers in the South,
1865-1960. By Rebecca Sharpless. (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2010. Illustrations, appendices, notes,
bibliography, index. Pp. xxix, 304. $35.00 cloth).
Although many scholars have successfully debunked the mythology surrounding the fictional creation of the tireless, faithful, and
endearingly sassy southern "Mammy" figure, there have been fewer
attempts to try to uncover the real experiences of the domestic work-
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ers who inspired the legend. In Cooking in Other Women s Kitchens:
Domestic Workers in the South, 1865-1960, Rebecca Sharpless points out
that Mrican-Americans were not only the "iconic" southern cooks
but the "actual" cooks as well, and she seeks to capture the felt expenence of the women who served in that capacity (2). In researching
the topic, Sharpless had to contend with source material that reinforced the trope of the Mammy, ranging from advertisements, to
cookbooks, to the sentimental reminiscences of white southerners.
But she uses these sources, which stem more from that white imagination than from historical reality, with sophistication and extreme
caution. Sharpless successfully endeavors to tell the story of MricanAmerican cooks using their "own words and ideas" (xvii). In so
doing, she reveals that black domestic workers too had to contend
with the fantastical ideals about Mammy, and thus, sometimes had
difficulty pleasing employers who expected their employees to be
as two dimensional as Aunt Jemima, rather than fully human. White
employers maintained racial stereotypes that stated that all black
women were natural cooks, that they were physically stronger than
white women and could not be physically exhausted, and that the focus of their lives was and should be cheerfully serving white people.
The truth that Sharpless reveals is infinitely more complicated.
Cooking in Other Women's Kitchens begins with an examination of
how black women gained cooking skills. Some learned from their
mothers, others learned through trial by fire in their first domestic
jobs, some were taught by the white women who employed them,
and a few received home economics training at institutions such
as Tuskegee. Although some women had an affinity for cooking
and found ways to use the kitchen as a creative outlet, most entered the profession because it was one of the few jobs available
to black women whose families desperately needed a female wage
earner. Despite the ambivalence or outright dislike some cooks felt
for their profession, Sharpless demonstrates that black women had
an enormous influence on the creation of southern cuisine. The
black cook was, in fact, so ubiquitous that a number of white southern women never learned how to cook, making them completely
dependent upon Mrican-American know-how in the kitchen. Particularly skillful Mrican-Americans could use their skills to their
advantage by commanding higher wages or increased job security.
However, even the most adept cook had to contend with stark
inequalities in the power dynamics between them and their white
employers. "Poorly paid, subject to being fired on a moment's no-
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tice, with brutally long working hours, few cooks were in a position
to exert their will in a white home" (167). Using testimony from
both cooks and their employers, Sharpless creates a detailed portrait
_ of the working relationships inside the typical white kitchen. Black
women faced constant constraints on their behavior from employers who could dock their wages for slight infractions, force them to
work overtime for no additional pay, and humiliate them by treating
them as social inferiors. Black women also had to contend with the
ever-present threat of sexual abuse and harassment from white men
who often considered sexual favors to be part of the cook's job description. In one of the most poignant chapters in the book, "Mama
Leaps off the Pancake Box: Cooks and Their Families," Sharpless
describes the toll that working long hours in white households took
on the children of Mrican-American cooks who had to do without
their mother's attention for long hours each day.
Despite these obstacles, black cooks found ways to resist their oppression. They could-and according to oral testimony sometimes
did--contaminate the food of particularly cruel employers. They
could deliberately ruin meals, mistreat kitchen appliances, maintain
a sullen attitude, skip work, or use their most potent weapon of allthey could quit. Sharpless demonstrates that African-American cooks,
despite their economic vulnerability, used this final weapon with surprising frequency. Floridian !della Parker quit her job working for
Maijorie Rawlings three times before finally leaving for good. Each
time she extracted concessions from her employer as part of the terms
of her returning to work. Interestingly, Sharpless argues that black
women could also resist their oppression by dissembling. Many took
pride in putting on performances in white households that satisfied
their employers while keeping the reality of their interior lives private.
Many white female employers were invested in the idea that their
servants genuinely cared about them and expected them to perform
what Sharpless calls "emotional labor" by listening to their troubles
along with cooking their meals ( 158). Although instances of real affection occasionally developed, Sharpless demonstrates that white ideas
about the affection of their cooks were often illusory.
Cooking in Other Women's Kitchens is well written, painstakingly
researched, and carefully situated in the scholarly literature about
foodways, the history of domestic servants, and Mrican-American,
Southern, and Women's histories. It is detailed enough to be of
interest to scholars who have not given the figure of the MricanAmerican cook the kind of historical scrutiny she deserves and
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accessible enough to be of interest to general readers and of use
in the undergraduate classroom. It is a rich and much needed addition to the literature about Mrican-American life in the South
in the years between Emancipation and the advent of the classical
phase of the civil rights movement.
Jennifer Jensen Wallach

University of North Texas

The South and America since World War II. By James C. Cobb. (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Illustrations, notes, index.
Pp. xvii, 318. $24.95 cloth.)
When one surveys the historians of the South of the past two
generations who have had a big influence on the field-for example, men named Woodward, Franklin, Tindall-it is impossible
to find one who has James C. Cobb's mastery of so many angles of
southern history. Here Cobb gives us a comprehensive history of the
South since World War II, one that surpasses in clarity and interpretive reach the good such offering in 1996 by the late Numan Bartley,
Cobb's mentor. This excellent book is brought to us by perhaps the
South's most thoughtful living interpreter of southern history and
culture and the most astute student of twentieth-century southern
economic history. No other working historian combines Cobb's
deep understanding of economic change in the South since World
War II with the hard-nosed realism about race and sensitivity to regional culture. This work moves smoothly from southern politics to
race relations, then to economic change, and inevitably to southern culture-including its manifestations in music of various styles,
literature, NASCAR, and many more. The author of the best work
on economic boosterism in the modern South, the best study of a
distinctive southern region- The Most Southern Place on Earth ( 1994)
about the Mississippi Delta-and the best recent analysis of southern
identity, Away Down South (2005), Cobb keeps on keeping on to the
great benefit of those who still want to think about the meaning of
the southern existence in America. And if the books are not enough,
one can find out what he really thinks by reading his blog, Cobbloviate, which is always entertaining, informative, and opinionated
about the things that really matter, football and barbeque.
Synthetic interpretations are often dismissed, occasionally maligned (because it is so easy to criticize the book the author did not
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write), but most often ignored. Synthetic studies can be sterile with
only flat generalities, but that will not be said of the present work.
Every time you see Cobb, his hair is a little whiter, but he still has good
_hearing. His ear for the colorful, telling quote enlivens every page. It
is worth the read just to be exposed to his vast knowledge of the best
and worst expressions of southern thought. The book reflects broad
reading over a long career (the white hair is thinning some too), a lot
of note-taking, and a great deal of remembering what has been said
about the South. Readers benefit greatly from those talents.
Cobb is absorbed with the question of how the South relates
to the rest of country-and the way the way the rest of country relates to it. He constantly grapples with the regional identity and how
it is a part of-and apart from-the American national identity. He
is suitably outraged at liberals who blame southerners for all that is
wrong with America-too many reactionaries, too many guns, too
many cigarettes. Without defending any of these excesses-the old
boy would not still be here if he partook of them-Cobb makes a vigorous counter-argument about how the alleged wrongs of the South
are indeed essentially American. Since the 1970s when John Egerton
described "the Southemization of America," Cobb writes, "a host of
liberal commentators soon seized on it ... as a literal explanation in
which an altogether mystifYing contagion of southern white values became almost singularly responsible for the nation's pronounced tilt
to the right during the last quarter of the twentieth century" (298).
For Cobb, the explanation of what has happened in the U.S. and the
South is far more interesting and politically and culturally paradoxical
than that. Setting the record straight on the chicken-and-egg conundrum of modem American conservatism is only one of many issues
addressed to the readers' benefit in this smart and lively book.
Robert]. Norrell

University of Tennessee

Sitting In and Speaking Out: Student Movements in the American South,
1960-1970. By Jeffrey A. Turner. (Athens: University of Georgia
Press, 2010. Acknowledgements, notes, bibliography, index.
Pp. x, 380. $69.95 cloth, $24.95 paper.)
The decade from 1960 to 1970 has long been understood as
a transformational period in American higher education. As the
era began, American universities-and southern universities in
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particular-were typically characterized by a powerful adherence
to tradition. They were, by and large, calm and stable places. In the
South, Greek culture dominated many campuses. Faculty members
<!.nd administrators were usually regarded as benevolent, almost
parental figures who helped guide students into adulthood. The
daily lives of students were circumscribed by established rules and
custom. Questioning authority was not encouraged, expected or
rewarded. Campus politics tended to focus on minor issues and
operated within very narrow bounds. By 1970, this state of affairs
had changed utterly. As Jeffrey A. Turner makes clear in this fine
book, the rise of student activism profoundly changed both the
schools that were home to the students and regional politics. The
old notions of college administrators as quasi-parental authorities
became perceived as hopelessly patronizing, and on virtually every
campus students had seized at least some degree of institutional
power. By the end of the decade, campus politics were no longer
dominated by narrow matters of social life, but had expanded to
include not only substantive issues of curriculum and student freedoms but also, and most intensely, issues of national domestic and
foreign policy.
In this extremely valuable work, Turner explores the rise and
evolution of student activism on southern campuses during this
crucial decade. To say that this book fills a gap is an understatement. Although recent work on student activism in places such
as Austin, Texas, and Chapel Hill, North Carolina, has begun to
complicate the picture, most scholarship on the student movement
in the 1960s has focused on a relatively small number of schools,
mostly on the East and West Coasts and in the Midwest. The South,
which had fewer dramatic or violent confrontations between students and authorities, has largely been left out of accounts of the
era or written off as too conservative and supportive of the military
to have sustained real student political activism. And while there
certainly has been a great deal of important work done on the civil
rights activism of southern black students, these studies have tended not to explore the role of these black students as students- that
is, they have been usually (and quite properly) concerned primarily with the history of the civil rights movement rather than the
history of higher education.
Turner combines deep archival research at more than twenty
schools with a solid grounding in the secondary literature of the
history of the South, of higher education, and of the youth move-
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ments of the 1960s. The archival work is especially impressive.
Turner has dug into the records held within a broad spectrum of
schools. He includes institutions of different profiles throughout
_the region. There are major private universities such as Duke,
Emory and Tulane, major public universities such as Georgia, Alabama, and North Carolina, and historically black colleges. He has
also consulted the papers of national student groups such as the
Congress On Racial Equality (CORE), Students for a Democratic
Society (SDS) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), as well as the manuscript collections of several
prominent student activists. The result is a book of surprisingly
wide scope that gives the reader a broad understanding of the interplay of national social and cultural forces with specific regional
and local issues along with insightful descriptions of how things
played out on specific campuses across the South.
Of particular note, this volume cogently explores the rise of
organized political activity on the part of both black and white
southern students and closely follows how they intertwine over the
course of the decade. Turner locates the birth of significant student activism in the South in the struggle of black students and
their white allies to desegregate the region's institutions of higher
education. The non-violent direct action of the sit-in movement
that swept through the South in the early 1960s is where students
first truly defied the authority of their elders and become powerful, independent political actors-and on an issue of consummate
social importance. But just as clear is the continuing and pervasive
importance of race on southern campuses even after the institutions had capitulated on segregation. Students' political concerns
grew to include both substantive matters of university governance
and other regional and national issues.
Turner's wide-angle view is particularly helpful in the chapters
that describe the new, and in many ways more complicated, issues
that arose in the universities in the wake of racial desegregation.
Campuses rapidly became broadly and openly politicized. Nearly
anything and everything on and off campus became a potential
locus of disputation. Students organized to influence things they
cared about, ranging from in loco parentis rules, to women's liberation and demands for curricular changes, to ending the war in
Vietnam. The relationship between black and white activism grew
incredibly complex. Local variations in the overall regional pattern
become striking as Turner explores the (only partially successful)
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efforts by several national student organizations to build a regional
student movement, the rise of the black power and student power
movements during the middle and later parts of the decade, and
finally, the central role of opposition to the war in Vietnam in de-f ining student activism are all thoughtfully addressed.
Turner has taken on an enormous task in this work and has
deftly handled the many tangled threads of this story. The picture
that emerges of a decade of major changes on southern campuses
will be surprising to many and will also help set the agenda for future work on the history of higher education in the South.
Melissa Kean

Rice University

How Florida Happened: The Political Education of Buddy MacKay. By
Buddy MacKay with Rick Edmonds. (Gainesville: University
Press of Florida, 2010. Acknowledgements, photos, index. Pp.
xv, 208. $32.00 cloth.)

Over the past decade, historians and journalists have published a number of studies on Florida's "Golden Age" of politics,
the 1970s and early 1980s. Such studies have focused on political
leaders, such as Reubin Askew or Bob Graham. Others have examined the era as a whole, focusing on the state's transition from
rural-dominated conservative political establishment to a state led
by World War II and Korean War veterans who were younger, progressive, and urban-centered. Buddy MacKay's political memoir,
How Florida Happened: The Political Education of Buddy MacKay, is a
most welcome addition to this growing library.
MacKay spent almost thirty years serving his state at various
levels of government service. From the Florida Legislature to Lt.
Governor to the U.S. House of Representatives, MacKay's political journey and education affords him the rare ability to not only
provide the reader a glimpse of the machinations of state government from the inside, but also gives the reader a macro view of the
growth and transformation of the state, and the many ironies it produced, as well as the challenges that now face the state. The thesis
of MacKay's book is twofold. First, he asserts that the "Golden Age"
of the 1970s was brought about by these new leaders in the public
and private sectors who shared a common vision of transforming
the state from its attachment to rural-dominated conservatism to
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one that looked away from the past and to the future, with environmental concern, tax justice, fairness and ethics in government as
priorities. Second, the Golden Age succumbed to a growth age in
which the state followed a path of pursuing a course of construction and tourism paired with disregard for the environment that
led to, if not encouraged, the establishment of "the naive and immature politics of today" (4).
The transformation began as ideological purity replaced the
art of compromise and "bipartisan, nonideological problem solving" (236). Paired with the incredible drain on the state's natural
resources from almost overwhelming growth, the state drifted to
the right as a whole and came to rely politically on ideological purity and economically on tax revenue generated from construction
and tourism; two funding sources that slowly drained the state of
water, its most precious resource. MacKay's conclusion, that Florida, like California, is a "fairy tale" state awaiting a Prince to ride to
its rescue, is biting as much as it is fair and accurate. Yet, MacKay
remains optimistic that another generation of leaders reminiscent
of Askew, Graham, and Chiles will emerge to right the state's list.
Perhaps the most attractive feature of this volume is that MacKay is not providing a dry, academic-oriented examination of Florida
government. That has been done before. This is a passionate story
told by a man who cares deeply about the future of his home. This
is at once an exploration of one man's political journey and an
open letter to his fellow Floridians that it is not too late to save
the state from itself, to preserve dwindling water resources, and
to forge a new consensus that will set Florida on a more progressive and less ideological course while fulfilling the promise of its
"Golden Age."
Gordon E. Harvey

Jacksonville State University

Fifteen Florida Cemeteries: Strange Tales Unearthed. By Lola Haskins.
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2011. Illustrations,
appendices, index. Pp. x, 208. $22.50 paper.)

Cemeteries, as abodes for the dead and travel destinations for
the living (as mourners or tourists), are cultural institutions about
which much has been written. Books about cemeteries and grave
markers have been written regularly since the 1960s, when histori-
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cal archaeologists James Deetz and Edwin Dethlefsen introduced
gravestones as objects for serious scholarly study. Today, books
about cemeteries and gravestone-related topics range from serious
historical scholarship to state or regional tour guides, from fan. tastical accounts of haunted burial grounds to visual dictionaries
of monument styles and gravestone symbolism. It is perhaps due
to the diversity of publications on this subject that cemetery and
gravestone researchers continue to struggle to be taken seriously
by fellow historians. In Fifteen Florida Cemeteries, poet Lola Haskins
appears to have drawn from all publication types to develop what
is at once a fascinating and frustrating tour of Florida's history and
its burying grounds.
Organized in five parts, one for each region of Florida, Fifteen
Florida Cemeteries includes fifteen chapters, one for each cemetery
Haskins visited. The division of the chapters into five parts is especially useful for those unfamiliar with Florida and its geography.
They include Tallahassee and the Panhandle; North Central and
Northeast Florida; Central and West Central Florida; and South
Florida. Each chapter is broken into two parts; the first provides
history on the area and Haskins' reflections on what she observed,
and the second consists of a "spotlight" essay about someone or
something that is buried at the cemetery. In her explorations,
Haskins visited a variety of cemeteries, including those of early
immigrant settlers, those for particular Christian denominations,
nineteenth century "rural" garden cemeteries, a nature preserve
that hosts green burials, modern memorial parks, a pet cemetery
and a race horse cemetery.
Among the strengths of Haskins' work is her absorbing narrative style. A poet by vocation, Haskins displays her ability to engage
in detailed storytelling and in so doing, brings life to these landscapes of the dead. Her accounts of conversations with cemetery
workers or neighbors provide particularly colorful accounts of how
many of the cemeteries were established and the relationship Floridians have with their dead.
There are many state or regional cemetery tour guide-style
books currently in publication, ranging from Maine to California,
and this book represents the first major offering to this end for
Florida. For lay readers, Haskins provides a useful introduction to
Florida's history from Spanish colonization to the present, providing background on settler communities, Florida's role during the
Civil War, race-relations and segregation during the Jim Crow era,
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as well as a number of natural disasters- most notably hurricanes
-that struck the state during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Writing with great emotion for the people and animals buried
_within the cemeteries she visited, Haskins humanizes these cultural
landscapes in a way that is often forgotten and this book may be
effective at fostering an interest among non-researchers for the
subject. For those interested in visiting the cemeteries highlighted
in the book, Appendix I includes the names and addresses of all
fifteen locations.
The strengths of this book for a non-professional audience
aside, Fifteen Florida Cemeteries is a work neither of cemetery nor of
historical scholarship. There is much history in this book, but as
Haskins herself confesses in the Preface, she is not a professional
historian. According to Haskins, "I wrote this book for love: because
I love my state and its history and because I love stories" (viii). In
lieu of a bibliography, Appendix II, entitled "Further Reading," is
her list of sources, but it is not clear if the list is a representative
sample, or all of Haskins' research materials. A further weakness is
the complete absence of citations, either in the form of footnotes
or endnotes. Haskins clearly did much research, but unfortunately, cites none of it. As she writes of the thoughts and emotions of
people in her spotlight essays, one constantly wonders "how does
she know that?"
Cemetery and gravestone specialists will be particularly frustrated with this book, for it is clear that Haskins did little to no
research concerning the history and evolution of these cultural
landscapes or the markers contained within. While she does offer
particularly useful and interesting material on the history of the
Woodmen of the World gravestones (23-24), and of the individual
cemeteries she visited, there is little on how the different cemeteries are situated within the broader historical context of cemetery
development. For example, in her chapter devoted to the Manasota Memorial Park in Bradenton, which is home to the remains
of circus magnate John Ringling, Haskins comments that "the
uniformity of the grave sites felt stifling" (180) and criticizes the
"numbing sameness" found in so many similar modern cemeteries
(184). While many would in all likelihood agree with these statements, such comments nevertheless betray a lack of understanding
as to how places of burial developed in such a way to the point
where uniformity and a lack of ostentation are now almost universally required.
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The absence of historical context for cemetery evolution over
time is harmless for a general audience, but Haskins' lack of research on the subject of cemeteries in general does result in her
_m aking, at times, troubling and potentially dangerous statements.
For example, in the chapter devoted to Mount Horeb Cemetery
in Pinetta, Haskins describes the community's decision to rehabilitate and clean up the neglected burying place, and notes with
admiration how the citizens "even [got] down on their hands and
knees to scrub the gravestones with bleach" (21). Gravestone conservators who read this book will understand the problem with this
statement, knowing that one should never use bleach to clean a
gravestone. A casual reader may get the wrong idea and start using
bleach on their own local gravestones.
An entertaining tour of Florida's history and its places of burial, Fifteen Florida Cemeteries weaves together fascinating stories of
deceased Floridians with their places of burial. General audiences,
whether from Florida or not, will learn much, while researchers
will have a useful starting point for further explorations.
Joy M. Giguere
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End Notes
FLORIDA FRONTIERS: THE WEEKLY RADIO MAGAZINE OF
THE FLORIDA HISTORICAL SOCIETY
Florida Frontiers: The Weekly Radio Magazine of the Florida Historical
Society is a weekly, half-hour radio program currently airing on pub-

lic radio stations around the state. The program is a combination of
interview segments and produced features covering history-based
events, exhibitions, activities, places, and people in Florida. The
program explores the relevance of Florida history to contemporary
society and promotes awareness of heritage and culture tourism
options in the state. Florida Frontiers joins the Florida Historical Quarterly and the publications of the Florida Historical Society Press as
another powerful tool to fulfill the Society's mission of collecting
and disseminating information about the history of Florida.
Recent broadcasts of Florida Frontiers have included visits to
the Grove in Tallahassee, the Marco Island Historical Museum,
and the former Tampa Bay Hotel. Discussions about the archaeological excavation of Fort Lane, the theatrical presentation Female
Florida: Historic Women in Their Own Words, and Prehistoric medical practices in Florida have been featured. We've explored the
Greek sponge diving culture of Tarpon Springs, the historic Mrican-American community of Eatonville, and the first permanent
European settlement of St. Augustine. Upcoming programs will
take us to the home of Harriet Beecher Stowe, the site of Florida's
oldest shipwreck, and Mission San Luis.
Florida Historical Society Executive Director Ben Brotemarkle
is producer and host of Florida Frontiers, with weekly contributions
from assistant producers Janie Gould and Bill Dudley. From 19922000, Brotemarkle was creator, producer, and host of the hour-long
weekly radio magazine The Arts Connection on 90.7 WMFE in Orlando. In 2005, Gould became Oral History Specialist at 88.9 WQCS
[245]
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in Ft. Pierce. Since 1993, Dudley has been producing an ongoing
series of radio reports for the Florida Humanities Council.
The program is currently broadcast on 90.7 WMFE Orlando,
Thursdays at 6:30 p.m and Sundays at 4:00 pm.; 88.1 WUWF Pensacola, Thursdays at 5:30p.m.; 89.9 ~CT Jacksonville, Mondays at
6:30 pm; 89.5 WFIT Melbourne, Sundays at 7:00 a.m.; 88.9 WQCS
(HD2) Ft. Pierce, Wednesdays at 9:00a.m.; 90.7 WPBI West Palm
Beach, Sundays at 7:00 p.m; 89.1 WUFT Gainesville, Sundays at
7:30 a.m.; and 90.1 ~UF Inverness, Sundays at 7:30 a.m. Additional public radio stations are expected to add Florida Frontiers to
their schedule in the coming year. The program is archived on the
Florida Historical Society web site and accessible any time at www.
myfloridahistory.org.
Florida Frontiers: The Weekly Radio Magazine of the Florida Historical
Society is made possible in part by the Florida Humanities Council

and the National Endowment for the Humanities; the Jessie Ball
duPont Fund; and by the Brevard County Board of Commissioners
through the Brevard Cultural Alliance, Inc.
FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY PODCASTS

The Florida Historical Quarterly has entered a new era of media. Dr. Robert Cassanello, Assistant Professor of History at the
University of Central Florida and a member of the FHQ editorial board, has accepted a new role as the coordinator for podcast
productions. In conjunction with the Public History programs at
UCF, Dr. Cassanello will produce a podcast for each issue of the
Quarterly. Each podcast will consist of an interview with one of the
authors from the most recent issue of the Quarterly. The podcasts
are uploaded to iTunes University and are available to the public at
http: / / publichistorypodcast.blogspot.com/ .
Dr. Jack E. Davis on his article "Sharp Prose for Green: John
D. MacDonald and the First Ecological Novel," which appeared in
Volume 87, no. 4 (Spring 2009).
Dr. Michael D. Bowen on his article "The Strange Tale ofWesley and Florence Garrison: Racial Crosscurrents of the Postwar
Florida Republican Party" appeared in Volume 88, no. 1 (Summer
2009).
Dr. Nancy]. Levine discussed the research project undertaken
by her students on the Hastings Branch Library that appeared in
Volume 88, no. 2 (Fall 2009) .

.·:
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Dr. Daniel Feller, 2009 Catherine Prescott Lecturer, on "The
Seminole Controversy Revisited: A New Look at Andrew Jackson's
1919 Florida Campaign," Volume 88, no. 3 (Winter 2010).
Dr. Derrick E. White, on his article "From Desegregation to Integration: Race, Football, and 'Dixie' at the University of Florida,"
Volume 88, no. 4 (Spring 2010).
Dr. Gilbert Din was interviewed to discuss his article "William Augustus Bowles on the Gulf Coast, 1787-1803: Unraveling a
Labyrinthine Conundrum," which appeared in Volume 89, no. 1
(Summer 2010).
Deborah L. Bauer, Nicole C. Cox, and Peter Ferdinanda on
graduate education in Florida and their individual articles in Volume 89, no. 2 (Fall 2010).
Jessica Clawson, "Administrative Recalcitrance and Government Intervention: Desegregation at the University of Florida,
1962-1972," which appeared in Volume 89, no. 3 (Winter 2011).
Dr. Rebecca Sharpless, "The Servants and Mrs. Rawlings: Martha Mickens and Mrican American Life at Cross Creek," which
appeared in Volume 89, no. 4 (Spring 2011).
Dr. James M. Denham, "Crime and Punishment in Antebellum
Pensacola," which appeared in Volume 90, no. 1 (Summer 2011).
FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLYJOINSJSTOR

The Florida Historical Quarterly is now available to scholars and
researchers through JSTOR, a digital service for libraries, archives,
and individual subscribers. JSTOR editors spent more than a year
digitizing FHQ volumes 3-83; it became available to academic libraries and individual subscribers in August 2009. The FHQ has
reduced the 5-year window to a 3-year window for greater access.
More recent issues of the Quarterly are available only in print copy
form. JSTOR has emerged as a leader in the field of journal digitization and the FHQjoins a number of prestigious journals in all
disciplines. The Florida Historical Quarterly will continue to be available through PALMM, with a 5-year window.
FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY NOW ON FACEBOOK

Join the Florida Historical Quarterly on Face book. The FHQ Facebook page provides an image of each issue, the table of contents
of each issue, an abstract of each article (beginning with volume
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90, no. 1). There will be a link to the Quarterly podcasts and the
Florida Historical Society.
2011-2012 Florida Lecture Series produced by the Lawton M.
Chiles Jr., Center for Florida History at Florida Southern College

November 17

Hon. John Antoon Gudge, U. S. District Court,
Middle District of FL)

"American Courts: State and Nation"
January 19

Lu Vickers (Professor, Tallahassee Community
College)

"Cypress Gardens: America's Tropical
Wonderland"
February 16

Tracy Jean Revels (Professor of History, Wofford
College)

"Sunshine Paradise: A History of Florida
Tourism"
March 29

Isabel Wilkerson (Professor of Journalism and
Director of Nonfiction, Boston University)

"The Warmth of Other Suns: the Epic Story of
America's Great Migration and the Odyssey of
George Swanson Starling"
***Information about the programs can be obtained by calling
the Lawton M. Chiles, Jr. Center for Florida History at (863) 6803001 or by calling James M. Denham at (863) 680-4312 or visiting
us on the web at www.flsouthern.edu / flhistory
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THE ZORA NEALE HURSTON IN BREVARD COUNTY
EXHffiiTION

On July 9, 1951, writer, folklorist, and anthropologist Zora
Neale Hurston wrote in a letter to Florida historian Jean Parker
Waterbury: "Somehow, this one spot on earth feels like home to
me. I have always intended to come back here. That is why I am
doing so much to make a go of it."
It would be natural to assume that Hurston was writing about
her adopted hometown of Eatonville, Florida. Growing up in the
oldest incorporated municipality in the United States entirely
governed by Mrican Americans instilled in Hurston a fierce confidence in her abilities and a unique perspective on race. Eatonville
figures prominently in much of Hurston's work, from her powerful 1928 essay How It Feels To Be Colored Me to her acclaimed 1937
novel Their Eyes Were Watching God. For the past twenty-two years,
the Association to Preserve the Eatonville Community (P.E.C.) has
celebrated their town's most famous citizen with the annual Zora
Neale Hurston Festival of the Arts and Humanities. Hurston will
forever be associated with the historic town of Eatonville.
But Hurston was not writing about Eatonville when she spoke
of "the one spot on earth [that] feels like home to me" where she
was "the happiest I have been in the last ten years" and where she
wanted to "build a comfortable little new house" to live out the rest
of her life.
Unknown to most, Zora Neale Hurston called Brevard County
"home" for some of the happiest and most productive years of her
life. Through a new traveling exhibition called Zora Neale Hurston in
Brevard County, an accompanying Curriculum Guide for Teachers,
and ancillary web-based materials, the Florida Historical Society
will highlight this little known aspect of Zora Neale Hurston's life
and career. When not traveling to other venues, the exhibit of
photographs, letters, and other memorabilia and artifacts will be
displayed at the Historic Roesch House in Eau Callie, across the
street from the Rossetter House Museum and Gardens, just blocks
from where Hurston lived.
Brevard County has a rich and varied history. It is known as
the site of the 7,000 year-old Windover Mortuary Pond, one of the
most significant archaeological discoveries in the world; the home
of educator and activist Harry T. Moore, the first martyr of the contemporary Civil Rights Movement; and the launch pad for every
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manned space flight from the United States. Fewer people are
aware, however, of the significant history relating to Zora Neale
Hurston in Brevard County.
For example, Hurston first moved to Eau GaBie in 1929, where
she was very productive. Here she wrote the book of Mrican American folklore Mules and Men (published in 1935), documented
research she had done in Florida and New Orleans to fill an entire
issue of the Journal of American Folklore, and made significant progress on some of her theatrical pieces.
Mter returning to New York in late 1929, Hurston came back
to Eau GaBie in 1951, moving into the same cottage where she had
lived previously. While living in Eau GaBie between 1951 and 1956,
Hurston staged a concert at Melbourne High School (its first integrated event); worked on the project that became her passion,
the manuscript for Herod the Great, covered the 1952 murder trial
of Ruby McCollum (an Mrican American woman who killed her
white lover); and wrote an editorial for the Orlando Sentinel arguing
against the Brown v. Board of Education decision. Her controversial disapproval of public school integration reflects her belief in
the need to preserve Mrican American culture and communities.
When Hurston was unable to purchase her much loved Eau
GaBie cottage, she moved to an efficiency apartment in Cocoa
Beach, while working as a librarian in Satellite Beach. In June,
1956, Hurston moved from the apartment to a mobile home on
Merritt Island. She was fired from her job in May 1957, because
she was "too well-educated for the job." She then left her happy
life in Brevard County to take a job at the Chronicle in Fort Pierce,
where she died three years later. All of this and more will be documented in the Zora Neale Hurston in Brevard County exhibition and
ancillary materials.
With funding from the Florida Humanities Council, The Florida Historical Society plans to complete the Zora Neale Hurston in
Brevard County exhibition in late 2011.
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William Stetson Kennedy 1915-2011. Image courtesy of Florida
Historical Society.

Stetson Kennedy and the Pursuit of Truth:
Facing South, The Institute for Southern
Studies
by Paul Ortiz
tetson Kennedy passed away today (August 27, 2011). He was
94 years old. Stetson died peacefully, in the presence of his
beloved wife Sandra Parks at Baptist Medical Center South in
St. Augustine, Florida. 1
Stetson Kennedy spent the better part of the 20th century doing battle with racism, class oppression, corporate domination,
and environmental degradation in the American South. By midcentury Stetson had become our country's fiercest tribune of hard
truths; vilified by the powerful, Stetson did not have the capacity to
look away from injustice. His belief in the dignity of the South's
battered sharecroppers, migrant laborers, and turpentine workers
made him the region's most sensitive and effective folklorist. 2
Stetson was so relentless, so full of life, that some of us thought
that he would trick death the way that he had once fooled the

S

Paul Ortiz is Associate Professor of History at the University of Florida, where he
is also the Director of the Samuel Proctor Oral History Program. He is the author
of Emancipation Betrayed: The Hidden History of Black Organizing and White Violence in
Florida from Reconstruction to the Bloody Election of 1920, which won the Harry T. and
Harriette V. Moore Book Prize from the Florida Historical Society.
"Stetson Kennedy Dies: Author and Civil Rights Activist was 94, wrote 'The
1.
Klan Unmasked,"' The St. Augustine Record, August 28, 2011.
2.
StetsonKennedy.com, "Palmetto Country," http:/ / www.stetsonkennedy.com /
palmetto.htm (accessed August 28, 2011).
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Ku Klux Klan into exposing their lurid secrets to the listeners of
the Adventures of Superman radio program in 1947. As recently as
April, Stetson gave a fiery speech to hundreds of farm workers and
their supporters at a rally in support of the Coalition of Immokalee Workers in Tampa. Standing in solidarity with Latina/ o and
Haitian agricultural workers affirmed Stetson's ironclad belief in
the intersections between labor organizing, racial justice, and economic equity. 3
Stetson Kennedy has been called Florida's Homer. He was an
epic bard of the South, and his prose was fiery and uncompromising. In the now immortal Southern Exposure (1946) he waged war on
the "hate-mongers, race-racketeers, and terrorists who swore that
apartheid must go on forever." Reading Southern Exposure sixty-five
years after its initial publication is an electrifying experience. While
the South's lickspittle politicians presented the region to northern
capitalists as a place to exploit people and resources, Stetson understood that real economic development could not occur until
Jim Crow had been smashed. Southern Exposure was a declaration
of war against white supremacy and corporate rule in the South.
Sandra Parks aptly observed that, "Stetson Kennedy was a walking
around reminder of the principle ... that people's basic decency
outweighed the customs, laws, misconceptions and violence of racism. Although millions of white Southerners were uneasy about
segregation, Stetson was among the few who took the risks of direct
action against it." 4
In assessing the scope and scale of Stetson Kennedy's life it is
clear that he was one of the outstanding personalities of United
States history. Over the course of his illustrious career he worked
with many of the giants of the 20th century including Simone de
Beavoir, Jean Paul Sartre, Richard Wright, Lillian Smith, Woody
Guthrie, Zora Neale Hurston, Myles Horton, Virginia Durr, Alan
Lomax, Maijorie Kinnan Rawlings, Erskine Caldwell (who edited
his first book) as well as Florida's beloved freedom fighters and
martyrs Harry T. and Harriette V. Moore.
3.
4.

Coalition of Immokalee Workers, http: / / www.ciw-online.org/ (accessed
August 28, 2011).
"Florida's Homer, Folkorist Stetson Kennedy, Dies at age 94," http: //www.
tam pabay. com/ news/ environment/ wildlife I floridas-h omer-folklorist-stetsonkennedy-dies-at-age-94/ 1188450, August 28, 2011 , (accessed August 28, 2011);
"Witness for the People: Stetson Kennedy's Work Earns Him A Spot in New
Film ," The St. Augustine Record, November 30, 2009 .
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Throughout his career as a folklorist, author and community
organizer, Stetson posed tough questions to authorities that made
even many of his friends uncomfortable . He insisted upon a level
of accountability from elected officials unheard of in the one-party
South, and he demanded justice for the oppressed. The legendary
oral historian Studs Terkel put it best when he said: "With half a
dozen Stetson Kennedys, we can transform our society into one of
truth, grace and beauty." 5
Stetson Kennedy personifies what Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
was trying to get at when he stated that, "Education without social
action is a one-sided value because it has no true power potential.
Social action without education is a weak expression of pure energy.
Deeds uninformed by educated thought can take false directions.
When we go into action and confront our adversaries, we must be
armed with knowledge as they are. Our policies should have the
strength of deep analysis beneath them to be able to challenge the
clever sophistries of our opponents." 6 In the writings of Stetson
Kennedy, education and social action are constantly joined. Generations of human rights advocates have used Stetson's investigative
reporting and research to improve the conditions of agricultural
workers, women, Latinos, and many others. This onetime Southeastern Editorial Director of the CIO's Political Action Committee
blew the lid off of the worst aspects of American life even as he
magnified the best: the cultural strengths and solidarities of the
working classes irregardless of race, creed, or color.
One of the consistent threads in Stetson's work is the exceptional attention that he gave to the relationship between humans
and the natural environment. His environmentalism was grounded
in connecting the fate of turpentine and phosphate laborers to the
degradation of the lands that they worked for low wages and dangerous conditions. This was a working class environmentalism and
it is a philosophical stance that underpins the organizing being
done against mountain-top removal as well as the environmental
racism movement.

5.
6.

Studs Terkel, Letter to the Editor, The New York Times Magazine, January 22,
2006.
Martin Luther King, Jr., Where Do We Go From Here? Chaos or Community? (1967;
Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), 164.
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Fables of the Reconstruction

In 1942, Stetson published the book Palmetto Country which focuses primarily on Florida history. 7 This book contains some of
the most remarkable chapters on the history of Reconstruction
published between W.E.B. Du Bois's Black Reconstruction in 1935
and john Hope Franklin's Reconstruction after the Civil War in 1961.
To understand how revolutionary Stetson's writing was however, we
must move forward in time to 1964, the year when the state of Florida chose William Watson Davis's The Civil War and Reconstruction
in Florida as one of twelve books to celebrate the state's 400th anniversary. Davis's book had originally been published in 1913. He
was a student ofWilliam Archibald Dunning, who opposed voting
rights for Mrican Arnericans. 8
Dr. Du Bois characterized Davis's book as "standard, anti-negro."9 A reviewer noted that Davis "finds that for nine years the
State was wracked by political wrangling, violence, and mutual suspicion. The attempt to found a commonwealth government upon
the votes of an ignorant [N] egro electorate proved a failure. It
made the Solid South." In other words, this was the standard narrative of venal Carpetbaggers, race traitor scalawags, and sub-human
Mrican Americans. The state of Florida officially promoted Davis's
racist analysis of Reconstruction over fifty years after its original
publication, and esteemed UNC-Chapel Hill history professor
Fletcher Green wrote an introduction for the new edition of the
book.
Stetson's view of the Civil War and Reconstruction in Palmetto Country was radically different. In it, Mrican Americans were
treated with dignity and respect and judged by their actions not
by their racial background. So-called Redemption is depicted as a
horrific tragedy, not as a progressive, inevitable fact. Class differences between whites were carefully examined. The Civil War is no
longer covered with the self-destructive myth of the "Lost Cause,"
7.
8.

9.

Stetson Kennedy, Palmetto Country (New York: Sloan & Pearce, 1942).
Paul Ortiz, "The Not So Strange Career ofWilliam Watson Davis's The Civil War
and Reconstruction in Florida," in Looking Back Without Anger: New Appraisals of
'the Dunning School' and Its Contributions to the Study ofAmerican History, edited by
John David Smith andj. Vincent Lowery. (Lexington: University of Kentucky
Press, forthcoming 2012).
W.E.B. DuBois, Black Reconstruction in America: An Essay Toward a History of the
Part Which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America,
1860-1880 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1935) , 731.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol90/iss2/1

138

Society: Florida Historical Quarterly, Volume 90, Number 2

END NOTES

255

but instead becomes, "A Rich Man's War, and a Poor Man's Fight."
Equally important, Stetson paid attention to the role that northern
robber barons played in corrupting Florida politics into the Gilded
· Age, thus anticipating C. Van Woodward's Origins of the New South
( 1951) by several years.
Stetson deepened this analysis in Southern Exposure, noting
that, "Prior to the Civil War, the despoilers of the South were the
small class of slave-driving large planters. Since the Civil War, the
parasites who have enriched themselves beyond measure through
the impoverishment of the South's people are predominantly corporate interests, the main body of them being situated outside the
South, with tentacles sucking at the region through Southern 'representatives.'"
Not surprisingly, the state's premier historical publication,
the Florida Historical Quarterly did not review Palmetto Country. To
have done so would have meant to call into question the existing
academic interpretation of Reconstruction in the United States.
Stetson recalled that, "My first book, Palmetto Country, appeared at
the outset of the war. Charged by someone to pick it to pieces,
Florida academia concluded sadly that it could find no error."
Anticipating a major argument of his Mter Appomattox: How
the South Won the Civil War ( 1995) Stetson demonstrated the culpability of the academics in perpetuating racism and bolstering
interpretations of American history that helped keep the racial and
class status quo in place.
Southern Exposure

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, Stetson Kennedy
played a critical role in the labor and civil rights movements by exposing injustices that most Alnericans took for granted. His work
with the CIO in Atlanta began during the war, and he immediately
sought to educate rank-and-file workers on the evils of the poll tax,
and the importance of building interracial industrial unionism in
the South. It is too easy to forget the types of risks that Stetson's
generation took in challenging American apartheid. In a letter to
Southern Changes, published in the 1990s, Stetson recalled, "Back
then, no hint of dissent, no matter how slight, could take refuge
behind the liberal shield, but was promptly branded as arch-radical and positively subversive. The Klan said the Bible said that Jim
Crow was God's will and therefore eternal, and anyone, white or
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black, who dared say nay thereby made themselves a likely candidate for social, economic, and even rope lynching."
Southern Exposure is considered to be a milestone of the early
!llodern civil rights movement era. In this book, Stetson demonstrated that "prejudice is made, not born," and he drew upon
Mrican American voices and experiences to prove that segregation was both separate and unequal. Racism was immoral, and it
culturally damaged all Americans and undermined southern economic development. He also carefully teased out the connections
between racial inequality, and economic injustice.
Equally important, Stetson showed the myriad ways in which
northern capital profited from southern poverty and racism. The
research underpinning the book is awe inspiring. Stetson developed a special skill in mining hundreds of pages of statistics,
obscure government reports, and other records to illustrate his
points. Several decades later he recalled that, "No matter how you
looked at it, the 1930 Census was a revolutionary document. Not
only the statistics, but the bowlegs of pellagra attested that the
American South was one of the major hunger areas of the world ....
The honest observer had no choice but to characterize the South
as a feudalistic, colonial, undeveloped, largely illiterate, diseaseriddenjim Crow apartheid society ruled by a racist one-party white
oligarchy. (And so I did.)"
Southern Exposure was rooted in a radical tradition of southern
truth-telling that included T. Thomas Fortune's Black and White:
Land, Labor, and Politics in the South (1884) ,Joseph C. Manning's Rise
and Reign of the Bourbon Oligarchy (1904), and William H. Skaggs's
The Southern Oligarchy (1924). With the publication of Southern Exposure, Stetson helped to transform what had been thought to be
a series of "regional" problems (racism, poverty, economic underdevelopment) into a national crusade to save the American dream.
A reviewer in the Boston Chronicle observed, "As Uncle Tom's Cabin
became one of the greatest single forces in the eventual overthrow
of slavery, so can Southern Exposure play a major role in freeing the
country of segregation."
The Jim Crow Guide: A Landmark in American Literature
Stetson Kennedy paid dearly for his investigative journalism:
his home was firebombed, and his life was repeatedly threatened.
Powerful forces, ranging from Mississippi senator Theodore Bilbo
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(author of the book Take Your Choice: Separation or Mongrelization)
to Forbes Magazine, despised Stetson because of his stance against
corporate interests. It is rumored that arch-racist Bilbo's very last
_words in 1947 involved a lament that Stetson Kennedy and Lillian
Smith were undermining the white South.
It is easy to forget that when Stetson first infiltrated the Ku
Klux Klan it occupied a storied place in the white American imagination. Hollywood films from Birth of a Nation to Gone with the
Wind promoted reverence for the "Hooded Americans." Stetson
revealed an organization that was in fact based on racist and antilabor violence as well as municipal corruption. Noted journalist
Drew Pearson called Stetson "our Nation's No. 1 Klan-buster." Historian Gary Mormino notes, "Stetson Kennedy is lucky to be alive ...
He was one of the most hated men in America." Mter feeding the
Klan's secret codes to the 4.5 million listeners of Radio's Adventures of Superman in 1947, one of the KKK's leaders famously stated,
"Kennedy's ass is worth $1,000 a pound!" Stetson did as much as
any writer or activist in history to thoroughly discredit the Klan and
to demonstrate to the public that this was an organization dedicated more to the principles of Nazism than Americanism.
Stetson Kennedy had the intelligence, and the wherewithal
to become a successful businessman, a respectable journalist, or
a writer living a comfortable and safe middle-class life. Instead, he
cast his lot with the impoverished, the people Herman Melville
called "The meanest mariners, renegades, and castaways" of American society. His writing on behalf of oppressed minorities cost him
dearly and Stetson had to flee the United States in the 1950s due to
threats of physical violence and the increasing pall ofMcCarthyism.
This was not a man who ever quietly went into the night, however.
In France, Kennedy earned an audience with the philosopher and
Nobel Laureate Jean Paul Sartre, who in turn helped Stetson publish The jim Crow Guide. Simon de Beauvoir was the book's editor. 10
The jim Crow Guide was published in 1956. This guidebook,
based in large part on oral history field work in Florida, was an uncompromising polemic against white supremacy and for universal
human rights. Sartre enthused that this was, "A history of the United States that is 'almost incredible'-sensibly different from that
10.

Stetson Kennedy, jim Crow Guide to the U.S.A.: The Laws, Customs, and Etiquette
Governing the Conduct of Nonwhites and other Minorities as Second-Class Citizens
(London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1959) .
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put forth by official manuals." A European critic added, "Books
such as this oblige us to look and think ... It is impossible to remain
indifferent after reading [it] ." 11
In Jim Crow Guide, Stetson demonstrates that white supremacy
was aimed at Latinos as much as it was aimed atMrican Americans.
In fact, I would count Stetson, along with Ernest Galarza, as one of
the pioneering scholars ofJuan Crow as well as Jim Crow. Certainly,
jim Crow Guide deserves to be treated as one of the key texts in U.S.
history. Stetson seamlessly connects race, class, and national origin
discrimination together into chapters on forced labor, marriage
laws, and voting, etc. Stetson understood racism as a national problem, not a distinctively southern issue. As he told noted historian
John Egerton years later, "Well, I'm sure you're as much aware as
I am that we're not really talking South, we're talking about the
nation, and that segregation had permeated the nation. Even legalized and compulsory segregation was not confined to the South." 12
Anticipating Leon Litwack's North of Slavery (1965), the Jim
Crow Guide challenges the idea of America as a "melting pot" and
states to the contrary, "that the ingredients which have gone into
the pot have been carefully screened for whiteness." He thus set
the stage for generations of later scholarship on whiteness by Alexander Saxton, David Roediger, and Cheryl Harris. In her 1993
essay, "Whiteness as Property," Harris states that. "In ways so embedded that it is rarely apparent, the set of assumptions, privileges,
and benefits that accompany the status ofbeingwhite have become
a valuable asset that whites sought to protect and that those who
passed sought to attain- by fraud if necessary. Whites have come to
expect and rely on these benefits, and over time these expectations
have been affirmed, legitimated, and protected by the law." 13 This
is an analysis confirmed repeatedly four decades earlier in Stetson'sjim Crow Guide. I believe that that this book should be studied
alongside Howard Thurman's Luminous Darkness: A Personal Interpretation oftheAnatomy of Segregation and the Ground of Hope, W.E.

11.

l!.aitions de Minuit book review on back cover of Stetson Kennedy, jim Crow
Guide: The Way it Was (Boca Raton: Florida Atlantic University Press, 1990).
12. John Egerton oral history interview with Stetson Kennedy, May 11 , 1990.
Interview A-0354. Southern Oral History Program Collection, University of
North Carolina, Chapel Hill, p. 9.;John Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day: The
Generation BejoTe the Civil Rights Movement in the South ( ew York: Knopf, 1994).
13. Cheryl Harris, "Whiteness as Property," Haroard Law Review 106 Qune 1993),
1710-1793.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol90/iss2/1

142

Society: Florida Historical Quarterly, Volume 90, Number 2
END NOTES

259

B. DuBois's Black Reconstruction, and Oliver Cromwell Cox's Caste,
Class, and Race as lodestones for the understanding of the creation
and recreation of white supremacy into our own time.
Unveiling Modern-Day Slavery
In the midst of the Cold War, the U.S. State Department
claimed that, "The United States Constitution and laws contain
effective safeguards against the existence of forced labor." In this
conception, modern-day slavery was a problem in other countries
and continents, but surely not in the United States. Stetson knew
better. He spent hundreds of hours on the road with a recorder
talking with agricultural workers who lived in slavery conditions
throughout Florida and the southeast. He talked with workers who
lived under the constant threat of physical violence and murder if
they dared to leave their employer's orchards. He also combed the
U.S. Government's own studies on migrant labor to find and document cases of peonage involving Mexican, Filipino, and Japanese
migrant laborers in California and the southwest.
When Stetson appeared before the United Nations Commission on Forced Labor in Geneva in 1952, he presented stacks of
oral recordings, government reports, and state-based studies that
demonstrated that brutal exploitation was a chronic experience in
American agriculture. "Peonage or debt slavery has by no means
disappeared from our land," Stetson testified. "There are more
white people involved in this diabolical practice than there were
slaveholders ... the method is the only thing which has changed." He
continued, "Forced laborers in the U.S.A. are not prisoners of war
or persons convicted of some crime against the state, but rather
are 'guilty' only of belonging to some vulnerable racial, economic, national, or occupational group ... Moreover, their labor is not
dedicated to the public welfare, but is exploited purely for private
pr?fit." In many ways, this research was even more explosive than
his better-known work in exposing the Ku Klux Klan.
Outcast

Verily I say unto you. No prophet is accepted in his own country."
-Luke 4:24
Stetson told John Egerton that, "It's true that I've always felt
like an alien in the land of my birth, so to speak, but this was in
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cultural terms, as well as racial or political or any of those things."
As Edward W. Said noted, this sense of marginality has driven the
best writing of the past century. It has animated the works of writers
as diverse as James Baldwin, Luis Rodriguez, and Edwidge Danticat
-a nd it is present in all of Stetson's work. He recalled a particularly
painful conversation early on at his family table where one of his
sisters said "I do believe you'd rather be with niggers than with us."
To which Stetson replied: "As a matter of fact, I would." 14
Stetson brought this sense of marginality to the University of
Florida in the 1930s. He took a writing class with famed novelist
Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings, but not much else about university life
in conservative Gainesville interested him. In an interview with
Diane Roberts, Stetson remembered being exasperated by the "'politically illiterate' university, blissfully unengaged with the struggles
against fascism in Europe and the forced labor that had replaced
official slavery in the South ... 'I guess I invented independent studies,' says Kennedy. "'I dropped out. "' 15
In 1937, the unemployed writer got a job working with the Federal Writer's Project of the Works Progress Administration. It was
here, that Stetson became a friend and collaborator of novelist and
anthropologist Zora Neale Hurston. Together, Kennedy and Hurston gathered, preserved, and promoted unbelievably rich veins of
labor lore, folk songs, Mrican proverbs and tall tales in Florida. Hurston and Kennedy were brilliant folklorists because they were more
interested in listening to people than in studying them. All the while,
they understood the grim realities behind the labor conditions that
their informants toiled under. Kennedy told Diane Roberts that,
"Zora and I were at a turpentine camp near Cross City where we met
this octogenarian who'd been born 'on the turp'mntine.' I asked
why he didn'tjust leave, and he said 'the onliest way out is to die out'
and you have to die 'cause if you tries to leave they'll kill you.'" 16
Stetson's political campaigns in Florida for the U.S. Senate and
for governor are the stuff oflegend. Needless to say, he did not win.
However, these campaigns exposed the base level of corruption in
Florida politics. To put it rather mildly, political pluralism is not a
well-established tradition in the Sunshine State. Lost ballot boxes,
14.
15.

16.

Egerton oral history interview with Kennedy.
Diane Roberts, "The Ballad of Stetson Kennedy," The St. Petersburg Times
Online, March 7, 2004, http:/ / www.sptimes.com/ 2004/ 03/ 07 / Perspective/
DIANE_ROBERTS.shtml (accessed May 15, 2011).
Diane Roberts, "The Ballad of Stetson Kennedy."
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Gerrymandering and intimidation at the polls are. 17 When Stetson
ran for Senate in 1950, his campaign platform slogans included:
"Right Supremacy, Not White Supremacy," "Total Equality," and
.other very un-Florida sentiments. What kind of Florida would we
be living in today if Stetson Kennedy had been elected senator or
governor? Woody Guthrie's campaign song for Stetson gives us a
clue:
"I aint' the world's best writer nor the worlds best speller
But when I believe in something I'm the loudest yeller
If we fix it so's you can't make money on war
We'll all forget what we're killing folks for
We'll find us a peace job equal and free
Dump Smathers-Dupont in a salty sea
Well, this makes Stetson Kennedy the man for me." 18
-Woody Guthrie,
"Stetson Kennedy"
An Enduring Influence

When the incredibly vibrant social movements of the 1960s
did not bring the Revolution, Stetson was neither surprised nor
anguished; he simply kept unleashing journalistic barrages against
the corrupt system of economics and governance in the United
States. Stetson's meticulous study of American institutions inoculated him against burnout. Years of research taught him that the idea
of American exceptionalism-the notion of the US as a uniquely
democratic state with some minor problems that could be fixed
by wise leaders or well-meaning college students-was nonsense.
The nation was born with severe defects which included the dispossession of Native Americans, racial slavery, white nationalism and
an increasingly suffocating corporate control. Stetson Kennedy believed in the promise of democracy and equality (these were one

17. Julian Pleasants, Hanging Chads: The Inside Story of the 2000 Presidential Recount
in Florida (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Ben Green, Before His Time:
The Untold Story of Harry T Moore, Americas First Civil Rights Martyr (New York:
Free Press, 1999); Paul Ortiz, Emancipation Betrayed: The Hidden History of Black
Organizing and White Violence in Florida from Reconstruction to the Bloody Election of
1920 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).
18. Matt Soergel, "Listen to 'Stetson Kennedy' by Woody Guthrie and Billy Bragg,"
Jacksonville. com (accessed August 29, 2011).
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in the same for him) but he also knew that these ideals had never
been achieved in the United States-even among and between
white people.
His essays for Southern Changes in the 1980s were especially effective in revealing the more subtle forms of racism that flourished
during the Reagan era. "Except for the black ghetto, Jim Crow has
been dumped upon the ash heap of history," Stetson wrote in 1989.
"And yet, I submit, where once we had segregated racism, we now
have desegregated racism." This was classic Stetson. While others
celebrated "progress" Stetson pointed out the enduring flaws of
the republic. 19
Stetson did not expect accolades for pointing out what was
wrong in American life. This is another key to his longevity, and
in his refusal to quit or to become cynical. He practiced the radical tradition of Ida B. Wells, Ruben Salazar, and Upton Sinclair, a
tradition that believes that it is naive to expect thanks for exposing
the deepest flaws of the nation. Instead, the writer or community organizer finds satisfaction in the heat of the moment. In the
words of Chicano intellectual Carlos Munoz, Jr., "Life is struggle
and struggle is life, but be mindful that Victory is in the Struggle."
Works such as Jim Crow Guide, Palmetto County, and The Klan
Unmasked gave light, and generations of civil rights activists and
southern community organizers followed. When I joined the board
of the Institute for Southern Studies in the 1990s, I came across
the following statement by Bob Hall: "At the birth of our magazine in 1973 .. . Southern Exposure emerged as the obvious choice [for
a name] ... to carry on the tradition of Stetson Kennedy's original
Southern Exposure .. . a tradition that links analysis to action, that tells
the truth and makes clear the imperative for change. We chose the
right person to follow. He is a freedom fighter, patriot and rebel,
investigator and truth-teller, a foot solider and leader in the larger
movement for a human planet."
Like most people, I discovered Stetson Kennedy relatively
late in life, well outside of the college classroom. His works are
still anathema in most southern history seminars. Like all great
prophets, he is a stranger in his own country. Some academics
are disturbed by the fact that Stetson's relentless pursuit of truth
clashes with their shameful retreat into "nuance" as if subjugation

... ~ ..

19.

Stetson Kennedy, "One Less Voice for Discrimination," Southern Changes, 11 ,
o. 4, (1989) , 16.
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can be softened by labeling it "complexity." Stetson Kennedy is not
someone we are going to find in a mainstream history book, but
he's someone we find when we are ready to strike against injustice
and inequality.
"I didn't even know Stetson's name until I was in my mid-30s,
and I consider that a travesty," Jimmy Schmidt, a staff member of
Gainesville's activist Civic Media Center recalled the day of Stetson's passing. "I'm Florida born and raised, and I feel like I should
have known Stetson's name and been taught about him as an example from when I was in elementary school." 20
Schmidt has worked indefatigably over the past several years to
help catalog Stetson's vast book collection which Stetson donated
to the Civic Media Center so that organizers and members of the
community will be able to study and read about progressive traditions for generations to come. We cannot depend on our schools
to teach our children how to dream, and organize collaboratively
for social change. Therefore, we'll have to do this work ourselves. 21
Recently, I traveled to St. Augustine to conduct an oral history
with Stetson in my capacity as director of the Samuel Proctor Oral
History Program at the University of Florida. We talked that day
about the ways that Stetson approached writing and research in
the 1930s as well as his disagreements with Lillian Smith and Gunnar Myrdal's American Dilemma, among other incredible topics. It
was a great day for story telling. I could taste and feel Caldwell's
Tobacco Road unfolding in Stetson's memory. The 94 year-old elder
became a young man again when he recalled the mentoring role
that Caldwell played in editing Palmetto Country.
I also learned that day that Stetson still mourned for his friends
Harry T. Moore and his wife Harriette, who were assassinated by
the Ku Klux Klan in Florida in 1951 because of their leadership
of voter registration campaigns. Stetson took the assassination of
the Moores as a personal blow and an affront to human dignity six
decades later.
Stetson and Sandra Parks stayed in contact with the Moore's
daughter, Evangeline, over the years. Sandra offered to give Evangeline her ticket to the inauguration of President Barack Obama in

20.
21.

"Florida Author, Knov.'ll for Infiltrating the Klan , Dies," The Gainesville Sun,
August 28, 2011.
Civic Media Center, "Stetson Kennedy Collection," https:/ / www.
civicmediacen ter.org/ collection/ stetsonkennedy (accessed August 28, 2011).
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2009 but she was unable to make the trip to Washington, D.C. due
to her rheumatism. "It has been more than half a century since my
parents were assassinated, but it has taken the election of Obama
~o make me feel that they did not die in vain," Evangeline Moore
observed. In spite of the freezing weather, and against his doctor's
advice, Stetson traveled to Washington, D.C. for the inauguration.
"I really did need to be there," he explained. "I've been campaigning for President Obama since 1932." 22
Stetson never gave up, he never stopped running. This is one
of my favorite Stetson zingers. In 2004, he told journalist Diane
Roberts, "If the Bush brothers really think that women and minorities are getting preferential treatment, they should get themselves
a sex change, paint themselves black, and check it out." 23 One of
Stetson 's intellectual strengths is that he understood that racism,
sexism and class oppression were not artifacts of the past. His perception of human social relations remained sharp to the very end.
He urged people to continue organizing unions and movements
for democracy.
I am overwhelmed with grief at Stetson's passing. I will revere
him as a mentor, a friend, and a role model for the rest of my life.
I am heartened that there are so many people today who work in
the spirit of solidarity that always animated Stetson's writing. Stetson Kennedy's pursuit of honesty, social equality, and freedom was
unparalleled. He told the stories of America's forgotten people. It
is our turn now to pick up his torch and to tell his stories for as long
as we are able to breath.

22.
23.

Susan D. Brandenburg, "Mr. Kennedy Goes to Washington ," Ponte Vedra
Recorder, February 5, 2009.
Diane Roberts, "The Ballad of Stetson Ke nned
y."
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Stetson Kennedy and the Florida Historical
Society
by Benjamin D. Brotemarkle

T

he book The Florida Slave, published by the Florida Historical
Society Press, is the last project completed by author,
activist, and folklorist Stetson Kennedy before his death on
August 27, 2011. Although he did not live to see the book in print,
he had finished his work on the manuscript and was very happy
with the cover design. The book contains interviews with ex-slaves
collected by the Works Progress Administration (WPA) Florida
Writers Project (FWP) in the 1930s, as well as the testimony of exslaves before the Joint Congressional Committee in Jacksonville
from 1871. Stetson compiled and edited the text, and wrote a
fascinating Introduction and an insightful Afterword. Like the best
of Stetson's work, The Florida Slave not only preserves an important
part of Florida history and culture, it is an impassioned call for
human rights and the ethical treatment of all people. Stetson
argues in The Florida Slave that "involuntary servitude" did not stop
with the end of the American Civil War. Writing that "there has
never been a time, since the Europeans settled here, when there
weren't people laboring beneath the Florida sun against their will,"
he encourages the reader to continue the struggle against slavery
in the twenty-first century.
Just three months before he died, Stetson Kennedy opened the
Florida Historical Society (FHS) Annual Meeting and Symposium
on May 26, 2011. The conference brought together hundreds of
historians and history enthusiasts in Jacksonville for three days of
academic paper presentations, tours of historic sites, and special
events. Having been born in Jacksonville on October 5, 1916, Stet-

Ben Brotemarkle is executive director of the Florida Historical Society and
Professor of Humanities at Brevard Community College where he has been named
Distinguished Educator and the Barnes and Noble College Booksellers Endowed
Faculty Chair of Academic Excellence . His books include Beyond the Theme Parks:
Exploring Central Florida (University Press of Florida, 1999) and Crossing Division
Street: An Oral H istory of the African American Community in Orlando (Florida Historical
Society Press, 2002).
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son was the perfect person to open the symposium with tales of
growing up in the city and his observations of race relations there
throughout the twentieth century. He expressed his pleasure with
~he fact that a special election held the week before had resulted
in Jacksonville's first Mrican American mayor, Alvin Brown, taking
office. Stetson pointed out that with the election of the city's first
black mayor, we were all watching history being made.
Stetson Kennedy's relationship with the Florida Historical
Society goes back much further than the last few months of his life.
Stetson's work documenting the history and culture of Florida was
of interest to FHS Members as soon as it began. In 1937, Stetson
left the University of Florida, where he had taken a creative writing
class from Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings, Pulitzer prize-winning author of The Yearling. He joined the WPA Florida Writers Project and
was soon named the head of the unit on folklore, oral history, and
socio-ethnic studies. At the 1937 Annual Meeting of the Florida
Historical Society, Dr. Carita Doggett Corse, Stetson's supervisor,
gave a presentation on the activities of the WPA in Florida.
From 1937 to 1942, Stetson dragged a coffee-table sized recorder he called "the thing" through the cities, towns, and rural
backwoods of Florida. Stetson said that "it took two or three good
men to lift" the recorder. He used the cumbersome device to capture the thoughts and memories of cracker cowboys, migrant farm
laborers, cigar factory workers, sponge divers, and many other diverse people. During this period Stetson was the supervisor and
friend of writer, folklorist, and anthropologist Zora Neale Hurston,
author of acclaimed novels including Their Eyes Were Watching God
(1937) as well as the collections of folklore Mules and Men (1935)
and Tell My Horse (1938). Stetson's work for the WPA resulted in
his classic Florida book Palmetto Country. The book was out of print
for almost two decades before the Florida Historical Society Press
republished it in 2009, with more than eighty period photographs
not included in previous editions as well as updated reflections by
the author.
Perhaps most striking to the contemporary Palmetto Country
reader is Stetson Kennedy's repeated suggestion, in 1942, that we
should celebrate our cultural differences rather than try to assimilate all racial and ethnic groups into one homogenous society. The
"melting pot" concept of a single, unified American culture was
the prevailing view in this country for decades after Stetson's call
for the preservation of our many unique cultural attributes. Today,
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of course, we recognize the wisdom of Stetson's multi-cultural perspective.
In his outstanding article "Stetson Kennedy and the Pursuit of
Truth," written in the days immediately following Stetson's death,
Paul Ortiz writes: "Not surprisingly, the state's premier publication,
the Florida Historical Quarterly, did not review Palmetto Country [in
1942]. To have done so would have meant to call into question the
existing academic interpretation of Reconstruction in the United
States." Stetson's book was also a pioneering work in the newly
developing field of modern oral history. Stetson's work helped
to establish the collection of oral history as a valid method of historical research among twentieth century historians. The editors
of the Florida Historical Quarterly took a conservative approach by
not endorsing Stetson's revolutionary work before oral history was
embraced as a research methodology by mainstream historians
in the following decades. In an interview for Florida Frontiers: The
Weekly Radio Magazine of the Florida Historical Society that was originally broadcast in September 2009, Stetson reflects on his role as
an early oral historian:
I am a great believer in oral history because [of what] I call ...
the "Dictatorship of the Footnote." The academicians are
quoting each other instead of going out and getting firsthand primary source material. And oral history, of course,
is [the perspective of] a participant and a witness, at least,
and seeing it with all their sensory organs, and for that reason it has more validity from my point of view.
In his 1995 book After Appomattox: How the South Won the War,
Stetson Kennedy acknowledges the Florida Historical Society and
our "support in getting my earlier works back into circulation." In
addition to Palmetto Country, those "earlier works" are the books
Southern Exposure (1946); The Klan Unmasked (1954), also published
as I Rode with the Klan; and The jim Crow Guide ( 1956). Stetson was
an activist as well as an author. His books reflect his experiences as
a participant in efforts to enact positive social change. During and
after World War II, he infiltrated the Ku Klux Klan, sharing secrets
he learned with the writers of the popular Superman radio program,
which resulted in the Man of Steel battling the KKK during four
episodes. The book Southern Exposure is a critical indictment of the
post-World War II South prior to the acceleration of the contemporary civil rights movement.
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It was during the late 1940s that Stetson Kennedy met and befriended educator and civil rights activist Harry T. Moore. Before
a bomb exploded under his home in Mims, Florida, on Christmas
night 1951, Harry T. Moore started the Progressive Voters League,
traveling throughout the state registering Mrican American voters.
He founded the Brevard County branch of the NAACP, and later
was an active state-wide leader in the organization. Harry T. Moore
and his wife Harriette both died from injuries sustained in the unprosecuted bombing of their home. Prior to his death, Moore had
offered his endorsement to Stetson Kennedy's 1950 independent
write-in campaign for U.S. Senator from Florida as a "colorblind
candidate on a platform of total equality." Folk musician Woody
Guthrie, best known for the iconic song This Land is Your Land,
wrote the campaign's theme song Stetson Kennedy, which was rediscovered and recorded by Billy Bragg & Wilco in 2000. In March
2008, a panel discussion called "Stetson Kennedy: Civil Rights Activist" was presented at the fifth annual Harry T. and Harriette V.
Moore Heritage Festival of the Arts and Humanities at Brevard
Community College. Stetson was joined by his wife, educator and
activist Sandra Parks, and Brevard County historian Rosalind Foster.
The panel was presented in conjunction with an FHS sponsored
photography exhibition called Stetson Kennedy s Palmetto Country.
The exhibition, featuring fourteen panels of images captured in
Florida in the late 1930s, was prepared by Michael Thomason of
the University of South Alabama for the Florida Historical Society.
It was Stetson Kennedy's infiltration of the Ku Klux Klan and
other white supremacist groups that earned him national and international recognition. Using the name 'John Perkins," Stetson was
able to secretly gather information that helped lead to the incarceration of a number of domestic terrorists. These experiences led
to the 1954 book I Rode With the Klan, which was later republished
under the title The Klan Unmasked. Much has been made of Stetson's
creative choice to integrate information obtained by another KKK
infiltrator and additional interviews with Klan members with his own
experiences, presenting them with one narrative voice. The accuracy of the information in his book can not be effectively challenged,
just the style in which the facts are presented. In his 2009 interview
for Florida Frontiers: The Weekly Radio Magazine of the Florida Historical
Society Stetson remembered his infiltration of the KKK
I first infiltrated during the war, when the Klan was afraid
that President [Franklin Delano] Roosevelt might pros-
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ecute them under the War Powers Act. So they didn't put
on their robes, and they changed their names to various
things like American Shores Patrol and American Gentile Army, and things like that, so that's how it all began.
And, yes, it was exciting, to put it mildly. When I went
overseas some years later, I thought I'd get away from my
nightmares, you know, of being caught. But in Paris, it was
raining frequently, and the French traffic cops wore white
rubber raincoats with capes and hoods, and their hand
signals were very much like the Klan signals, so I kept on
having nightmares.
As racial tensions were rising in the United States during the
1950s, Stetson was having difficulty getting his books exposing bigotry published. The French existentialist philosopher Jean-Paul
Sartre, best known for the play No Exit (1944), published Stetson's
book The jim Crow Guide in Paris in 1956. Feminist Simone de Beauvoir, author of the The Second Sex (1949), was Stetson's editor. While
living in Paris, Stetson became close friends with Richard Wright,
the self-exiled African American existentialist writer best known for
the novel Native Son (1940) and the semi-autobiographical Black
Boy (1945).
Despite his international travels and connections to celebrated
figures, Stetson Kennedy never forgot his roots as a native Floridian, born in Jacksonville in 1916. Stetson's contribution to the
cultural heritage of Florida spanned more than seven decades. His
most recent books are Southern FloridaFolklife (1994) with Peggy A.
Butler and Tina Bucuvalas; After Appomattox: How the South Won the
War (1995); and Grits & Grunts: Folkloric Key West (2008), winner
of the Charlton Tebeau Award from the Florida Historical Society.
Named in honor of the late Charlton W. Tebeau, longtime University of Miami history professor and author of the acclaimed book
A History of Florida, the Tebeau Award recognizes an outstanding
general interest book on a Florida history topic.
At the FHS Annual Meeting held in Pensacola May 21-23, 2009,
Stetson Kennedy and Rosalind Foster presented a well-received
special session called "Bringing Oral History to Life." "Roz" Foster
is president of the North Brevard Heritage Foundation and serves
on the Brevard County Historical Commission. The two became
friends when Stetson approached Foster about her work collecting oral histories in Mims, Florida, where Harry T. and Harriette
V. Moore had lived. While cleaning out a barn near the Moore
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home site to have the structure relocated for historic preservation,
Foster discovered the "lost" papers of Harry T. Moore. A brown
leather satchel she uncovered contained letters, event programs,
an NAACP roster, and personal notes that chronicled Moore's activities during the last years of his life. Stetson helped Foster with
her research, allowing her to make copies of all of his FBI files
relating to the investigation of the bombing of Moore's home. In
a broadcast of Florida Frontiers: The Weekly Radio Magazine of the Florida Historical Society that aired during the week following Stetson's
death, Roz Foster remembered him: "I found him a very compassionate person, a very caring person ... He wanted to search for the
truth and right wrongs in life. And I found him quite a gentleman
also."
Beginning with the FHS Annual Meeting held in St Augustine,
May 27-29, 2010, the Stetson Kennedy Award has been presented
by the Florida Historical Society for a book based on investigative
research which casts light on historic Florida events in a manner
that is supportive of human rights, traditional cultures, or the natural environment. The recipients of the inaugural Stetson Kennedy
Award were Craig Pittman and Matthew Waite for their book Paving Paradise: Florida s Wetlands and the Failure of No Net Loss (2009).
In 2011 , the Stetson Kennedy Award was presented to Irvin D.S.
Winsboro for the book Florida's Freedom Struggle: The Black Experience
from Colonial Time to the New Millennium (2010).
Stetson's work as an author, activist, and folklorist has been
deservedly well recognized. He has received the Florida Heritage
Award, the Florida Governor's Heartland Award, the NAACP Freedom Award, and has been inducted into the Florida Artist's Hall
of Fame. At the 2010 FHS Annual Meeting, Stetson Kennedy was
presented with the Dorothy Dodd Lifetime Achievement Award.
Named in honor of Dorothy Dodd, former Florida State Librarian
and longtime supporter of the Florida Historical Society, Stetson
was recognized for his lifetime of preserving Florida history and
culture and working to improve the lives of all Floridians. At the
age of 93, Stetson became visibly energized and animated when
talking of his life's work, which was still ongoing.
Although Florida is a large state, word very quickly spread of
Stetson Kennedy's passing. Via e-mail, Facebook, twitter and telephone, historians, history enthusiasts and members of the general
public expressed their love and respect for Stetson and their grief
at his death. Board members of the Florida Historical Society
('
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shared their remembrances of Stetson, including author and educator Maurice O'Sullivan, Kenneth Curry Professor of Literature
at Rollins College and editor of books including The Florida Reader:
_Visions of Paradise (with Jack Lane, 1994) and A Trip to Florida for
Health and Sport: The Lost 1855 Novel of Cyrus Parkhurst Condit (with
Wenxian Zhang, 2009):
One thing that shouldn't be lost as we all celebrate his
achievements is his humanity, his generosity towards many
of us as we were beginning our work on Florida. While we
will remember his integrity, his books, and his principled
crusades, I will always remember his willingness to give me
advice and support. Rest in peace, Stetson.

As executive director of the Florida Historical Society, I was
honored when Sandra Parks, representing the Stetson Kennedy
Trust, asked me to be "master of ceremonies" for the Celebration
of Stetson Kennedy's Life on October 1, 2011, in Beluthahatchee.
Stetson's work has long inspired my own, including two of my books
that relied heavily on oral history interviews; Beyond the Theme Parks:
Exploring Central Florida ( 1999) , and Crossing Division Street: An Oral
History of the African American Community in Orlando (2005). He offered encouragement as I began work on my forthcoming book The
Florida Quest: Discovering Our Cultural Heritage (2012). At the time
of this writing, in September 2011, the recognition of Stetson's life
is still two weeks away, but it is shaping up to be a celebration worthy of such an outstanding Floridian. The event is scheduled to
include musical performances, tributes from state, national, and
international dignitaries, the screening of a new documentary
about Stetson, and displays celebrating his work and the work of
those inspired by him. I am one of many people that Stetson has
influenced, and I was privileged to be able to call him my friend.
I am humbled that I, on behalf of the Florida Historical
Society, have been able to play a role in bringing an updated version of Stetson Kennedy's classic first book Palmetto Country (1942,
2009) to print, and to have worked toward the publication of his
last new book The Florida Slave (2011). In The Florida Slave, Stetson
remembers working with the FHS early in his career: "When the
FWP was shut down in 1942-we arranged for the Florida filesincluding the ex-slave narratives-to go to both the University of
Florida Library and the Florida Historical Society as permanent
repositories." For nearly three quarters of a century, Stetson Ken-
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nedy and the Florida Historical Society have been working toward
the same goal of protecting and preserving the fascinating history
of our state and the stories of its diverse people.
On September 25, 2009, the FHS held "An Evening with Stet-son Kennedy" at our state-wide headquarters in the Library of
Florida History in Cocoa. That night Stetson enthralled the audience with his tales of research and activism. We had hoped to have
a similar event upon the publication of The Florida Slave, but that
was not to be. Although Stetson Kennedy is gone, his important
accomplishments remain, and the Florida Historical Society will
continue working to preserve his remarkable legacy.
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GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSIONS TO THE FLORIDA
HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
_ The Florida Historical Quarterly is a peer-refereed journal and
accepts for consideration manuscripts on the history of Florida,
its people, and its historical relationships to the United States, the
Atlantic World, the Caribbean, or Latin America. All submissions
are expected to reflect substantial research, a dedication to writing, and the scholarly rigor demanded of professionally produced
historical work. Work submitted for consideration should not have
been previously published, soon to be published, or under consideration by another journal or press.
Authors should submit three copies of the manuscript to the
Florida Historical Quarterly, Department of History, CNH 551, University of Central Florida, Orlando, Florida 32816-1350.
Manuscripts should be typed and double-spaced (excluding
footnotes, block quotes, or tabular matter).
The first page should be headed by the title without the author's name. Author identification should be avoided throughout
the manuscript. On a separate sheet of paper, please provide the
author's name, institutional title or connection, or place of residence, and acknowledgements. Citations should be single-spaced
footnotes, numbered consecutively, and in accordance with the
Chicago Manual of Style.
Tables and illustrations should be created on separate pages,
with positions in the manuscript indicated.
In a cover letter, the author should provide contact information that includes phone numbers, fax number, email address, and
mailing address. The author should provide a statement of the
substance and significance of the work and identify anyone who
has already critiqued the manuscript.
Illustrations must meet the following guidelines: pictures
should be 5x7 or 8x10 black and white glossy prints; prints will
be returned after publication. Images may be submitted in EPS
or PDF electronic format at 300 dpi or higher. Xeroxed images
cannot be accepted. All illustrations should include full citations
and credit lines. Authors should retain letters of permission from
institutions or individuals owning the originals.
Questions regarding submissions should be directed to Connie L. Lester, editor, at the address above, or by email at Connie.
Lester@ucf.edu or by phone at 407-823-0261.
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Red Pepper
and Gorgeous George
Claude Pepper's Epic Defeat
in the 7950 Democratic Primary
James C. Clark
''This important and insightful work
captures the drama, controversy,
and chicanery of one of America's
most memorable elections. A
must-read for anyone interested
in Florida and southern history."

-Keith M. Finley, Southeastern
louisiana University
"A fascinating study of two important Floridians at a critical juncture in
American history. ... Clark effectively untangles the divergent strands in the
complicated story of the Florida senatorial election of 1950. Crisply written,
engagingly presented, and carefully researched, this is essential reading for
students of modern America."-William Link, author of Righteous Warrior:
Jesse Helms and the Rise of Modern Conservatism

The 2000 presidential election introduced the phrase"hanging chad" to
the national lexicon, but for those in the know the Florida "election of the
century" took place 50 years earlier.
Claude Pepper was first elected to the U.S. Senate in 1944. A Democrat, he had every reason to suspect the seat was his indefinitely. Certainly
no Republican candidate could challenge him in a general election. Pepper never counted on George Smathers.
Smathers fought a bare-knuckled campaign, employing ferocious
and divisive attacks against Pepper. He helped make"liberal" anathema
to aspiring southern politics, and was the first of a new breed of conservative politicians-though not yet Republican-to rise to power. His
resounding victory inspired others, including Richard Nixon and Barry
Goldwater, to adopt similar tactics and set the stage for a reversal of the
political power structure that had ruled the South for nearly a century.
224 pp.

I 6 x 9 I 14 b/w photos I ISBN 978-o-8130-3739-4 I Hardcover $29.95

~ University Press of Florida I 800· 226-3822 I www.upl.com
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Created in St. Augustine in 1856, The Florida Historical Society is the
oldest existing cultural organization in the state, and Florida's only state-wide
historical society. The Society is dedicated to preserving Florida's past through the
collection and archival maintenance of historical documents and photographs, the
publication of scholarly research on Florida history, and educating the public about
Florida history through a variety of public history and historic preservation projects.
We publish scholarly research in the Florida Historical Quarterly and through the
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